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Power Without Responsibility (JN 500) Journalism, Government and Source Relations Case Study: Hutton Report.

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Presentation on theme: "Power Without Responsibility (JN 500) Journalism, Government and Source Relations Case Study: Hutton Report."— Presentation transcript:

1 Power Without Responsibility (JN 500) Journalism, Government and Source Relations Case Study: Hutton Report

2 Lecture Outline 1. Government Communication 2. Government and Television 3. Case Study: Hutton Report

3 1. Government Communication Churchill in 1951 tried unsuccessfully to live without a press secretary. Position of press secretary grew in importance during the 1960s (with growing influence of TV). Four clear roles emerged: Spokesman; Adviser on media relations; Agent dealing with news organisations; and Co-ordinator of information service in all Whitehall ministries (Seymour-Ure 1996, p. 211).

4 1. Government Communication Growing role of press secretary as media manager and early spin doctor embodied in Bernard Ingham, Thatcher’s press secretary.

5 1. Government Communication Blair’s electoral victory in 1997 was based upon a systematic reworking of the party’s internal media and communications management framework started in the mid-1980s with a unit headed by Peter Mandelson and involved party and media personnel, including advertising professional Philip Gould. “Mandelson and Gould succeeded not because they exploited slick advertising and media management more effectively than the Conservatives, but because they forged between themselves an approach to political strategy which has never before been seen … They welded policy, politics and image- creation into one weapon” (Hughes and Wintour 1993, p. 183).

6 1. Government Communication Four features of the Millbank model: 1. Strong central control and coordination 2. Setting the agenda and proactivity 3. Rapid and robust response 4. Import of political staffers into the government machine (Sanders 2009, pp. 80-82).

7 1. Government Communication Criticisms of the Millbank model: it undermined government commitment to parliamentary accountability, gave unelected officials great power, contaminating civil servant political neutrality, it produced great centralization of control in Downing Street, it spread skepticism about politics and undermined public trust (Sanders 2009, p. 82).

8 1. Government Communication Spin doctoring became synonymous with New Labour largely through the figure of Alastair Campbell, Blair’s Director of Communications and Strategy. Campbell often exerted great control over journalists through force of his personality, direct engagements with editors, and control of the release and dissemination of information according to the levels of compliance of journalists.

9 1. Government Communication “The Most Powerful Man in Britain Quits” The Daily Mirror “PM’s lost his brain” The Sun Blair without Campbell is like fish without chips – “Unimaginable”.

10 1. Government Communication ‘Spin’ – the “highly professional selling of the political message that involves maximum management and manipulation of the media (Grattan 1998) Spin doctor functions: control of media access to politicians (preventing spontaneous questioning, favouring reporters with access – ‘on the drip’) packaging of information and control of timing of release of information for media and public consumption, (pseudo- events, exploitation of deadlines, etc) forms of direct communication with journalists about interpretations of political events and comments (including attempted control of the sources the journalist might draw on).

11 1. Government Communication Power of spin doctors can be overstated. As with public relations activity more generally, spin often is not successful. The fragility and indeterminacy of public life means that the best-planned campaign can founder. Spin encounters spin from opponents, and spin still receives news media and public scrutiny, especially over controversial issues.

12 1. Government Communication Errington and Miragliotta (2007, p.86) note governments employ techniques to foster journalistic dependence on them as a media source: 1. Employing journalists who were formerly part of the press gallery 2. Selectively leaking stories 3. Blacklisting journalists who dare to challenge the government’s agenda and rewarding those who do the government’s bidding with exclusive stories 4. Hijacking reporters.

13 1. Government Communication These developments in government communication are partly in response to the rapidly changing media environment characterized by ubiquity, speed, quantity, accessibility, fragmentation (Sanders 2009, p. 74). http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national- affairs/stuck-in-a-cycle-of-spin/story-fn59niix- 1225907612323 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national- affairs/stuck-in-a-cycle-of-spin/story-fn59niix- 1225907612323

14 1. Government Communication “Communication has moved to the centre stage of government and democratic politics.” (Sanders 2009, p. 74) Governments are now major employers of journalists, public relations practitioners and advertising personnel. UK government employed 3,200 press officers in 2006 - when Labour came to power in 1997 there were only 300 fully-fledged public relations officers.

15 2. Government and Television Eden in 1955 was first PM to welcome TV. Political parties had ascendency over journalists in political broadcasting until introduction of ITV (as noted in earlier week). Until 1959 no radio and TV coverage of general election campaigns (although there were party election broadcasts). In 1959 there was ‘invention’ of the daily campaign press conference.

