1. Russia’s Position vis-à-vis USA/NATO on Ballistic Missile Defense and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons Simon Saradzhyan December 2012 1

2. Russian Assessment of Missile Threats Posed by 3rd Countries: RF Government Then-Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov at MoD’s May 2012 conference on BMD: “We have concluded that it will be very difficult, if not impossible for Pyongyang and Teheran under the current conditions of international sanctions to commission intercontinental ballistic missiles.” GRU chief Igor Sergun’s presentation at the May 2012 conference on BMD : – At present it is shorter-range and tactical missiles that are mostly spread around the world. – A direct missile attack threat to leading states of the world including NATO member-states look very insignificant. – At this stage the problem of missile proliferation can and should be addressed not solely by the use of force and not through building expensive BMD assets, that are not always adequate to existing missile threats, but by engaging preventive diplomacy and strengthening arms control and non-proliferation regimes as well as reducing weapon systems. Repeated statements by Vladimir Putin and other top Russian officials: Russia has no evidence that Iran is working on nuclear weapons. 2

3. Russian Assessment of Missile Threats Posed by 3rd Countries: Expert Community EastWest Institute’s 2009 paper “Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Technical Experts: – “On basis of the technology currently available to it, Iran could hypothetically build IRBMs and ICBMs. These would be large, visible, and cumbersome systems with serious drawbacks as military missiles; in particular, they would be vulnerable to preemption.” – Iran will not be able to master independently the “critical technologies” for advanced mobile or silo-based IRBMs and ICBMs in 15 years. Ex-secretary of Security Council Andrei Kokoshin’s 2011 Belfer paper: “Series of medium-range missile tests conducted by Iran could make military and strategic sense only if such missiles were equipped with WMD, primarily with nuclear warheads.” EASI’s 2012 report: "there is sufficient consensus regarding the threat risk from medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (up to 4,500 km) to begin now to develop a response, with deployment commensurate with the progression of the threat.“ 3

4. Russia’s Assessment of U.S/NATO BMD plans: RF Government’s views: Vladimir Putin on the U.S. missile defense plans in September 2012: “The ambition is to upset the strategic balance.” Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov at MoD’s May 2012 conference on BMD: "The American missile defense system is of a global nature.” Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov in September 2012: Russia is concerned with U.S. plans to deploy a new missile defense shield in Southeast Asia. Moscow’s concerns about the situation arise from the technology involved, as well as the “geography and the US capability to deploy these assets in different locations.” Col. General Valery Gerasimov of General Staff’s May 2012 presentation: – “Concept for a BMD posture is global in character – BMD assets in Europe and in Asia Pacific Region are elements of the global BMD system primarily intended for protection of selected sites in the US territory – BMD assets pose a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force based across Russia Poland-based BMD shooters featuring third-phase performances would pose a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force, while failing to assure protection of the entire Western Europe against the threat of missile strikes from the south Close-to-Russia sea-launched BMD shooters would be posing a threat to the Russian Strategic Nuclear Force.” 4

5. Russia’s Assessment of U.S/NATO MD Plans: Industry and Expert Views Russia’s lead designer of ballistic missiles Yuri Solomonov in March 2011: "All these 'Aegis' and associated things do not present any threat to the Russian strategic nuclear forces.” "All that fuss" around U.S. missile defense elements in Europe "is totally senseless. “It is a political game and it is not very smart. Someone needs it to achieve one's goals,” he said. Ex-chief of RVSN staff Viktor Yesin in April 2012: Russian ICBM RS- 18 (SS-19 Stiletto) launched from Kozelsk, Kaluga region, in the northwestern direction could be detected by the radar at Vardo in Northern Norway and shot down by SM-3 Block II, but it would take 5 to 10 of these interceptors to shoot down one warhead. U.S. fuels Russia’s fears of BMD? – East Coast BMD proposal. – A U.S. official cited in James Acton’s 2011 paper: SM-3 Block IIBs can intercept Russian ICBM’s if deployed very close to Russia, such as in the Barents Sea. 5

