1. IAEAs Approach to Safety Culture

2. IAEA Safety Standards 2

3. IAEA Safety Standards
This is the Safety Fundamentals SF-1 our agreed 10 principles for protecting people and environment. In the third principle of leadership and management for safety can read the following: 3

4. Fundamental Safety Principles SF-1
Integration of safety culture
“A safety culture that governs the attitudes and behaviour in relation to safety of all organizations and individuals concerned must be integrated in the management system. Safety culture includes:
Individual and collective commitment to safety on the part of the leadership, the management and personnel at all levels;
Accountability of organizations and of individuals at all levels for safety;
Measures to encourage a questioning and learning attitude and to discourage complacency with regards to safety.”

5. General Safety Requirements Specific Safety Requirements
Part 1 Governmental and
Regulatory Framework
1. Site Evaluation for
Nuclear Installations
Part 2 Leadership and Management
for Safety
2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants
2.1 Design and Construction
2.2 Commissioning and Operation
B. Design of Nuclear Power Plants
Part 3 Radiation Protection and
Safety of Radiation Sources
Part 4 Safety Assessment
3. Safety of Research Reactors
Part 5 Predisposal Management
of Radioactive Waste
4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Facilities
Part 6 Decommissioning and
Termination of Activities
5. Safety of Radioactive Waste
Disposal Facilities
6. Safe Transport of
Radioactive Material
Part 7 Emergency Preparedness
and Response

6. General Safety Requirements Specific Safety Requirements
Part 1 Governmental and
Regulatory Framework
1. Site Evaluation for
Nuclear Installations
Part 2 Leadership and Management
for Safety
2. Safety of Nuclear Power Plants
2.1 Design and Construction
2.2 Commissioning and Operation
B. Design of Nuclear Power Plants
Part 3 Radiation Protection and
Safety of Radiation Sources
Part 4 Safety Assessment
3. Safety of Research Reactors
Part 5 Predisposal Management
of Radioactive Waste
4. Safety of Nuclear Fuel
Cycle Facilities
Part 6 Decommissioning and
Termination of Activities
5. Safety of Radioactive Waste
Disposal Facilities
6. Safe Transport of
Radioactive Material
Part 7 Emergency Preparedness
and Response

7. Difference between Management and Leadership
“The difference between management and leadership can be stated simply whereby ‘management’ is a function and ‘leadership’ is a relation. Management ensures that work is completed in accordance with requirements, plan and resources. It is through leadership that individuals may be influenced and motivated, and organizations changed. Managers may also act as leaders.”
Source: IAEA Safety Standards: GS-G-3.5

8. Evolution to Management Systems
Systemic approach
GSR Part 2
2013
(Integrated)
Management
Systems
Safety & Performance
GS-R-3
2006
Quality Management
50-C-Q
1996
Quality Assurance
This slide shows how the agency standards followed the evolution in this area.
Quality Control
50-C-QA
Time

9. Objective of the GS-R Part 2 Leadership and Management for Safety
The application of SF-1 to establish requirements for:
Effective leadership for safety
Effective management for safety
Effective safety culture improvement activities
Safety as a sustainable outcome of excellence in leadership and management
Integrated management system: make sure that other requirements will not compromise Nuclear Safety
Systemic approach of ITO

10. Systemic Approach – The Interaction between Individuals, Technology and Organization
Monica

11. IAEA Safety Standards
This is the Safety Fundamentals SF-1 our agreed 10 principles for protecting people and environment. In the third principle of leadership and management for safety can read the following: 11

12. Safety (Culture) Requirement GS-R-3
“The management system shall be used to promote and support a strong safety culture by:
Ensuring a common understanding of the key aspects of safety culture within the organization;
Providing the means by which the organization supports individuals and teams in carrying out their tasks safely and successfully, taking into account the interaction between individuals, technology and the organization;
Reinforcing a learning and questioning attitude at all levels of the organization;
Providing the means by which the organization continually seeks to develop and improve its safety culture.”