16 2. Government and Television 14 Days Rule: agreement not to broadcast information on issues in the fortnight before they were debated in either House – lasted up to 1956-7. “By 1956-7 the questioning of political leaders on TV by impartial interviewers had become established custom” (Goldie quoted in Seymour-Ure p. 187). “Between 1955 and 1959 … the balance started to tip: politics began to adapt to broadcasting, as politicians became keener to use it, by opening their arenas [party conferences] or by using the arena of the TV studio” (Seymour-Ure 1996, p. 186).

17 2. Government and Television 1960s saw rise of current affairs programming and political news satire programmes, such as That Was The Week That Was. (put in wk 11) http://www.youtube.com/watc h?v=okH2Bb2Fj7A http://www.youtube.com/watc h?v=okH2Bb2Fj7A Politics, then, became more of an everyday, cultural and televised phenomenon. Harold Wilson described as the first “TV prime minister” (Seymour-Ure 1996, p. 191). Appeared on breakfast TV with David Frost.

18 2. Government and Television Thatcher had ‘media makeover’. http://www.telegraph.co.u k/news/politics/margaret- thatcher/8999746/How- Maggie-Thatcher-was- remade.html http://www.telegraph.co.u k/news/politics/margaret- thatcher/8999746/How- Maggie-Thatcher-was- remade.html

19 2. Government and Television 1980s – Televised proceedings in the Lords and the Commons. Over time it has changed PM’s Question Time into more of a media performance. Political identity and performance oriented to TV. Kinnock’s election as Labour leader in 1983 partly prompted by his perceived telegenic qualities.

20 2. Government and Television 1990s – Increased detachment of political role from political place (Seymour-Ure 1996, p. 195). Decline of Parliament in political reportage. Greater intrusion into and promotion of private lives of politicians.

21 2. Government and Television TV gave greater emphasis to political leaders. TV’s effects on position of Prime Minister: Greater time and effort in media work; Increased role as opinion leader or mobiliser; Drew PM away from natural parliamentary base (Seymour- Ure 1996, p. 202).

22 2. Government and Television “Something few people will say, but most know is absolutely true [is that] a vast aspect of our jobs today – outside of the really major decisions … is coping with the media, its sheer scale, weight and constant hyperactivity. At points, it literally overwhelms.” (Tony Blair)

23 3. Case Study: Hutton Report Political Context: Publication of government dossier in September 2002, six months before the Iraq War started. It claimed Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and they could be launched within 45 minutes of an order being given. On 15 February 2003 between 1 and 2 million people at an anti-war demonstration, the largest in the country’s history.

24 3. Case Study: Hutton Report After military operations no WMD were found. Andrew Gilligan, defence correspondent of the Today programme, met David Kelly, a weapons inspector. Gilligan subsequently reported that government knew that the 45-minute figure was wrong and Downing Street ordered that the dossier be “sexed up.” Subsequent article identified Alastair Campbell as person who influenced reworking of document.

25 3. Case Study: Hutton Report After appearances before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee by Kelly, Campbell and journalists, Kelly committed suicide and the PM ordered an independent judicial inquiry headed by Lord Hutton.

26 3. Case Study: Hutton Report Hutton’s report was almost complete vindication for the government and disastrous for the BBC (Barnett 2005, p. 334). He argued it was not improper to take into account redrafting suggestions from Downing Street. Gilligan was criticised as well as BBC management for not investigating whether Gilligan’s allegations could be supported. BBC Chairman Gavyn Davies, Director- General Greg Dyke and Gilligan all resigned.

27 3. Case Study: Hutton Report Barnett (2005, pp. 335-6) argues three reasons in defence of BBC: “…there is no question that BBC journalists had discovered a legitimate story of huge public significance…”; “…there was no question about Kelly’s status as a senior and reliable source”; and “…there was no question that changes had been made to the dossier after – and almost certainly as a result of – discussions with Number Ten advisers.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/uk/2003/david_kell y_inquiry/default.stm http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/uk/2003/david_kell y_inquiry/default.stm http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eNvDTRGqXKs

28 References Barnett, S 2005, ‘Opportunity or threat? The BBC, investigative journalism and the Hutton Report’, in S Allan (ed.), Journalism: Critical Issues, Open University Press, Maidenhead. Errington, W. and Miragliotta, N 2007, The Politics of Spin, in: Media & Politics: An Introduction, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, pp. 80-99. Grattan, M 1998, ‘The Politics of Spin’, Australian Studies in Journalism, vol. 7, pp. 32-45. Hughes, C. and Wintour, P 1993, Labour Rebuilt: The new model party, London, Fourth Estate. Sanders, K. 2009 Communicating Government, in: Communicating Politics in the Twenty-First Century, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, pp. 73-91. Seymour-Ure, C 1996, ‘Media, Government and Politics: Prime Ministers and Parties’, The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945, 2 nd edn, Blackwell, Oxford.


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