6. Russia’s demands for binding guarantees: Vladimir Putin in February 2012: “We would like to receive military and technological guarantees fixed in legally binding documents. Statements like ‘don’t be afraid, we promise that nothing will happen’ are clearly insufficient in the modern world. This is childish. We need guarantees and serious agreements in the security sphere.” Vladimir Putin in September 2012 on Mitt Romney’s portrayal of Russia as America’s No.1 "geopolitical foe”:“The most important thing for us is that even if he doesn’t win now, he or a person with similar views may come to power in four years. We must take that into consideration while dealing with security issues for a long perspective.” Dmitry Medvedev in November 2011:”Our partners should realize that these guarantees cannot be general and abstract. They need to be formulated in such a way that Russia can rely not on promises, but on objective military data to determine whether the steps the United States and NATO take in developing missile defense are in line with their declarations, or whether they are infringing our interests and undermining the strategic nuclear parity, which is the foundation of global security today.” 6

7. Red lines and deadlines: Dmitry Medvedev in July 2012: “Time is gradually running out. If by 2018 we fail to reach any agreement on this issue, then we might face a new arms race, which would be an extremely negative as well as a costly and absolutely ineffective outcome for everyone.” Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov in September 2012: “When the implementation of the third and then fourth and subsequent stages of the phased adaptive approach on the [U.S.] global defense system begins, the situation could alter for us.” Then-Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov at MoD’s May 2012 conference : "A thorough analysis by the Defense Ministry's research organizations showed that once the third and fourth stages (of EPAA) are deployed, the capability to intercept Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles will be real.” Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin in November 2012: Russia will “react in the sharpest manner” to any U.S. ships equipped with the Aegis combat system attempting to sail by its shores. 7

8. Russia’s response if no BMD deal with USA: Dmitry Medvedev in November 2011: 1.“Activate an early warning radar in Kaliningrad.” 2.“Urgently strengthen its defensive capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Forces installations.” 3.ICBMs and SLBMs “will be fitted with advanced missile defense penetration systems and the latest effective warheads.” 4.“Develop a set of measures that will enable Russia… to destroy the data exchange and control centers of the missile defense system.” 5.“If the aforementioned measures prove to be insufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy, along its western and southern borders, advanced offensive systems capable of destroying the European component” of MD, including Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad. 6.“If problems persist, Russia reserves the right to refrain from taking further steps as regards disarmament and arms control. …Russia may have sufficient grounds to withdraw from the New START Treaty.” Dmitry Medvedev’s 2010 decision to establish AeroSpace Defense Forces. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin in October 2012: “The Russian response [to EPAA] is currently mostly virtual, political and diplomatic in character, but under certain circumstances we would be forced to deliver a technical response, which I don't think you'll like.” 8

9. Withdrawal from New START unlikely 9

10. Russia’s response if no BMD deal with USA “Retaliatory Measures of the Russian Federation” - from then-Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov’s presentation at the May 2012 conference:  “increase defense of fixed launching sites,  ensure maximal concealment of Strategic Nuclear Force mobile launchers,  increase readiness of deployed BM platforms,  increase capabilities of ICBMs in penetrating modern Ballistic Missile Defense,  decrease the attacking missile launch fixing time,  increase the numbers of information sources in order to assure target identification by Russian AD and BMD assets,  employ effective systems in fighting mobile BMD assets,  ensure destruction or disruption of opposing BMD infrastructure assets.  Taking into account a missile defense system's destabilizing nature -- that is, the creation of an illusion that a disarming strike can be launched with impunity -- a decision on pre-emptive employment of the attack weapons available could be made when the situation worsens.”  Russia has no plans to abrogate the INF treaty over the missile defense issue. 10

11. Russian response to U.S./NATO BMD: Industry and Experts Anatoly Shlemov of the United Shipbuilding Company said in August 2012 that that the Kremlin “has definitely assigned a task” for Russia’s defense industry to come up with naval missile interceptor similar to the U.S. Aegis system. Russia’s lead designer of ballistic missiles Yuri Solomonov in March 2011: By pursuing a new 10-warhead ICBM as a response to U.S. missile defense, Russia is making the same mistake that the Soviet Union did “in relation to Ronald Reagan's well-known SDI program.” Ex-chief of RVSN staff Viktor Yesin in September 2012: Russia will reactivate mothballed ballistic missile silos around Moscow as part of deep modernization of a missile defense network Moscow. 11

12. Efforts by RF Government to internationalize response to US/NATO MD plans Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov at MoD’s May 2012 conference: "We see what is happening in the Asia Pacific region today, and we are certainly thinking together with our Chinese friends what response should be given to potential new threats and challenges.” Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization at the June 2012 summit in Beijing: We rejected the deployment of missile-defense systems either "by one state or a group of states," as such actions represent a "threat to international security." Then-Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov in October 2012: Russia views the Collective Security Treaty Organization as an efficient mechanism of countering U.S. antimissile activities in Europe. 12

