1. This Briefing is Classified
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Arctic Update
Current as of: 18 Nov 2014

2. Purpose, Background and Agenda
UNCLASSIFIED
Purpose, Background and Agenda
Purpose: Provide an update on J5 Arctic efforts.
Background:
Consulted with trusted partner
Previous CDR’s Estimate for the Arctic (Feb 12) (USNORTHCOM only)
New Strategic Guidance
N-NC Plans
CAN-US Threat Assessment (2012)
CAWG White Paper (Mar 12)
Arctic Collaborative Workshop (Apr 14)
CAN-US Arctic Intelligence Forum (Apr 14)
Commander’s Testimony (HASC – 26 Feb 14,
SASC – 13 Mar 14)
Exercises (FACETED EAGLE, Arctic Zephyr, etc)
Canada’s Northern Employment & Support Plan
(Nov 12)
NADSA
Arctic OWG
Agenda
Recent CDR Guidance
Situation/Threat
History/Vignette
Commander’s Intent
Facts & Assumptions
Requirements and Gaps
Way Ahead
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3. Recent CDR Guidance Clarify Threat Response Advocacy Partnerships
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Recent CDR Guidance
Clarify Threat
There is an Arctic defense threat and we must be ready for it (Northern approaches)
We have forces on alert every day for the threat
We need to start building more defense forces now
At what point does presence equate to perception of sovereignty?
Any competition for resources is bad
Response
We can’t be late to need for civil support missions
Advocacy
We have to plan now for what we will need to be relevant in the Arctic in the future – very long acquisition times
Partnerships
Partnerships are key to our success – we can’t do it alone
Get services moving
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4. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Situation / Threat
(U) Estimated 25% of world’s undiscovered hydrocarbon resources may lie beneath the Arctic. 80% in uncontested areas. (U) There is an increase in human activity in the Arctic; increase in N-NC missions. (FOUO) There is a requirement for deterrence against emerging threats. Consistent presence and demonstrated capability to respond will reduce the likelihood of a threat emerging.
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5. History / Vignette (U) Wrangel Island Dispute
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History / Vignette
(U) Wrangel Island Dispute
(U) 22% of Russia’s GDP dependent on Arctic resources
(U) Flag on ocean floor of North Pole
(U/FOUO) Increased LRA
(U/FOUO) Increased naval activity
(U) Ukraine / Crimea
(U) Troop and base build up in the Arctic
(U/FOUO) Sanctions in other areas of the world squeeze Russia to look for resources in the Arctic with no resistance
(U/FOUO) Russia makes pact with China; China will buy Russian oil and have limited access to other Russian resources
(U/FOUO) Russia limits Freedom of Navigation in Arctic waters and claims extended sovereignty rights
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6. Arctic Commander’s Intent
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Arctic Commander’s Intent
Purpose: The Homelands are defended in depth and risk to our National Security Interests remains low. Civil Support is provided on time.
Method (Key Tasks):
Execute NORAD’s missions of aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning; and USNORTHCOM’s primary mission of homeland defense and, when directed by the SecDef, provide civil support.
Center our efforts on defense, security and safety.
Work hand-in-hand with CJOC, USEUCOM, and, where possible, other cooperative partners in order to synchronize our terminology, objectives, and operations and to most efficiently leverage our combined Arctic capabilities to meet anticipated contingencies.
Execute our UCP responsibilities as DOD’s capability advocate for the Arctic.
Raise the level of awareness of Arctic issues within DOD, and seek efficient ways to draw DOD enterprise activities into a Whole-of-Government effort.
Increase our all-domain awareness in the Arctic, to include participation in Canadian exercises and maritime presence when possible.
End State:
Adversaries are deterred, and if deterrence fails, attacks are defeated.
Conditions are set for civil support.
US allies and partners in the USNORTHCOM AOR contribute to the peaceful opening of the Arctic in a manner which strengthens international cooperation.
