1. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Myth Breakers for Election Officials A Brief Summary  HAVA Facts  E-Voting Problems in Recent Elections  Election Complexities with E-Voting  HAVA–Compliant Alternatives to DREs  Costs Considerations  Distinguishing Truth from Myth

2. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org What Myths?  Many local election officials don't have the information they need to make wise decisions about voting equipment. They hear many conflicting stories, and it's hard to tell truth from myth.  This presentation gives facts that dispel many of the e-voting myths. Preface  For details download: www.votersunite.org/takeaction/mythbreakers.pdf For details download: www.votersunite.org/takeaction/mythbreakers.pdf

3. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org For Example: did you know?  A repeat of a failed election was held in 2004 Hinds County, Mississippi had to hold its November 2003 election all over again because so many of the DREs broke down that they couldn't determine the will of the voters.  Dead batteries had to be replaced before an election Neglecting to keep the DRE batteries charged between elections cost Arapahoe County, Colorado over $100,000 in battery replacements just before a recent election.  Logic and Accuracy testing is labor-intensive If it takes an hour to do the Logic and Accuracy testing on one DRE, San Diego county would have to spend 1275 person-days testing before every election in order to comply with California law. Preface

4. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Facts about The Help America Vote Act (HAVA)  HAVA Does Not Require the Use of DREs States are required to allow the disabled to vote unassisted, and they have until the first general election of 2006 to comply. Three non-DRE systems currently satisfy this requirement: Ballot marking devices, such as the AutoMark. Tactile ballots like they use in Rhode Island. Open Voting Consortium system, which is free software that runs on standard computers.  HAVA Does Not Prohibit Punch Card and Lever Systems A jurisdiction may continue to use its punch card or lever system if it adds a training program for voters to prevent over-votes and accidental under-votes. HAVA Facts

5. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org More Facts about HAVA  HAVA Allows Partial Replacement of Old Systems A state can take HAVA funds to replace punch cards or levers in some counties and not in others.  HAVA "Audit" Requirement is Not a Meaningful Recount Vendors and some election officials say that an end-of-day printout satisfies the HAVA audit requirements. However, if a DRE has made any errors in recording or storing votes, its end-of-day printouts will be incorrect, and no meaningful audit can be done. When a machine produces results a second time, it's merely a reprint, not a recount. HAVA Facts

6. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org And More Facts about HAVA  HAVA Preserves the Right to Use Paper Ballots HAVA explicitly preserves jurisdictions' rights to use paper ballots. Section 301(c)(2) specifically says that the term "verify" may not be construed to forbid the use of paper ballots.  EAC Guidelines and Standards Are Strictly Voluntary HAVA charges the Election Assistance Commission with developing guidelines and voting system standards, but compliance with these standards is not mandated for the states, nor is compliance required in order to receive HAVA funds for voting equipment upgrades or purchases. This means that states retain control over whether or not they upgrade voting equipment to the FEC 2002 standards, which are the current standards. HAVA Facts

7. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Map of E-Voting Problems 1) California, 2003: Diebold installs uncertified software without notifying authorities 2) California, 2004: Senate majority leader introduces urgent bill to ban computerized voting 3) California, 2004: Sec’y of State decertifies Diebold for November 4) Alameda County, 2004: Diebold control modules fail to start up 5) Orange County, 2004: Hart DREs trip circuit breaker and shut down when batteries run out; voters turned away from the polls 6) Orange County, 2004: Hart access-code confusion causes 7,000 voters to receive the wrong ballots 7) San Diego County, 2004: Diebold DREs lose votes; control modules fail to start up properly 8) Arapahoe County, 2004: Failure of battery charge in DREs costs over $100,000 to replace batteries 9) Bernalillo County, 2002: Sequoia DREs fail to count 12,000 out of 48,000 votes – insufficient memory 10) Dallas County, 2002: ES&S iVotronics mark incorrect choices on the screen 11) Harris County, 2003: Hart DREs won’t start; voters write votes on make-shift paper 12) Indiana, 2004: ES&S installs uncertified software on iVotronics; admits certified version won't tabulate votes 13) Hinds County, 2003: DREs overheat, break down; election invalidated, and re-held later 14) Floyd, Coweta Counties, 2002: Diebold DREs lock up; access cards malfunction; wrong candidate marked on screen E-Voting Problems in Recent Elections 15) Bryan, Terrell Counties, 2002: Diebold DRE ballots omit races; and present wrong races 16) Muscogee County, 2003: DREs register "yes" when voters vote "no" 17) Montgomery County, 2004: Diebold DRE presents incomplete ballot when font is magnified 18) Sarasota County, 2004: ES&S DREs fail to count 189 votes. 19) Wake County, 2002: Flawed ES&S iVotronic software loses 436 ballots 20) Georgia, 2004: Diebold ballot-encoding mix-ups prevent voters from voting in primary 21) Miami-Dade County 2002: ES&S iVotronics fail to count 8.2% of the votes 22) Broward County, 2002: ES&S iVotronic error misses counting 22% of the votes 23) Broward County, 2004: ES&S iVotronics lose 134 votes; winning margin is 12 votes 24) Napa County, 2004: Optical Scan calibration error fails to tally thousands of votes 25) Lubbock County, 2004: Optical Scan programming error prevents all votes from being counted 26) Scurry County, 2004: Defective chip in Optical Scan gives landslide victory to the wrong candidate 27) Bay County, 2004: Optical Scan ballot alignment error hands thousands of votes to opponent These are just a few examples of the E-voting problems in U.S elections in the last two years

8. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org California, 2003: Diebold installs uncertified software without notifying authorities California, 2004: Senate committee passes urgent bill to ban computerized voting in 2004 California, 2004: Secretary of State decertifies all Diebold DREs for the November election Alameda County, 2004: Diebold control modules fail to start up Orange County, 2004: Hart DREs trip a circuit breaker and shut down when batteries run out; voters turned away from the polls. Access-code confusion causes 7,000 voters to receive wrong ballots San Diego County, 2004: Diebold DREs lose votes; control modules fail to start up Arapahoe County, 2004: Failure of battery charge in DREs costs over $100,000 to replace batteries Bernalillo County, 2002: Insufficient memory causes failure to count 12,000 out of 48,000 votes Dallas County, 2002: ES&S iVotronics mark incorrect choices on the screen Harris County, 2003: Hart DREs won’t start; voters write votes on make-shift paper Indiana, 2004: ES&S installs uncertified software on iVotronics; admits certified version won't tabulate votes E-Voting Problems in Recent Elections Many people advocate the use of voter-verified paper ballots (VVPB) on DREs, but when machines break down or voters receive the wrong ballots, a VVPB printer would be no help. Some of the Recent DRE Problems

9. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Sarasota County, 2004: ES&S DREs fail to count 189 votes Wake County, 2002: Flawed ES&S iVotronic software loses 436 ballots Georgia, 2004: Diebold ballot-encoding mix- ups prevent voters from voting in primary Miami-Dade County, 2002: ES&S iVotronics fail to count 8.2% of the votes Broward County, 2002: ES&S iVotronics lose 22% of the votes Broward County, 2004: ES&S iVotronics lose 134 votes; winning margin is 12 votes Hinds County, 2003: DREs overheat, break down; election invalidated, and re-held later Floyd, Coweta Counties, 2002: Diebold DREs lock up; access cards malfunction; wrong candidate marked on screen Bryan, Terrell Counties, 2002: Diebold DRE ballots omit races; present wrong races Muscogee County, 2003: DREs register "yes“ when voters vote "no" Montgomery County, 2004: Diebold DRE presents incomplete ballot when font is magnified E-Voting Problems in Recent Elections More of the Recent DRE Problems So, some people question the wisdom of using the current crop of DREs, even if they have a printer attached. To make sure voters aren’t disenfranchised, each precinct would have to have paper on hand anyway in case the machines malfunction.

10. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Napa County, 2004: Optical Scan calibration error fails to tally thousands of votes Lubbock County, 2004: Optical Scan programming error prevents all votes from being counted Scurry County, 2004: Defective chip in Optical Scan gives landslide victory to the wrong candidate Bay County, 2004: Optical Scan ballot alignment error hands thousands of votes to opponent Optical Scan Machines Miscount, Too Problems with optical scan machines have been severe but recoverable. These examples illustrate the importance of auditing optical scan machines by performing random recounts of the paper ballots. E-Voting Problems in Recent Elections

11. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Illegal Use of Uncertified Software  Most states require electronic voting equipment to be certified before it can be used in an election. If the state requires federal certification, only equipment with a NASED qualification number may be used. Some states also require state certification for all voting systems.  In violation of state laws and without the knowledge of election officials, uncertified software has been installed by vendors and used in elections in at least these states: California – Diebold Indiana – ES&S Maryland – Diebold Arizona - Diebold Election Complexities with E- Voting

12. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org The NASED Qualification Process  Independent Testing Authorities (ITA) are selected by NASED The ITA testing process is a secret from election officials and the public All contracts and contacts are between the vendors and the ITA ITAs test a machine’s design, not individual voting machines Currently qualified machines meet 1990 standards, not 2002 standards  NASED-qualified, state-certified machines have performed like this: New Mexico – Sequoia voting systems lost 12,000 votes North Carolina – ES&S iVotronic lost 436 votes California – Diebold TSx lost 10 votes Election Complexities with E- Voting

13. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Chain of Custody is More Complex  Election equipment is particularly vulnerable to tampering after it has been installed tested but before it is used. Every single DRE must be secured to ensure that the software is not illegally altered between elections. Each DRE, after being tested and zeroed out, must remain secure until election day. Electronic machines break down during an election and are removed for repair. Procedures must be developed for retesting the machines before they are placed back in service. Election Complexities with E- Voting

14. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Ballot Boxes are the Size of a Credit Card  Using electronic voting equipment does not eliminate the need to track and preserve the physical records of votes.  The physical records are now in the form of ballot memory cards rather than paper ballots. Ballot cards are not a permanent form of storage since the data can be erased or overwritten Ballot cards are the size of a stack of about five credit cards Ballot cards, which can be easily lost or slipped into a pocket, must be kept as secure as ballot boxes Election Complexities with E- Voting

15. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Logic & Accuracy Testing – the Reality  Logic & Accuracy testing on electronic voting machines is essential. In November 2001, the failure of Registrar of Voters managers to do L&A testing on ballot counting machines caused votes for some candidates to go to other candidates. All 82 elections were subjected to a hand recount, with the results in 13 local water and school board races overturned.  Testing DREs is a major undertaking To comply with California law, the Registrar of San Diego County must test 10,200 DREs before every election. If it takes an hour to do the Logic and Accuracy testing on one DRE, San Diego county would have to spend 1275 person-days testing before every election. Election Complexities with E- Voting

16. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Logic & Accuracy Testing – What if it Fails?  Ideally, every L&A test would show that the machines are operating correctly. But if a machine fails, then: It would be necessary to take the machine out of service or have it repaired. If the software were flawed, the flaw would be present in all DREs using that same software. It would be too late to have a software patch developed, tested, certified, and installed in time for the election. It might be too late to print absentee ballots for the entire county to use for the election. Election Complexities with E- Voting

17. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Increase in Human Error  While many look to e-voting machines as a way of reducing human error, the fact is that human error may be on the increase because of the new and complex problems they present: Houston, Texas: Poll workers assigned the wrong ballots to voters. Orange County, California: Poll workers gave thousands of voters the wrong ballots. San Diego, California: Poll workers gave voters the wrong provisional ballots. Walker County, GA: after six elections were held on the same equipment, even vendor technicians couldn’t operate it successfully. Election Complexities with E- Voting

18. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Potential Problems Inherent in Electronic Devices  Touch Screen Misalignment (Florida, 2003)  Miscellaneous Breakdowns on Election Day (California, 2004)  Power Surges or Static Electricity Discharges  Electrical Outages and Inadequate Battery Charges (Colorado, 2004)  Maintenance Challenges for Poll Workers (San Diego, 2004)  Rapid Obsolescence and Toxic Waste Disposal When they are obsolete, HAVA funds won’t replace them Rechargeable batteries in DREs wear out and are toxic waste Election Complexities with E- Voting

19. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Election Official’s Challenges from the San Diego Report, 2004  Recruiting more poll workers, and technically savvy workers  Additional training for poll workers  Testing thousands of machines before each election  Providing troubleshooting and hotline support during an election  Providing field support  Educating the public about using the machines  Handling technical problems on election day  Creating a back up plan for emergency problems Election Complexities with E- Voting

20. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org HAVA-Compliant Alternatives  Precinct optical-scan with ballot-marking devices. Two major studies of voting systems determined that precinct-count optical scan systems outperformed DRE voting machines in terms of residual voting errors and cost per voter. Ballot-marking devices provide all the support for disabled individuals that DREs provide.  Tactile ballots for the vision-impaired and hearing-impaired Tactile ballots have been used in Rhode Island very successfully.  Open Voting Consortium System Free voting software to install on standard computers provides all the features of other computerized systems. HAVA–Compliant Alternatives to DREs HAVA does not require DREs. Here are some alternatives:

21. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org The Possibility of Paper  Several touch screen systems provide an integrated printer for printing voter-verified paper ballots: Avante AccuPoll TruVote  Some citizen groups advocate the exclusive use of paper ballots in systems where no vote is recorded electronically: Ballot Integrity Project HAVA–Compliant Alternatives to DREs

22. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Comparison of Approximate Acquisition Costs System Type5-Booth Precinct Paperless DRE System$19,000 DREs with integrated VVPB Printer$20,000 Optical Scan + Ballot-Marking Device$10,000 Optical Scan + Tactile Ballots$6,000 Open Voting Consortium SystemFree software + $6,000 Cost Considerations

23. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Hidden Costs of DREs  Increased warehouse costs for secure and environmentally-controlled storage for the machines when they are not in use.  Increased energy costs for keeping the backup batteries charged between elections.  Increased labor costs for security when these machines are stored overnight at the polling place before an election.  Increased costs for hardware maintenance and software upgrades for each of the thousands of such machines for a typical large county.  Increased costs for expendable parts, including the backup batteries and smart cards used by these machines.  Increased labor costs for verifying the software and firmware version on each machine before every election. Cost Considerations

24. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org More Hidden Costs of DREs  Increased personnel costs for performing logic and accuracy tests on every one of the machines prior to the start of every election.  Increased labor costs for hiring additional poll workers (San Diego required twice as many when it switched to DREs).  Increased training costs for longer training sessions and larger number of poll workers to train on using a more complicated system.  Massive costs for replacing these machines in 10 to 15 years when the technology that they use is no longer maintained or supported by the vendor, and HAVA funding is no longer available. Cost Considerations

25. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org What Computer Experts Say  Johns Hopkins/Rice Report on Diebold DRE software “Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts.”  SAIC Report on Diebold Software “The system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of compromise.”  Compuware Report on Diebold, ES&S, Sequoia, and Hart The study showed that all four of the voting machines had serious security problems. These problems are described in great detail in the report, which is over 200 pages long.  RABA Technologies Report on Diebold "I was really surprised with the totality of the problems we found. Just about everywhere we looked we found them." Distinguishing Truth from Myth

26. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org How the Vendors Respond  RABA expert William Arbaugh, a University of Maryland assistant professor of computer science who participated in the test, graded the system an "F," "with the possibility of raising it to a 'C' with extra credit -- that is, if they follow the recommendations we gave them."  Diebold President Bob Urosevich said in the release that the RABA Technologies report confirmed "the accuracy and security of Maryland's voting procedures and our voting systems as they exist today." Distinguishing Truth from Myth

27. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox  From a Walker County, GA news report: “The voting machines have been used for six elections, three of which were for the same State House District 1 race. Problems have cropped up at every election.”  Claims made, on Atlanta television, by Cathy Cox days after the problems in Walker County. "Though Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox said the state’s 26,000 elections voting machines performed without any problems on Super Tuesday earlier this week, some lawmakers Thursday said the machines may nonetheless be vulnerable to fraud and wanted printed receipts to serve as proof of the computer tabulation." Distinguishing Truth from Myth

28. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Florida Secretary of State Glenda Hood  U.S. Representative Robert Wexler (D-FL) One of the many recent severe election problems in Florida has led to the federal lawsuit filed by Representative Robert Wexler (D-FL). It is currently scheduled for a hearing in August of 2004.  Florida Secretary of State Glenda Hood On Lou Dobbs tonight, March 8, 2004, Secretary of State Glenda Hood said this: “Well, I have a high confidence level. And it's based on the fact that, since 2002, when we put new equipment in place in the state of Florida, that we have had no problem whatsoever, according to our 67 supervisors of elections.” Distinguishing Truth from Myth

29. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Clearing up Misconceptions  League of Women Voters' opposition to Voter-verified paper ballot (VVPB) is not a member-endorsed position. Many rank and file members strenuously object to the policy and have launched a website in opposition to the Executive Board's action.  No systems require voters to verify their ballots If machines are required to provide a method by which voters could verify paper ballots, voters would NOT be required to verify them. Distinguishing Truth from Myth

30. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Clearing up More Misconceptions  VVPB does not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act Some people are concerned that providing different verification methods to sighted and blind individuals would be a violation of the law. The United States Department of Justice disagreed in an official opinion issued through its Office of Legal Counsel.  Optical scan machines are a reliable way to count paper ballots Jim Dickson, vice president for governmental affairs at the American Association of People with Disabilities, says: "As a matter of fact, not theory, whenever paper ballots are counted by an automatic tabulator you never get the same results twice." However, a Caltech/MIT report says, “"Optical scanning has the best track record of all equipment types currently in use." Distinguishing Truth from Myth

31. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Clearing up More Misconceptions  Election Center Received Large Donations from Vendors In March of 2004, it was discovered that, for years, the Election Center has been receiving large donations from the three major manufacturers of paperless electronic voting. Optical scan machines are a reliable way to count paper ballots Executive Director R. Doug Lewis, a major defender and proponent of DREs, confirmed that the center had taken donations from makers of electronic voting machines – Sequoia, Electronic Systems & Software, and Diebold. Lewis said he did not think accepting donations from the manufacturers presented any conflict of interest or breach of ethics. Distinguishing Truth from Myth

32. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Election Transparency  Election transparency minimizes fraud and miscounts.  With transparency, ballots are collected and counted in public view.  With electronic voting, ballots are collected and counted by software processes, which are: developed by anonymous software engineers, who are hired by vendors. federally qualified by anonymous testers, who are hired by vendors. installed and maintained by technicians, who are hired by vendors. trade secrets of the vendors and therefore not open to public scrutiny. “An election that uses electronic ballots is not transparent.”

33. Copyright ©2004 www.VotersUnite.org contact@votersunite.org Myth Breakers for Election Officials For more details, download the entire “Myth Breakers” file: http://www.votersunite.org/takeaction/mythbreakers.pdf A Brief Summary