13. Russian Government continues to hope for BMD deal with USA or not? Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev in May 2012: "I am certain that we are capable of finding a formula that would allow us to avoid any division into winners and losers.” Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov in May 2012: "I am firmly convinced that we are capable of achieving a positive result [in talks over missile defense] and solving the problem. We only need the political will.” More hopeful after Obama’s re-election: – Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin in November 2012: “We hope that President Obama after his re-election will be more flexible on the issue of taking into the account the opinions of Russia and others regarding a future configuration of NATO’s missile defense.” – Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in November 2012 that he received confirmation during talks with his U.S. counterpart, Hillary Clinton that the Obama administration hopes to work toward a deal on European missile defense. Vladimir Putin in June 2012: "I think that the missile defense issue will not be solved regardless of whether Obama is elected or not. I think that something can radically change only in the case if USA agrees with our proposal which says that Russia, Europe and U.S. were equal participants of this process.” 13

14. Contours of possible US/NATO-Russia MD deal NATO and Russia should: 1.Reach consensus on missile threats and impact of MD on strategic stability. 2.Conclude a Founding Act on Missile Defense Cooperation: – Using language from the 1997 founding act on NATO-Russian relations, this new document should declare that the signatories “have no intention, no plan and no reason” to target each other’s strategic nuclear forces – The act would establish two separate systems and institutionalize the continuous sharing of information on threats collected by radars and other mean (data fusion centers); facilitate the interoperability of NATO’s and Russia’s systems through information-sharing (defense technology cooperation agreement), joint exercises; designate Russia and NATO countries separate sectors, but will not ban the United States and NATO from deploying radars and interceptors to target missile threats that may emerge from countries located south of Russia as part of this act USA should: – agree to exchange information on missile defense technologies; – revive 2007 proposal to restrict radar angles and abstain from the deployment of mid- course interceptors in northeastern Europe. as part of this act Russia should: – contribute its assets, such as Armavir and Gabala (?) radars; – avoid imposing excessive demands. US-Russian cooperation in space as an example (Ryan/Saradzhyan 2012 paper). 14

15. Evolution of Russia’s nuclear posture in 2000-2012: 2009 Strategy of National Security - unequivocal commitment to pursue full elimination of nuclear weapons 2010 Defense Doctrine – reaffirmed 1st use; – for the 1st time constrains use of nuclear weapons: conventional“aggression when the very existence of the state is threatened” while the 2000 doctrine allowed use in conventional war if “situations critical to the national security”; – introduced use of high-precision conventional systems for strategic deterrence; – major conventional conflict with a nuclear power may escalate into a nuclear war; – no reference to NSNWs; – NATO - No 1 "external military danger;” 15

16. The roles Russian strategists have envisioned specifically for NSNWs: Deterring U.S. and NATO and equalizing for the superiority of Western and Chinese conventional forces. Can be played by SNF. Equalizing for strategic nuclear forces’ inferiority. No significant inferiority. Buying time for Russia to narrow the gap with USA In long-range, precision-guided conventional weapons. Can be played by SNF. Deterring powers in the south. Can be played by SNF and conventional forces. Deterring U.S. global missile defense and ensuring the capability of destroying elements of this defense in Europe. De-escalating aggression by disrupting command of the aggression, eliminating the threat of defeat and changing the balance of forces. 16 Roles above described in public statements/writings of Russia’s military and political leaders and academics.

17. Russia’s NSNWs Russia’s NSNWs:  From 15,000-21,700 in 1991 to 2,000 warheads now assigned to delivery systems, another several thousand awaiting dismantlement. Of those assigned:  Some located in central Russia; others are located in the Far East, in western Russia, and on the Kola Peninsula relatively close to bases with delivery systems.  Air Force: 3 types of aircraft with 730 warheads assigned.  Navy: 150-nuclear capable ships with 700 warheads assigned.  Ground forces: 100-200 warheads for short-range missiles.  Air defense forces: 300-400 warheads.  BMD forces: 68 nuclear capable interceptors deployed.  Coastal defense forces: 20 warheads for cruise missiles. Source: "Nonstrategic nuclear weapons, 2012” Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, BAS, September 2012. CountryCategoryEstimated warheads United Statesair, naval760 Russiaair, naval, ground, air-defense2,000 Reasons for the assymetry: While the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff sees no role U.S. NSNWs in Europe that cannot be performed by either U.S. strategic nuclear forces or conventional forces, the Russian General Staff sees a number of utilities in maintaining a formidable number of NSNWs both west and east of Urals. 17