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7. Facts and Assumptions Classified Additions Facts:
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Facts and Assumptions
Facts:
(FOUO) Arctic summer ice extent has decreased by 40% since 1979
(FOUO) Interest in the Arctic, by both Arctic and non-Arctic nations, is increasing
(FOUO) There has been an increase in human activity in the Arctic
(FOUO) North American Arctic is different than the Eurasian Arctic (ice, weather)
(FOUO) Maritime traffic has increased in the Arctic
(U) The Arctic is an austere and harsh environment
Key Strategic Assumptions:
(FOUO) Human activity/resource development will continue to increase in the Arctic
(FOUO) Russia is committed to increasing its influence in the Arctic
(FOUO) Current budgetary pressures will limit investment in Arctic capabilities
(FOUO) Miscalculation of the threat, capabilities, personnel, equipment, environment could be catastrophic
(U) Personnel and equipment should be capable of operating at conditions as cold as -60 degrees F for extended periods of time
Classified Additions
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8. Requirements and Gaps Domain Awareness Communication Infrastructure
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Requirements and Gaps
Domain Awareness
Aerospace
Land
Maritime Surface
Maritime Subsurface
Greater range
Wide area surveillance
Better weather observations/ forecasting
ISR
Info Sharing Policies
Communication
Information Sharing
High Latitude Coverage
Wide Area Coverage C2
Sat Comms
More Bandwidth
Mobile capability
Secure Capability
Reliable
Survivable
Infrastructure
Information Sharing C2
Runways
Hangars
Deep Water/Draft Port
Icebreakers
Base/FOB in location that enables timely response - opening & sustainment
Expeditionary
Surge capable
Presence C2
Deployable C2
Sustainability
Exercises
Trained & equipped forces
Exercised forces
Maritime charted
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9. UNCLASSIFIED
Proposed Way Ahead
Socialize / Refine Commander’s Estimate for the Arctic
Continue to influence N-NC Theater Strategy and plans
Establish recognized requirements across components & subordinates
Develop force utilization COAs
Advocate for required Arctic Capabilities
Shape Objectives for Exercises
Identify Key Leader Engagement opportunities for the Commander
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10. Back-Up

11. Cooperative and Integrated Approach
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
Current Systems
NTM (NSA, NGA ADF-CO and WMD/sanction enforcement)
ONI SeaLink Advanced Analysis (S2A) (Capability to find, fix, track dark uncooperative vessels of interest in Arctic)
HF Radar Remote Power Module (University of Alaska Fairbanks)
Stateside Affordable Radar System (STARS)
Enhanced Polar System
Operationally Response Space (ORS) (TACSAT 4)
Satellite and terrestrial based Automatic Identification System (AIS)
Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT)
RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM)
Canadian Polar Communications & Weather (PCW) satellite
Cruise Missile Launch at Sea Alert Warning System (CLAWS) (S&T)
Canadian Tactical Narrowband SATCOM (TNS)
Phone, , Fax (primary SAR means)
Battle Control System Fixed (BCSF)
Iridium
Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS)
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
Cooperative and Integrated Approach
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12. Cooperative and Integrated Approach
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
Potential Solutions
NTM (NSA, NGA ADF-CO and WMD/sanction enforcement)
ONI SeaLink Advanced Analysis (S2A) (Capability to find, fix, track dark uncooperative vessels of interest in Arctic)
N-NC S&T Arctic Over the Horizon Radar (CWP with Canada, using NSWC Crane as site)
N-NC S&T Mobile Sensor System (CWP) (Working with U of Alaska and NRL)
N-NC S&T and US Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Lab (CRREL)
N-NC S&T Arctic “Thunderstorm” Rapid Reaction Technology Office
HF Radar Remote Power Module (University of Alaska Fairbanks)
Stateside Affordable Radar System (STARS)
Enhanced Polar System
Operationally Response Space (ORS) (TACSAT 4)
Satellite and terrestrial based Automatic Identification System (AIS)
Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT)
RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM)
Canadian Polar Communications & Weather (PCW) satellite
Cruise Missile Launch at Sea Alert Warning System (CLAWS) (S&T)
Canadian Tactical Narrowband SATCOM (TNS)
Phone, , Fax (primary SAR means)
Battle Control System Fixed (BCSF)
Iridium
Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS)
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
Cooperative and Integrated Approach
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13. Plan of Action and Milestones
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Plan of Action and Milestones
Huddle
Jul 14
Aug 14
Sep 14
Oct 14
Nov 14
Dec 14
Internal JPT
CJOC Workshop
14 Aug
JTF-AK/D17
Workshop
10 Sep
Lit Review
Situation
Strategic Guidance
Tasks
Mission Statement
Commander’s Intent
Facts & Assumptions
End State
Advocacy
Way Ahead
Current System Analysis/Limitations
Define Requirements
System Gap Analysis
Future System(s) Analysis
Draft Commander’s Estimate
O-6 Staff Coord
GO/FO Staff Coord
N-NC J5/D IPR
ND IPR
CDR IPR
DC IPR
Final Commander’s Estimate
N-NC Commander’s Arctic Estimate will prepare commands for timely and effective response.
