1. Security Fundamentals Group TEMPEST Security Hidema Tanaka

2. Security Fundamentals Group Information leakage via electromagnetic emanation Electromagnetic wave, which is emanated unintentionally from running IT devices, contains information of processing signals from the devices. scanner color printer PC FAX multifunction machine

3. Security Fundamentals Group What is TEMPEST Reconstruction image by emanated electromagnetic wave target PC antenna Tempest receiver

4. Security Fundamentals Group Threat of information leakage from display image ・ There is a possibility that personal information on public information terminals stolen. ・ Screen design of public information terminal is very simple. (Universal design) ・ It is easy to reconstruct such simple display image by TEMPEST. ・ Human-interface can not be protected by crypto-technology. Target of TEMPEST e-voting systemATM system a serious threat on the information security !! Target of TEMPEST e-voting system Target of TEMPEST e-voting system ATM information

5. Security Fundamentals Group Principle of TEMPEST Very easy : almost same as TV but attacker needs some information of the target. TVTEMPEST known as “Channel”Reception frequencyunknown standard(e.g.NTSC)Synchronous frequency (reconstruction of image) depend on “target” (e.g. VESA for PC)

6. Security Fundamentals Group Activity of our group Signal generator Vertical/Horizontal synchronous frequency Receiver Monitor 1. Analysis: Which frequency? What information? Video signal Synchronous signals 2. Simplification: Effectiveness vs Cost (Reality of threat). 3. Countermeasure: New techniques.

7. To evaluate information in electromagnetic emanation quantitatively, it is important to monitor emanated signals from electronic instruments in more easy-to-use way and more easy to reconstitute way, then to analyze how information signal is contained in emanated signal. We propose the method to monitor electromagnetic signals emanated from PC (desktop PC) in more easy-to-use way and more easy to reconstitute way. Also we reconstitute information from monitoring results and evaluate it. Security Fundamentals Group Analysis 秘 秘 Analysis & evaluation

8. Security Fundamentals Group Our proposal system ・ Not need shield room --- We can get high S/N signal. ・ Experimental results can be re-produced. --- It does not depend on the environment. ・ data-processing is easy.

9. Security Fundamentals Group 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567 This result shows that we can monitor emanated electromagnetic signal corresponding to character line(1 ～ 7line) displayed on the monitor. We can reconstitute easily by the result from the proposed monitoring method, and also it is very easy-to-use. Monitor display image

10. Security Fundamentals Group We can reconstitute image by using signal processing. In this reconstitution result of monitor display image, we can read a character around 18 point.

11. Security Fundamentals Group Simplification of TEMPEST ・ High performance receiver (10 ～ 20 years ago, FSET 22 was a military model) ・ Real time image processing (such as Adobe Photoshop) ・ Hardware Amplification and noise canceller ・ Setting of synchronous frequency in 0.001[Hz] step ・ Very expensive ($100M or higher? I do not know.) Does attacker (such a pedestrian hacker) need such expensive machines ? Frequency range100[Hz] – 22[GHz] Frequency resolution0.1[Hz] Bandwidth10[Hz] – 500[MHz] Average noise level< 142 dBm Specification of FSET22

12. Security Fundamentals Group The answer is NO. Easy TEMPEST receiver ・ Receiver: AOR AR8600 mk2 with TV output about $800 ・ Signal generator: NF Wave Factory 1944B about $2000 ・ No image processing Performance ・ do not succeed from far away by antenna. But wire tap (power cable or LAN cable using a current probe) is ok. ・ Rough screen such as ATM interface is ok. Countermeasures are important and necessary.

13. Security Fundamentals Group Countermeasures We can already use some countermeasure products, cage special cable and connector/adapter Tempest PC (about $10,000) jamming machine … but they are too expensive and limited usage.

14. Security Fundamentals Group Kuhn and Anderson (Cambridge university), IH98 Top 30% of horizontal frequency spectrum of image Effective to Tempest attack Removing top 30 % of horizontal frequency spectrum of image The basic idea of the Tempest fonts New technique → Software solution “TEMPEST fonts”

15. Security Fundamentals Group Monitor display image Enlarged view of reconstruction image If we use common font, we can read a character in reconstruction image.

16. Security Fundamentals Group Monitor display image reconstruction image But, when we use proposed TEMEPST font, we are hard to read a character in reconstruction image. TEMPEST font generated by Fourier trans. and Gaussian.

17. Security Fundamentals Group Future works ・ Reconstruction of keyboard typing information via EM ⇔ “Keyboard acoustic emanation” (L.Lhuag et.al, CSS05) ・ EM side-channel cryptanalysis (IC card, RFID etc) ・ EM attack (small scale of E-Bomb) on IT devices e.g. Attack to LAN cable → packet error → DoS attack