18. Risks and Costs Incurred by Non- strategic Nuclear Weapons 1.More likely to be used than SNWs in wartime. 2.Ambiguity destabilizing in times of crisis. 3.Entrench Russia and NATO in a military stand-off. 4.Give other states an excuse, if not a reason, to seek nuclear weapons. 5.Threat of unauthorized use – diminished, but still not negligible. 18

19. Conditions and Obstacles on the Way towards Negotiation and Implementation of a Verifiable NSNW Reduction and Accounting Agreement with Russia: 1. Conditioning and bundling with other issues: a)U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe (withdrawal as precondition). b) Missile defense. c)Conventional forces in Europe. d)Long-range conventional strike weapons. e)Weaponization of space. 2. Obstacles: a) Opposition by military and industry. b) Difficulties in establishing effective accounting and verification procedures for NSNW control agreements. c) Asymmetry in numbers, types and ranges. d) Lack of a common definition of tactical weapons. e) Ambiguity of dual-use delivery systems. 19

20. Options for Possible NSNW Russia’s unlikely to concede to major reductions/parity even though it needs only low hundreds at most, so focus on unilateral or bilateral steps to attain for (warheads rather than delivery systems): – Transparency: exchange information on numbers and types of NSNW eliminated by PNIs; exchange information on the numbers, types, and location of operationally deployed NSNWs; mutual on-sight inspections. – Demating. – Relocation. – Consolidation. – No increase commitment. – Bundle with revival of conventional arms control in Europe? 20

21. The bigger picture: Steps to transition from “Mutually Assured Destruction” to “Mutually Assured Stability” 21 Traditional agenda: Missile cooperation as a game changer. – Putin’s calm reaction to Bush Jr’s 2001 withdrawal from ABM an indicator: let’s “work out new framework of strategic relations.” Greater transparency in nuclear posture. More time for warning and decision. New agenda: Deep economic cooperation as foundation for U.S.-Russian partnership.

22. Traditional agenda: Russian and U.S. arsenals in 1945-2011 Source: NRDC and FAS 22

23. Russia's Foreign Trade in 2011 (in mn of USD) PartnerVolumeExportImport% Share% Growth 1. EU393987.7266457.8127529.948.0128.3 2. APEC196503.592979.6103523.923.9135.3 3. CIS122560.178260.044300.114.9134.2 4. China83505.035240.648264.410.2140.8 5. Netherlands68491.362567.35924.08.3117.2 6. Germany71849.834173.737676.18.7137.2 7. EurAsEC64603.441816.522786.97.9132.1 8. Customs Union58373.537829.220544.37.1135.2 9. Italy45982.732582.013400.85.6122.6 10. Ukraine50630.430509.620120.86.2136.1 11. Belarus38607.624922.613685.04.7137.7 12. Turkey31803.225429.16374.03.9126.3 13. USA31205.916604.414601.53.8133.3 Russia’s top foreign trade partners 23

24. CategoryRussia from the perspective of U.S. interests USA from the perspective of Russian interests. Deployed strategic nuclear weapons. No. 2 (1,537) No. 1 (1,800). Oil production.No. 1 (10,229 thousand barrels per day). No. 3 (10,142 thousand barrels per day). Natural gas production.No. 2 (22,990 billion cubic feet).No. 1 (26,836 billion cubic feet). GDP (dollar exchange rate).No. 9 ($1,857,770 million).No 1 ($15,094,000 million). GDP (PPP).No. 6 ($2,812,383 million, just behind Germany.) No 1 ($15,075 billion). Global exports.No. 9 ($520,900 million).No. 2 ($1,497,000 million). Global imports.No. 17 ($322,500 million).No. 1 ($2,236,000million). Bilateral trade.No. 20 on the list of U.S.’ trading partners. No. 8 on the list of Russia’s trading partners. Population.No. 9 (143 million).No. 3 (314 million). Total area.No. 1 (17,098,242 sq. km.)No. 3. (9,826,675 sq. km.) Life expectancy.No. 164 (66.46 years).No. 51 (78.49 years). Corruption (the higher the score and the ranking – the lower corruption). No. 143 (score: 2.4).No. 24 (score: 7.1) Russia and United States from each other’s perspective 24

25. IMF's GDP Forecast PPP (Billion of USD) 25

26. Population Forecast (Million) 26