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14. UNCLASSIFIED
Strategic Guidance
U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region (May 2013)
Evolve Arctic Infrastructure and Strategic Capabilities
Enhance Arctic Domain Awareness
Preserve Arctic Region Freedom of the Seas
Provide for Future United States Energy Security
Implementation Plan for the U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region (Jan 2014)
Prepare for Increased Activity in the Maritime Domain
Sustain and Support Evolving Aviation Requirements
Develop Communication Infrastructure in the Arctic
Sustain Federal Capability to Conduct Maritime Operations in Ice-impacted Waters
Promote International Law and Freedom of the Seas
DOD Arctic Strategy (Nov 2013)
End State: A secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is
protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges.
Supporting Objectives:
Ensure security, support safety, and promote defense cooperation.
Prepare for a wide range of challenges and contingencies.
Objective tasks:
Exercise sovereignty and protect the homeland.
Engage public and private sector partners to improve domain awareness in the Arctic.
Preserve freedom of the seas in the Arctic.
Evolve Arctic infrastructure and capabilities consistent with changing conditions.
Supporting existing agreements with allies & partners - pursue new ones to build confidence with key regional partners.
Provide support to civil authorities, as directed.
Partner with other departments, agencies, and nations to support human and environmental safety.
Support the development of the Arctic Council and other international institutions that promote regional cooperation.
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15. NC TCP Tasks Summary TCP-11 (30 Sep 2011)
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
NC TCP Tasks Summary
TCP-11 (30 Sep 2011)
End State #5: US allies and partners in the USNORTHCOM AOR contribute to the peaceful opening of the Arctic in a manner which strengthens international cooperation.
IMO 5.1 – Defense
Develop a visible, deterrent military presence in the Arctic
Develop an Arctic CONOP in coordination with CJOC
Advocate for Arctic capabilities via the USNORTHCOM Integrated Priority List
Provide actionable intelligence and situational awareness on threats/issues affecting the Arctic
Develop a plan to protect DOD critical Arctic infrastructure
IMO 5.3 – Safety
Develop policies and conduct planning for SAR operations with combatant commands, IA and partner nations
Advocate for and provide Arctic navigational support
Provide mobility for SAR operations
Support capabilities demonstrations to improve Arctic Domain Awareness and all-weather, 24/7 Arctic rapid response—especially for SAR missions
Conduct HA/DR exercises with IA and partner nations
Support DHS’s ability to protect non-DOD critical Arctic infrastructure
IMO 5.2 – Security
Respond to short-notice requests for support
Provide interoperable C4 in the Arctic
Integrate other combatant commands, IA, and partner nations into USNORTHCOM’s exercise programs
Advocate for DOD and USCG Arctic national asset capabilities
Advocate for and provide Arctic ISR for MDA
IMO 5.4 – Cooperative Partnerships
Develop Arctic Engagement Strategy to enable a cooperative, collaborative environment in the Arctic
Develop means/methods with Canada, Russia, Denmark, combatant commands and USG to conduct surveillance enhancing Arctic All/Integrated Domain Awareness
Develop strategies, policies, plans and MOUs with Canada, Russia, and Denmark to ensure cooperative security arrangements within the NC AOR and along its boundaries, in coordination with USEUCOM
Build relationships and normalize processes to integrate information and intelligence with IA
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16. NCP Tasks Summary (30 Sep 2013) LOO 1 - Aerospace Warning
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NCP Tasks Summary
(30 Sep 2013)
LOO 1 - Aerospace Warning
IMO 1.1 – Process, assess, and disseminate intelligence and information related to man-made objects in the aerospace domain
IMO 1.2 – Detect, validate, and warn of threats and attacks against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles
LOO 4 – Partnerships