13. IAEA Safety Standards
This is the Safety Fundamentals SF-1 our agreed 10 principles for protecting people and environment. In the third principle of leadership and management for safety can read the following: 13

14. IAEA Safety culture characteristics and attributes (GS-G-3.1)14

15. Safety is a clearly recognized value Attributes
High priority to safety: shown in documentation, communications and decision- making
Safety is a primary consideration in the allocation of resources
The strategic business importance of safety is reflected in business plan
Individuals are convinced that safety and production go ‘hand in hand’
A proactive and long-term approach to safety issues is shown in decision-making
Safety conscious behavior is socially accepted and supported (both formally and informally)
GS-G-3.1

16. Accountability for safety is clear Attributes
Appropriate relationship with the regulatory body exists, which ensures that the accountability for safety remains with the licensee
Roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and understood
There is a high level of compliance with regulations and procedures
Management delegates responsibilities with appropriate authority to enable accountabilities
Ownership for safety is evident at all organizational levels and by all individuals
GS-G-3.1

17. Safety is learning driven Attributes
A questioning attitude prevails at all organizational levels
An open reporting of deviations and errors is encouraged
Internal and external assessments, including self-assessments are used
Organizational and operating experience (both internal and external to the facility) is used
Learning is enabled through the ability to recognize and diagnose deviations, formulate and implement solutions and monitor the effects of corrective actions
Safety performance indicators are tracked, trended, evaluated and acted upon
There is a systematic development of staff competencies
GS-G-3.1

18. Safety is integrated into all activities Attributes
Trust permeates the organization
Consideration for all types of safety, including industrial and environmental safety and security, is evident
Quality of documentation and procedures is good
Quality of processes, from planning to implementation and review, is good
Individuals have the necessary knowledge and understanding of the work processes
Factors affecting work motivation and job satisfaction are considered
Good working conditions exist with regards to time pressures, work load and stress
Cross-functional and interdisciplinary cooperation and teamwork are present
Housekeeping and material condition reflect commitment to excellence
GS-G-3.1

19. Leadership for safety is clear Attributes
Senior management is clearly committed to safety
Commitment to safety is evident at all management levels
Visible leadership showing involvement of management in safety related activities
Leadership skills are systematically developed
Management assures that there is sufficient and competent staff
Management seeks the active involvement of staff in improving safety
Safety implications are considered in the change management process
Management shows a continuous effort to strive for openness and good communications throughout the organization
Management has the ability to resolve conflicts as necessary
Relationships between management and staff are built on trust
GS-G-3.1

20. IAEA Safety Standards
This is the Safety Fundamentals SF-1 our agreed 10 principles for protecting people and environment. In the third principle of leadership and management for safety can read the following: 20

21. Safety (Culture) Guidance GS-G-3.5
Specific guidance for nuclear installations*
Further explanation of the five safety culture characteristics and the attributes
Improving safety culture
Warning signs of a decline in safety culture
Concept of interaction between individuals, technology and the organisation
Assessment of safety culture
* Nuclear power plants, other reactors (research and critical assemblies), nuclear fuel cycle facilities
GS-G-3.5

22. Post-Fukushima activities – Strengthening of Nuclear Safety
IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety Vienna, June 2011
Chairpersons’ Summaries
15. In spite of all recent efforts there is still room for improvement in understanding the concept of safety culture and implementing it effectively worldwide in the management of all NPPs.

23. Basis for the recent work on safety culture
Member States requests to IAEA to provide practical guidance
IAEA Safety Standards
Behaviour and social science
Past experiences

