1. Non-cognitivism in religious faith and language Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

2. Non-cognitivism ‘The door is in the corner’ - true or false; factual belief; can be known (cognition) ‘The door is in the corner’ - true or false; factual belief; can be known (cognition) A different kind of belief: ‘I believe in love’ - expression of a value I hold, not something I know (non-cognitive) A different kind of belief: ‘I believe in love’ - expression of a value I hold, not something I know (non-cognitive) Is religious language like the first or the second? Is religious language like the first or the second? ‘The door is in the corner’ - true or false; factual belief; can be known (cognition) ‘The door is in the corner’ - true or false; factual belief; can be known (cognition) A different kind of belief: ‘I believe in love’ - expression of a value I hold, not something I know (non-cognitive) A different kind of belief: ‘I believe in love’ - expression of a value I hold, not something I know (non-cognitive) Is religious language like the first or the second? Is religious language like the first or the second?

3. Søren Kierkegaard Religious faith is not a philosophical system or set of beliefs; it is held passionately. Religious faith is not a philosophical system or set of beliefs; it is held passionately. To believe that God exists, but to treat this as just another fact, about which we feel nothing, is not to have faith. Faith isn’t (just) a matter of what, but of how, we believe. To believe that God exists, but to treat this as just another fact, about which we feel nothing, is not to have faith. Faith isn’t (just) a matter of what, but of how, we believe. Religious faith is not a philosophical system or set of beliefs; it is held passionately. Religious faith is not a philosophical system or set of beliefs; it is held passionately. To believe that God exists, but to treat this as just another fact, about which we feel nothing, is not to have faith. Faith isn’t (just) a matter of what, but of how, we believe. To believe that God exists, but to treat this as just another fact, about which we feel nothing, is not to have faith. Faith isn’t (just) a matter of what, but of how, we believe.

4. Objective uncertainty The commitment that characterizes faith requires a decision, a ‘leap’. This leap requires objective uncertainty. The commitment that characterizes faith requires a decision, a ‘leap’. This leap requires objective uncertainty. Objective certainty will not have the same impact on one’s life as faith in the face of uncertainty - perhaps God prevents certainty for this reason. Objective certainty will not have the same impact on one’s life as faith in the face of uncertainty - perhaps God prevents certainty for this reason. The commitment that characterizes faith requires a decision, a ‘leap’. This leap requires objective uncertainty. The commitment that characterizes faith requires a decision, a ‘leap’. This leap requires objective uncertainty. Objective certainty will not have the same impact on one’s life as faith in the face of uncertainty - perhaps God prevents certainty for this reason. Objective certainty will not have the same impact on one’s life as faith in the face of uncertainty - perhaps God prevents certainty for this reason.

5. Is faith irrational? Faith is ‘incomprehensible’, but it is not irrational: we ‘cannot believe nonsense against the understanding… because the understanding will penetratingly perceive that it is nonsense and hinder [us] in believing it’. Faith is ‘incomprehensible’, but it is not irrational: we ‘cannot believe nonsense against the understanding… because the understanding will penetratingly perceive that it is nonsense and hinder [us] in believing it’. Religious faith in its trust and commitment is ‘incomprehensible’ in that it lies outside the limits that reason can reach for itself. Religious faith in its trust and commitment is ‘incomprehensible’ in that it lies outside the limits that reason can reach for itself. Faith is ‘incomprehensible’, but it is not irrational: we ‘cannot believe nonsense against the understanding… because the understanding will penetratingly perceive that it is nonsense and hinder [us] in believing it’. Faith is ‘incomprehensible’, but it is not irrational: we ‘cannot believe nonsense against the understanding… because the understanding will penetratingly perceive that it is nonsense and hinder [us] in believing it’. Religious faith in its trust and commitment is ‘incomprehensible’ in that it lies outside the limits that reason can reach for itself. Religious faith in its trust and commitment is ‘incomprehensible’ in that it lies outside the limits that reason can reach for itself.

6. Is Kierkegaard a non- cognitivist? There are facts about God, but we cannot know these facts using reason. There are facts about God, but we cannot know these facts using reason. Religious faith must involve an emotional response. Religious faith must involve an emotional response. So religious language is expressive, not merely fact-stating. So religious language is expressive, not merely fact-stating. There are facts about God, but we cannot know these facts using reason. There are facts about God, but we cannot know these facts using reason. Religious faith must involve an emotional response. Religious faith must involve an emotional response. So religious language is expressive, not merely fact-stating. So religious language is expressive, not merely fact-stating.

