1. Conventional Prompt Global Strike
Recent development
and implications
James M. Acton

2. Basic technological approaches

3. Key recent developments
12 December 2013: President Putin’s State of the Nation address
9 January 2014: First test flight of WU-14 (China)
7 August 2014: Second test flight of WU-14
25 August 2014: Second test flight of Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (United States)

4. Putin’s 2013 State of the Nation qddress
“The ramping up of high-precision strategic non-nuclear systems by other countries, in combination with the build-up of missile defence capabilities, could negate all previous agreements on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, and disrupt the strategic balance of power…
Russia will respond to all these challenges, both political and technological. We have all we need in order to do so. Our military doctrine and advanced weapons, weapons that are being and will be deployed, will unconditionally allow us to ensure the security of the Russian state.” Russian President Vladimir Putin (December 2013)

5. Other key Russian statements
Recent series of statements by senior officials:
New heavy ICBM “would provide the capability of creating a strategic high-accuracy weapon system with a conventional payload with practically global range, if the U.S. does not pull back from its program for creating such missile systems.” Col. Gen. Karakayev (December 2012)
“Taking into account the U.S. activity, Russia is forced to develop [non-nuclear, strategic offensive arms] arms in future.” Deputy Defense Minister Antonov (April 2013)
Periodic reports of testing a maneuverable, hypersonic re-entry vehicle since at least 2004 (unclear whether goal is to develop a nuclear or non-nuclear payload)

6. Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2
Program initiated in 2003
Planned range of 17,000 km (global reach with weapons based on east and west coasts)
Tests in April 2010 and August 2011; both terminated less than 3 minutes into a planned 23 minute endo-atmospheric flight, before “equilibrium gliding” was achieved
Downgraded to risk mitigation program, i.e. effectively cancelled, in 2012

7. Advanced Hypersonic Weapon:
Basic concept
Endo-atmospheric boost-glide system
Congress forced DoD to fund AHW in FY08
NAS (2008): Range of 8,000 km [?]
Evolutionary design based on SWERVE
Could be land- or sea-based
At least a decade away from deployment
Side note: Tactical Boost Glide Program appears in DARPA/AF FY15 Budget request

8. Advanced Hypersonic Weapon:
Flight tests
Successful test in November 2011 over 3,800 km
Second test, over longer range with significant cross-range maneuver, failed in August 2014 due to booster malfunction
Retest likely (but no official announcement)

9. Capability-based planning
“We prefer actually in our shop not to talk about specific scenarios, but a set of attributes that targets have…Those attributes are time-urgent, very distant, perhaps highly defended or in other ways access denied for the United States; high value targets, high regret factor for not striking a target; and potentially an interest in low collateral damage.
It is those kinds of targets…that make us think that this particular kind of capability is very valuable.”
Brian Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities, 2007

10. Possible CPGS missions
Denying a new nuclear proliferator the ability to employ its nuclear arsenal
Destroying or disabling antisatellite capabilities
Countering anti-access/area-denial capabilities
Killing high-value terrorists and disrupting terrorist operations

11. WU-14 flight test II
First flight test in January 2014 (presumably successful)
WU-14 is Pentagon’s designation
WU is designator for Wuzhai/Taiyuan
Photos of crash site appeared on social media in August 2014
Media report of second WU-14 test on 7 August

12. Geolocating the crash site
Work with Jeffrey Lewis and Catherine Dill
Crash site turns out to be near a spa resort in the Mongolian desert about 200 km south east of Ordos

13. Keep-out zones Westward launch Eastern zone identical to January test
Crash site outside keep-out zone
Range of 1,750 km
Very limited cross-range maneuvering

14. Analysis of WU-14 test
The launch’s purpose was, almost certainly, to test a hypersonic glider.
The test was probably a failure.
The WU-14 appears to be significantly less ambitious than the U.S. Advanced Hypersonic Weapon.
What is the significance of a liquid-fueled booster?
Technically driven—need for greater burn-out velocity?
Financially driven—use of retired missile is cheap?
Strategically driven—goal is delivery of nuclear warheads?

15. CPGS weapons do not solve the ISR challenge of hunting mobile missiles
Accuracy
“Refresh rate”
Need continuous or near-continuous coverage
Visual reconnaissance satellites, HUMINT, SIGINT [?] inadequate
In-theatre capabilities (aircraft) or space-based radar needed
Timeliness
Discrimination
Trucks on busy roads v. mobile missiles

16. Potential paths to escalation—including to the nuclear level
Warhead ambiguity: An observing state’s uncertainty about whether an incoming warhead was conventional or nuclear
Dominant issue: overstated re Russia; understated re China
Destination ambiguity: An observing state’s uncertainty about whether it was the target of a CPGS attack
Target ambiguity: An observing state’s uncertainty about whether the United States intended to attack a conventional or nuclear target with a CPGS weapon
Crisis instability: Pressures felt by an adversary to use or threaten to use “strategic” weapons out of concern that they lacked survivability

17. No CPGS system possess all the desirable characteristics for risk reduction
Separate deployment areas for CPGS and nuclear weapons
Different trajectories for CPGS and nuclear weapons
Use of boosters with no nuclear association for CPGS
Predictable trajectories for CPGS weapons
Observable mid-course trajectories for CPGS weapons
Limited CPGS deployments
Strategic risks of boost-glide systems not appreciated
Cooperative risk reduction measures more effective than unilateral measures

18. Confidence-building measures can help address warhead ambiguity and survivability concerns
Inspections
Surveillance
Notifications (could also help with destination ambiguity)
Survivability concerns
Can include non-prompt systems on reciprocal and politically binding basis
Data exchanges
Declarations
Joint studies
Observation of exercises

19. The feasibility of treaty based-limits depends on basing mode
Make some/all CPGS weapon types treaty accountable
Address Russian and Chinese survivability concerns
Conventional ICBMs & SLBMs are New START accountable
Disagreement over boost-glide missiles (but probably academic)
Treaty inclusion very difficult for some some basing modes
Strong Navy opposition to inspections on SSNs and surface ships
Inspections on SSBNs and SSGNs already occur—but this basing mode exacerbates warhead ambiguity