1. reproduction is primarily a social act it requires the emergence of responsible citizens  Human reproductive Dignity sets a moral requirement, since it demands that ‘people have the moral right and the moral responsibility to confront the most fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own lives’. Human reproductive Dignity has a prima facie communal starting point, whereas Human Rights have the individual as their starting point reproduction and the use of new techniques entail many legal/ethical dilemmas both require equal consideration  Human Reproductive Dignity is not bound to formalistic (legal) requirements, and so can take account of considerations in the two distinctive realms of morality and law. This contrasts with the (human) rights framework which cannot transcend the two distinctive domains universalisability is the ability to picture the outcome for anyone, at anytime, anywhere  Human Reproductive Dignity sets internal limitations. These guarantee, on the one hand, a minimum standard for the individual, whilst, on the other hand, providing a prima facie assessment of the communal impact. The internal limitations imply for the universalisability criterion that the pragmatic application of the concept will differ from its conceptualisation the notion should apply to both women and men at the same time it should take the gender differences into account  Human Reproductive Dignity provides both sexes with a claim to equal concern. This allows to recognise the different positions of women and men in the reproductive process, while striving for a balance. The human rights framework, on the contrary, unrealistically (and undesirably), presents claimants with equal rights A human right to procreate, which would by definition be based on equality, is inconsistent with the biological reality that men and women do not have the same position in reproduction. Even though assisted reproduction could involve the two genders on a more equal level, as the woman’s bodily integrity would not necessarily be involved to the same extent, it seems that in natural reproduction no egalitarian involvement could be acceptable. Human rights represent goods that are indefinite. It is, however, questionable whether a right to procreate could unlimitedly be exercised. Can we have as many children as we would like, and could this be the case everywhere? When we would reproduce indefinitely in the world of scarce resources, the claim for a right to reproduce seems self-destructive. A rights-based perspective sees reproduction as an isolated, individual act. ‘A rights claim is insufficiently sensitive to the needs of the community’. ABSTRACT: Reproduction is not sufficiently protected by a (human) rights framework and therefore would be better approached from the principle of Human Reproductive Dignity. The human rights framework is crushed under the weights and pressures that are released by old issues and the new developments in the field. The (human) rights framework is too individual-centred and gender-biased to deal with the regulative dilemmas. A (human) right to procreate seems imprecise, theoretically untenable, and has a self-destructing scope. In comparison, the principle of Human Reproductive Dignity provides a more solid foundation for reproduction. In its ideal form the principle is constituted of a pillar that provides for the social dimension, a pillar that accommodates both the ethical and legal concerns, it provides a ground for universalisability and supports the gender aspect. Moreover, as the principle works as both an empowering instrument as well as a restraining one, it offers a more suitable approach for reproduction than the human rights one does. Human Reproductive Dignity as an ideal regulative CoRe Marleen Eijkholt CSEP/iSEI, marleen.eijkholt@manchester.ac.uk Human Reproductive Dignity Human Reproduction DEFINITY INDIVIDUALITY ABSENCE OF DUTY EQUALITY In the legal theoretical framework a right is only established when it correlates with a duty. Which duty could correspond to the right to procreate, however, is difficult to define; a duty to procreate is unthinkable, and a more specified claim such as a right to non- interference with the innate capacity to procreate, seems more to correspond with a right to bodily integrity. Moreover, the right does not provide any guarantees. At maximum the right could provide a means to try to conceive offspring, but offspring itself cannot be guaranteed.