1. FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Charles Howard Southwest Research Institute

2. 2 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Abstract The MMS mission requires a high density non-volatile solid state recorder. The SSR will be implemented with screened commercial FLASH devices, characterized for radiation effects (both TID and SEE). In an extensive collaborative effort by NEPP and SWRI, multiple manufacturers and devices have been characterized. The additional SEU failure modes exhibited by FLASH devices compel mitigation techniques to extend beyond the traditional bit error correction. A discussion of mitigation techniques and tradeoffs between FPGA complexity/utilization, bandwidth and total memory will be presented.

3. 3 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Why FLASH? “I am your density” –George McFly, Back to the Future SDRAM –512Mx8 in an MCM? SRAM –Yeah, right… FLASH –512Mx8 discrete parts 1Gx8 available –4Gx8 MCMs (8Gx8 possible) –NON-VOLATILE…

4. 4 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Why NOT FLASH? Space qualified parts? –General availability sorely lacking –No Rad foundry providing FLASH Legacy / Lack thereof –Radiation testing of commercial products is a strenuous process… –Each wafer lot must be tested –“Long term” availability for commodity parts? NOT!

5. 5 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications NEPP/SWRI testing of FLASH SEE response is generally excellent for all flash products –Error cross-sections orders of magnitude lower than for standard volatile memories None of the parts suffered SEL –There were other destructive effects, usually failure of the erase circuit. The SEFI rate is a concern with flash memories. –What do you call a SEFI that won’t clear after a power cycle?

6. 6 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications FLASH Memory in Space Environment “The SEFI (Single Event Functional Interrupt) rate is of greater concern for space applications than the bit error rate” –TID and SEE Response of Advanced 4G NAND Flash Memories NSREC08, T.R. Oldham

7. 7 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Mitigation Considerations Class of Error –SEUs –SEL –SEFI –“Permanent” SEFI Cost of implementation/mitigation –Area –Mass –Power –Required FPGA logic

8. 8 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Error Classes SEU –Address to satisfy MAR Some form of ECC SEL –Sufficiently low to neglect Component design issue SEFI (part becomes nominal after power cycle/reset) –More likely than SEU, must address Detect & power cycle/reset Permanent SEFI –More likely than SEU, must address –Different mitigation approach! ???

9. 9 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Module Topology

10. 10 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications CAVEAT STATEMENTS I am not doing the probability calculations Consider a DWORD storage system for reference Permanent SEFIs are not recoverable: –Loss of Erase, Write or Read Circuit –Can approximate the loss of a component Block based failures and permanent SEFIs are roughly equivalent –Lose a “unit” of data (BLOCK x 4 x n) ~ “component” Simple addressing and memory management –No exotic stuff like link listing

11. 11 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Design Options Unmitigated SEC/DED (Traditional EDAC) Reed-Solomon Parallel Reed-Solomon TMR Redundancy ECC “Plus”

12. 12 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Unmitigated 0% more memory –Area / Power / Mass 1x Implementation concerns –Addressing schemeSimple –Memory management metricsSimple Utilization -- logic required to implement –I/O count1x –GatesBaseline Susceptibility –BitAny Single Bit Error –Byte or componentNOPE…

13. 13 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications SEC/DED 25% more memory –Area / Power / Mass 1.25x Implementation concerns –Addressing schemeSimple –Memory management metricsSimple Utilization -- logic required to implement –I/O count1.25x –GatesHamming cost Susceptibility (Immunity) –BitAny Single Bit Error –Byte or componentNOPE…

14. 14 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Reed Solomon (Block) 25% more memory –Area / Power / Mass 1.25x Implementation concerns –Addressing schemeStraightforward –Memory management metricsSimple Utilization -- logic required to implement –I/O count1.25x –GatesEncoder/Decoder/RAM –BandwidthLikely Adverse Susceptibility(Immunity) –Bit, byteMany/codeblock –Component failuresNOPE…

15. 15 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Parallel Reed Solomon 50% more memory –Area / Power / Mass 1.5x Implementation concerns –Addressing schemeSimple –Memory management metrics Utilization -- logic required to implement –I/O count1.5x –GatesEncoder/Decoder Susceptibility (Immunity) –Bit, byte, byte “plus”YEAH! –SOME component failures2/3 (NOT IN THE RS)

16. 16 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications TMR 200% more memory –Area / Power / Mass 3x Implementation concerns –Addressing schemeSimple –Memory management metricsSimple Utilization -- logic required to implement –I/O count3X or TDM –Bus loading / signal integrityOuch… –GatesVoters (plus) Susceptibility (Immunity) –Bit, byte or componentOH, YEAH! We can handle anything!

17. 17 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Redundant Memory X% more memory –Area / Power / Mass X Implementation concerns –Addressing schemeSimple –Memory management metricsSimple Utilization -- logic required to implement –I/O countX –GatesMinimal Susceptibility (Immunity) –Bit, byte or componentNope.

18. 18 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications ECC with Warm Spare 25-50% more memory per dword –Area / Power / Mass 1.5x Implementation concerns –Addressing schemeSimple –Memory management metricsStraightforward Utilization -- logic required to implement –I/O count1.5x –Bus loading / signal integrity –GatesECC & steering Susceptibility (Immunity) –Bit, byte or componentOH, YEAH! We can handle anything!

19. 19 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Memory Topology

20. 20 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Failure 1

21. 21 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Failure 2

22. 22 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Observations ECC covers SEU errors Warm Spare compensates for SEFIs and block errors ECC with Warm Spare is a superior option –Susceptibility to permanent SEFIs plummets –Memory availability remains near 100% Block based errors mapped to spare SEFI based errors map to spare ECC with Warm Spare is roughly equivalent to full TMR at half the power, mass, area, and cost

23. 23 FLASH Mitigation Strategies for Space Applications Summary Memory modules allow highest density/area Mitigation is user’s choice depending upon design goals but must cover SEFI and SEU ECC with Warm Spare is roughly equivalent to full TMR at half the power, mass, area, and cost TID and SEE Response of an Advanced Samsung 4Gb NAND Flash Memory (NSREC07); T. R. Oldham, M. Friendlich, J. W. Howard, Jr., M. D. Berg, H. S. Kim, T. L. Irwin, and K. A. LaBel TID and SEE Response of Advanced 4G NAND Flash Memories (NSREC08); T. R. Oldham, Fellow, IEEE, M. Suhail, M. R. Friendlich, M. A. Carts, R.L. Ladbury, Member, IEEE, H. S. Kim, M. D. Berg, C. Poivey, Member, IEEE, S. P. Buchner, Member, IEEE, A. B. Sanders, C. M. Seidleck, and K. A. LaBel, Member, IEEE SEE and TID of Emerging Non-Volatile Memories; D.N. Nguyen and L.Z. Scheick, Jet Propulsion Laboratory California Institute of Technology, http://parts.jpl.nasa.gov/docs/PID16621.pdfhttp://parts.jpl.nasa.gov/docs/PID16621.pdf A Case Study of Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFIs) in COTS SDRAMS (NSREC08); Joe Benedetto and George Ott, Radiation Assured Devices