IMO 4.1 – Foster partnerships to enhance and integrate intelligence and operational capabilities, to synchronize operations, to facilitate mission partner unity of effort, and to ensure Command Continuity of Operations
IMO 4.2 – Protect C4ISR capabilities and respond to cyberspace threats and incidents in cooperation with USSTRATCOM, USCYBERCOM, USSOCOM and CJOC
IMO 4.3 – Conduct strategic communication activities to deter and dissuade adversaries, inform the public, foster partnerships, and advocate for requisite authorities and resources
LOO 2 - Aerospace Control
IMO 2.1 – Monitor, control, and prosecute all unwanted and unauthorized activity approaching and/or operating within North American airspace
IMO 2.2 – Conduce surveillance of the airspace of, and defend against manned or unmanned air-breathing attacks against North America
LOO 5 – Strategic Agility
IMO 5.1 – Develop a culture of innovation in order to adapt to changes in the strategic environment and to outpace the threat
IMO 5.2 – Identify concepts and capabilities in order to counter emerging and future threats, and advocate for requisite authorities and resources
LOO 3 – Maritime Warning
IMO 3.1 – Process, assess, and disseminate maritime intelligence and information related to North America
IMO 3.2 – Warn of maritime threats to, or attacks against North America to enable identification, validation, and response by national commands and agencies responsible for maritime defense and security
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17. Commander’s Vision of the Arctic
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Commander’s Vision of the Arctic
Climate change necessitates our urgent and responsible attention; should the US fail to adequately address inevitable challenges, we will not be prepared for the Arctic to open if it occurs sooner than predicted
Because everything takes longer in this environment and unique capabilities are required, we need to look ahead now in this theater
Because security interests can follow economic interests, emerging Arctic challenges require a deliberate preparation to ensure economic access and freedom of maneuver, and deter transnational criminal threats
Clearly defined and achievable near-, mid- and long-term goals to shape capabilities, partnerships, presence, messaging, and training will enable achievement of the theater strategic end state
The United States is an Arctic nation with unique challenges that require a whole-of- government and international approach
While national interests are diverse, a peaceful opening is in the interest of the community of Arctic nations
We will continually enhance collaborative partnerships with non-governmental, intergovernmental, Federal, State, local, and tribal organizations and countries that share the Arctic commons
We will be the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities, and the respected leader in Arctic expertise
Since the beginning of the satellite record in 1978 the Arctic ice extent has episodically continued to recede. In fact, the ice has continued receded faster than scientific modeling, which makes modeling Arctic change difficult and dynamic. Several Arctic change models suggest a seasonally ice-free/ice- infested period beginning in As a result, human activity (tourism, commercial, adventure, scientific and military activity) is increasing.
Anecdote: As the recent series on NPR (15-19 Aug 11) highlighted, commercial resource interest is significant. Shell Oil has kept a fleet of 20 exploration vessels waiting for several months in Alaska anticipating the Administration would allow them to drill on the North Slope.
As an Arctic littoral nation, sitting astride the Bering Strait and sharing coastline with Canada, the United States must recognize its Arctic responsibilities and prepare for the ensuing challenges. This includes acceding to UNCLOS. NSPD-66/HSPD-25, The Arctic Region Policy is a good step forward, but this policy has yet to be implemented by the interagency. The NSS has held two IPCs on implementation, but fully implementation is still required.
Due to the limited shipping and construction season in the Arctic it can talk up to four times longer to build infrastructure. It is also four times more expensive due to the added costs of bringing materials from the lower 48 and then moving them up into the Arctic. Therefore we must look ahead and not be “late to need” as the Arctic Report to Congress aptly states.