7. Ludwig Wittgenstein Language can be compared to games Both are guided by rules - what you can do, what words mean The meaning of words lies in how they are used Cp. ‘the peace of the Lord passes understanding; ‘the car passes the house’

8. ‘Language games’ Examples: asking, thanking, cursing, praying, greeting Examples: asking, thanking, cursing, praying, greeting A language game is the spoken aspect of a ‘form of life’; a form of life is a whole collection of cultural practices, but Wittgenstein also emphasises its biological basis A language game is the spoken aspect of a ‘form of life’; a form of life is a whole collection of cultural practices, but Wittgenstein also emphasises its biological basis Examples: asking, thanking, cursing, praying, greeting Examples: asking, thanking, cursing, praying, greeting A language game is the spoken aspect of a ‘form of life’; a form of life is a whole collection of cultural practices, but Wittgenstein also emphasises its biological basis A language game is the spoken aspect of a ‘form of life’; a form of life is a whole collection of cultural practices, but Wittgenstein also emphasises its biological basis

9. Religion Religion involves many language games, but not a whole form of life Religion involves many language games, but not a whole form of life A distinctive part of a distinctively human form of life; rooted in natural human responses A distinctive part of a distinctively human form of life; rooted in natural human responses Religion involves many language games, but not a whole form of life Religion involves many language games, but not a whole form of life A distinctive part of a distinctively human form of life; rooted in natural human responses A distinctive part of a distinctively human form of life; rooted in natural human responses

10. Religious language Religious language governed by quite different rules, e.g. asking God and asking your boss for prosperity Religious language governed by quite different rules, e.g. asking God and asking your boss for prosperity ‘God exists’ - God is not a ‘thing’ ‘God exists’ - God is not a ‘thing’ ‘a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s a belief, it’s really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately seizing hold of this interpretation.” (Culture and Value 64) ‘a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s a belief, it’s really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately seizing hold of this interpretation.” (Culture and Value 64) Religious language is not descriptive, but expressive Religious language is not descriptive, but expressive Religious language governed by quite different rules, e.g. asking God and asking your boss for prosperity Religious language governed by quite different rules, e.g. asking God and asking your boss for prosperity ‘God exists’ - God is not a ‘thing’ ‘God exists’ - God is not a ‘thing’ ‘a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s a belief, it’s really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately seizing hold of this interpretation.” (Culture and Value 64) ‘a religious belief could only be something like a passionate commitment to a system of reference. Hence, although it’s a belief, it’s really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately seizing hold of this interpretation.” (Culture and Value 64) Religious language is not descriptive, but expressive Religious language is not descriptive, but expressive

11. Phillips: defending Wittgenstein Wittgenstein isolates religion from all rational criticism Wittgenstein isolates religion from all rational criticism ‘Religion has something to say about… birth, death, joy, misery, despair, hope, fortune, and misfortune.’ If religion doesn’t help us make sense of these, we are right to reject it. ‘Religion has something to say about… birth, death, joy, misery, despair, hope, fortune, and misfortune.’ If religion doesn’t help us make sense of these, we are right to reject it. However, religion cannot be criticised as ‘not true’ - it does not make factual claims. Religious language takes its meaning from religious life. However, religion cannot be criticised as ‘not true’ - it does not make factual claims. Religious language takes its meaning from religious life. To think ‘God’ is the name of a thing or exists independently of religion is a ‘monstrous illusion’ To think ‘God’ is the name of a thing or exists independently of religion is a ‘monstrous illusion’ Wittgenstein isolates religion from all rational criticism Wittgenstein isolates religion from all rational criticism ‘Religion has something to say about… birth, death, joy, misery, despair, hope, fortune, and misfortune.’ If religion doesn’t help us make sense of these, we are right to reject it. ‘Religion has something to say about… birth, death, joy, misery, despair, hope, fortune, and misfortune.’ If religion doesn’t help us make sense of these, we are right to reject it. However, religion cannot be criticised as ‘not true’ - it does not make factual claims. Religious language takes its meaning from religious life. However, religion cannot be criticised as ‘not true’ - it does not make factual claims. Religious language takes its meaning from religious life. To think ‘God’ is the name of a thing or exists independently of religion is a ‘monstrous illusion’ To think ‘God’ is the name of a thing or exists independently of religion is a ‘monstrous illusion’

12. Objection Non-cognitivism is a reinterpretation of religious belief and language, not an analysis of it - religious believers think ‘God exists’ is a fact, likewise that they will exist in heaven after death Non-cognitivism is a reinterpretation of religious belief and language, not an analysis of it - religious believers think ‘God exists’ is a fact, likewise that they will exist in heaven after death Religious language could have both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects - it can be both factual and expressive Religious language could have both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects - it can be both factual and expressive Non-cognitivism is a reinterpretation of religious belief and language, not an analysis of it - religious believers think ‘God exists’ is a fact, likewise that they will exist in heaven after death Non-cognitivism is a reinterpretation of religious belief and language, not an analysis of it - religious believers think ‘God exists’ is a fact, likewise that they will exist in heaven after death Religious language could have both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects - it can be both factual and expressive Religious language could have both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects - it can be both factual and expressive