24. IAEA Safety culture publications http://www.iaea.org
Document
Title
Safety Fundamentals No. SF-1
Fundamental Safety Principles
Safety Requirements No. GS-R-3
The Management System for Facilities and Activities
Safety Guide No. GS-G-3.1
Application of the Management System for Facilities and Activities
Safety Guide No. GS-G-3.5
The Management System for Nuclear Installations
Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-4
Safety Culture
Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-15
Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety Culture
Safety Report Series No. 11
Developing Safety Culture in Nuclear Activities
Safety Report Series No. 42
Safety Culture in the Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants
Safety Report Series: No 74
Safety Culture during Pre-Operational Phases of Nuclear Power Plant Projects
Safety Report Series:
How to Perform Safety Culture Self-Assessment – final draft
How to Continuously Improve Safety Culture – draft
TECDOC-1321
Self-assessment of safety culture in nuclear installations
TECDOC-1329
Safety culture in nuclear installations
TECDOC-1707
Regulatory Oversight Of Safety Culture In Nuclear Installations
UPD

25. From Variable to Metaphor Approach
Technology
Management
system
Safety-
Culture
Strategy
Technology
Management
system
Safety-
Strategy
Culture
Culture as one variable amongst others:
Culture as something inherent in all aspects of the organisation:
Safety culture is often in the nuclear world seen as something rational that managers can decide over and develop. But this is not the nature of culture. Culture is a dynamic concept, not as something binary or linear. Some times you can see naïve attitude campaigns, with posters on the wall about wanted values, behaviour expectations. Science has showed this has no or minor influence of culture.
Science in culture has gone from seeing culture as an variable to see culture as something inherent in all aspects of the organisation. If you approach culture as a metaphor, you will have better possibility to detect the culture, work with it.
An organisation that has a metaphor approach would probable have a more developed safety culture.
IAEA have been successful with there management systems approach to integrate not only the different management system, also the safety culture. (Reference GS-R-3) A management system is a way to try to control people’s behaviours. And as we all know the reality is not so rational as if we have written a procedure, people will follow it in all cases. They culture will also influence the outcome of the management systems as well as the culture will influence the quality of the management system it self. Here is the dynamics of the culture concept that you always play with in this subject.
The Variable Approach
Organizations have cultures
The Metaphor Approach
Organizations are cultures

28. Organizational culture theories nowadays
Culture is seen as less of a ‘quick fix’
It is recognized that culture can be changed, but it is also recognized that this often takes
time,
effort, and
does not always end up the way it is planned.
Culture can be seen as something we can influence, rather than something we can control
Culture work needs to encompass the whole organization – not a top-down process
Communication is essential
Shared understanding

29. What use can we draw from the theories?
We need to accept:
Culture is complex
Culture is abstract and inherent into all aspects
There are many cultures in an organization
So what do we need to do?
Educate and train to become more effective in improvement activities
Address the deepest cultural elements when assessing and to make sustainable change
Better understand how different cultures impacts safety culture

32. Some of TEPCO’s conclusion in IEM5 The IAEA International Expert Meeting on Human and Organizational Factors
TEPCO: “The cause of the accident should not be treated merely as a natural disaster due to an enormous tsunami being something difficult to anticipate.
We believe it is necessary to seriously acknowledge the result that TEPCO failed to avoid an accident which might have been avoided if ample preparations had been made in advance with thorough use of human intellect.”
TEPCO concluded the following in the IAEA International Expert Meeting5:
Believed that severe accident was unlikely
Did not pay attention to low probability high consequence risks
Missed out the opportunities to learn from others and improve
Is this only valid for TEPCO?
The official report of
Executive summary
The Fukushima
Nuclear Accident Independent
Investigation Commission

33. Importance to surface the assumptions
Culture is stronger than the technical factors. We easily get ”blind” and get socially conformed.
Therefore it is of key importance to create a good shared space which support the basic assumptions to surface and to periodically perform safety culture assessments.

34. From Theory of culture to Practice
Behaviour
Attitudes
Values
Understanding 34

35. Performance
Depends on the ability and willingness of individuals to continuously think, engage, and demonstrate safe behaviours
Shaped by:
Personal motivation
Shared space Me
Shared space
External space

36. The Difference….
Debate
Dialogue
Discussion

37. Shared Space

38. Shared space as a tool for cultural change
Behaviour
Behaviour
Attitudes
Attitudes
Values
Values
Understanding
Understanding
Shared Understanding
Dialogue 38

39. …Thank you for your attention