1. Current Scottish Police Reform Proposals Professor Jim Gallagher, Nuffield College, University of Oxford

2. Untidy Institutional Landscape A dominant Scottish Parliament 32 Local Authorities 14 Territorial Health Boards –Plus 7 national ones 2 Enterprise Agencies 6 Sheriffdoms 8 Police Forces and Fire Brigades

3. Structural Changes ? Some reluctance from Govt But since devolution gradual ingathering of power –Fiscal powers effectively removed from councils –Centralisation of Agencies –Detailed involvement with NDPB’s But wholesale reorganisation for Police and Fire

4. Why? Partly a political accident: no party opposed, each bid the other up Almost last vestige of pre-1995 local government –not obviously well-designed for policing Resentment of independence of CC’s –Frustration at slow progress on cost reduction

5. Presented as saving money Planned annual savings of £106m - about 10% [“reducing duplication, waste and inefficiency”] May facilitate some of that - eg shared services Governance and accountability an afterthought

6. The Present Proposals A single Scottish Force Run by an NDPB appointed by Ministers Consultative relationship with individual councils Operational independence for CC

7. And not… Local councils as police authorities Joint central-local budget control –Though councils may be able to buy more local policing Any kind of professional consensus –One Chief Constable

8. Potential Advantages Economies of scale –Rationalisation of operational capacity –Savings from sharing support services (very ambitious assumptions made) Simplification of governance –Removal of central/local ambiguity –No need to herd 8 Chiefs

9. Risks and Concerns Local responsiveness –In the absence of real accountability Centralisation of governance –Scope to be uniformly wrong –Risks in direct political control Questions so far unanswered –Inspection and oversight

10. Local Responsiveness Managing the service to respond effectively to differing local –circumstances: geography, crime patterns, other needs –is not the same as responding to different local preferences: style, prioritisation The latter is much less likely with no real local control

11. Centralisation of Governance General post-devolution trend –The eggs are in one basket –Have to rely on effective oversight UK policing governance was consciously decentralised and power distributed –Peelite, if you wish, but civilian and local –Met Police a partial exception, if not a model Good reasons to distribute power over policing

12. Scope to address concerns: local control Rather then an NDPB Police Authority could be composed of councillor majority Local (ie divisional) Policing Budgets part-funded by councils so they have a real say Very much doubt Govt will do either of these

13. Governance: - Autonomy of Board? - Operational independence of CC Board appointed, funded by Ministers –Must they take a power of direction too ? –Role of Ministers in appointments? Operational independence (nowhere defined) –Use the Scotland Act definition of independence which is applied to LA –Then broad definition of what it applies to (prevention and detection of crime, maintenance of order…)

14. Chief Officer Appointments Historically - local and national agreement Ministers want the same now Proposal - make this process statutory : –Board appoints from a short list approved by Minister –Not the other way round

15. Oversight and Inspection HMIC historically discharged central function Something of a mish mash on complaints –Cross force investigations –Fiscal for allegations of criminality –Complaints Commissioner

16. Oversight Needs better thought through –What support for Board –If HMIC exist, to whom do they provide assurance? And why? Complaints must be rigorously investigated –Should it always be by an English Force –Or should it be combined with professional oversight What is the role for Parliament here –Oversight of a very mighty executive?