Our aspirations in the region must be clearly articulated. They should be articulated in the same terms as the Arctic Report to Congress which talks about near-term as 0-10 years, mid-term as years and long-term as years. Our goals should look ahead to a seasonally open Arctic. Therefore DOD must anticipate today the Arctic operations that will be expected of it tomorrow. To accomplish this we must plan across the near, mid and long terms by laying a foundation TODAY which enables us to expand our presence as needed and ultimately assure sustain operations and prevent disproportionate competitive advantages and unhealthy competition
DOD must anticipate today the Arctic operations that will be expected of it tomorrow. 17
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18. UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
Arctic Situation
Climate – Human access is increasing but highly variable & challenging
Arctic coastal waters are “ice free” for only a few weeks each summer
Shifting permafrost adds to the cost & challenges of Arctic infrastructure
Economics – Development will be slow with limited competition
Hydrocarbons – >80% of estimated Arctic oil and gas reserves are under uncontested waters and territory – therefore little competition for resources
Minerals – most known mineral deposits are under sovereign territory
Protein – fish stocks are slowly moving north, management is becoming an Arctic Council priority
Shipping – coastal transport shipping will increase to support extraction – intercontinental container shipping will grow more slowly
Political/Military – Arctic nations have incentives to cooperate
The likelihood of military conflict in the Arctic is low
Shortest air route from Asia to North America is over the Arctic
Non-Arctic nations are exploring ways to gain greater access to resources
In the near future, while we can’t discount potential geopolitical wildcards, accidents (safety) are the most likely driver of DoD/DND activity.
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19. Domain Awareness enables all missions.
UNCLASSIFIED
Arctic Mission Areas
Safety (Most Likely) – DOD/DND in support
SAR / Mass Rescue Operation
Environmental Response / Oil Spill
Civil Support – Massive earthquake, massive flood, massive forest fire, volcano eruption
HA / DR (Other Arctic Nations)
Security (Likely and potentially dangerous) – DOD/DND probably in support
Vessels of Interest/Dark ships
Fisheries violations (USCG Ops)
CT and CWMD-T
Homeland Defense (Most Dangerous) – DOD/DND in lead
Aerospace warning, aerospace control, maritime warning
Maritime Defense, Missile Defense, DCIP, CI Protection
Domain Awareness enables all missions.
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20. Arctic Mission Enablers
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO
Arctic Mission Enablers
Domain Awareness
Assessment:
- Adequate short range
- Limited bandwidth
Need:
- Greater range
- Wide area surveillance
Better weather observations/ forecasting
Communications
Assessment:
- Limited bandwidth
- Limited high north
Need:
- Sat Comms
- Bandwidth
- Mobile capability
Presence
Assessment:
Limited trained & equipped forces
Need:
- Trained & equipped
forces
- Exercised forces
Maritime charted
Deployable C2
Infrastructure
Assessment:
- Limited bases
Need:
- Base/FOB in location that enables timely response, opening & sustainment
- Expeditionary
- Surge capable
Enablers cross-cut Safety, Security, and Defense missions.
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO

21. Arctic Missions & Requirements (1 of 2)
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Arctic Missions & Requirements (1 of 2)
Mission
Requirements
Preparation
SAFETY
Civil Support / DSCA
Maintain the ability to provide DSCA during domestic events, emergencies, and disasters
Exercise C2 capabilities annually
Determine prepositioned support
SAR
Primary mission for USCG on the high seas
Continue to integrate SAR capability with the Arctic nations to include exercises
SECURITY
MDA
Monitor global maritime domain
Access and maintain data on vessels, facilities, and infrastructure
Collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate information to decision makers
Determine sensor requirements necessary to support MDA
Capitalize and employ MDA sensor network
Regional Security Cooperation
Strengthen U.S. security posture in the region
Advance security initiatives and build partner nation capacity and capabilities
Develop Tri Command domain awareness COP for the Arctic
Maritime Security
Protect sovereignty and maritime resources
Freedom of navigation and access
Deploy US Navy vessels in support of freedom of navigation
Some requirements cross-cut Safety, Security, and Defense
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22. Arctic Missions & Requirements (2 of 2)
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Arctic Missions & Requirements (2 of 2)
Mission
Requirements
Preparation
DEFENSE
Power Projection
Deploy and sustain forces in response to crisis, to contribute to deterrence, and enhance regional stability
Deploy US Navy vessels in support of freedom of navigation
Sea Control
Protection of vital sea lanes
Destruction of enemy naval forces
Suppression of enemy sea commerce
Establishment of military superiority in areas of naval operations
Strategic Deterrence
Influence an adversary’s decision-making in order to prevent hostile actions against U.S. vital interests
Continue support of active air defense operations of NORAD
Air and Missile Defense
Protect U.S. deployed and multinational forces as well as critical assets and areas of vital interest or political importance from attack by air and missile threats
Detect and target aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and missiles
Detect, target, and warn of aircraft, UAS, and missile overflights or transits of the AOR
Continue to support and refine active air and missile defense capability
Some requirements cross-cut Safety, Security, and Defense
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23. Arctic Partners 23 UNCLASSIFIED USCG US NAVY JTF-ALASKA SOCOM CJOC
USCG: Most capable U.S. maritime domain force in the Arctic.
May 2013 Arctic Strategy
Improving Awareness
Modernizing Governance
Broadening Partnerships
US NAVY: Working with USNORTHCOM to define Arctic maritime requirements.
Developed Arctic Roadmap.
Near Term: undersea and air
Mid Term: expand surface operations
Far Term: sustained operations surface, subsurface, and air
USCG
US NAVY
JTF-ALASKA
JTF-ALASKA: Developed Arctic Domain Security Orientation course with UAF. Developing SAR Conops. Working ALCOM and C2 issues. Helping define Arctic requirements.
SOCOM
SOCOM: Very capable U.S. Arctic force. Experience in the Arctic a little dated but working hard to hone skills.
CJOC
EUCOM: Multi-lateral coordination for stability in its Arctic AOR. Works to ensure regional stability with many Arctic nations. Co-sponsor with USNORTHCOM for Exercise ARCTIC ZEPHYR. Active with Northern CHODS and other Arctic key engagements.
It is also important to understand the interests of others and to be aware changing national priorities of actors who desire to operate in the region if we are to achieve our Arctic endstate. Our current challenge is to develop our own internal capability and capacity to assess states and enhance our ability to work USEUCOM and our interagency partners in doing so.
CJOC: Defining Arctic requirements. Working to mitigate Arctic capability gaps. Helping define domain awareness requirements and improve capabilities.
EUCOM
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24. Arctic Partners and Stakeholders
UNCLASSIFIED
Arctic Partners and Stakeholders
Safety
Security
Defense
Enablers
DHS
USCG
Can Coast Guard
Public Safety
FAA
Nav Canada
NOAA
Transport Canada
NRCAN
First Nations/Native People/Dept for
Aboriginal Affairs
Joint Rescue Coordination Centers
AK ANG
AK State Troopers
Canadian Rangers
FEMA
NAVSUPSALV
DHS
USCG
Can Coast Guard
RCMP
MSOCs
CSEC
Public Safety
Transport Canada
CBSA
CBP
CSIS
DOT/MARAD
FBI
ICE
CIC
DFAIT
CANR
DOS
CONR
Arctic Council
National Guard
NORAD
ALCOMNWS Office
USNORTHCOM
Can Nat Sec Advisor
USEUCOM
US Nat Sec Advisor
USSOCOM
Transport Canada
CJOC
NRO
DG Space
NGA
Royal Canadian Navy
NASA
Royal Canadian AF
NOAA
US Navy
Canada Space Agency
DNI/IC
ADM MAT
NAVNORTH
Industry (e.g. UAF, ACS)
ACC
DTRA
AFNORTH
NSA
ARNORTH
Environment Canada
SOCNORTH
CIA
JTF-AK/ALCOM
DOJ
USARC
DOE
MSOCs
First Nations/ & Native People
OSD
Industry Canada
SJS
Department of Commerce
USCG
Arctic Circle Forum
Allies
FEMA
JTF N
DOI
ANR
We need to synergize respective efforts
to shape Arctic outcomes.
UNCLASSIFIED