1. Chapter 9

2.  In previous chapters, we have looked at threats, planning, and response  In Chapter 9, we complete the discussion of the plan-protect-respond cycle  Response planning is necessary because defenses can never stop all attacks. Companies must respond appropriately when attacks happen or natural disasters occur Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 2

3. 3 Plan (Chapter 2) Protect (Chapters 3-8) Respond (Chapter 9)

4.  The Situation ◦ Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans in 2005  Followed shortly by Hurricane Rita ◦ The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) botched the relief effort Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 4

5.  Wal-Mart Is the Largest Retailer in the United States ◦ Supplied $20 million in cash ◦ Supplied 100,000 free meals ◦ 1,900 truckloads full of diapers, toothbrushes, other emergency supplies  45 trucks were rolling before the hurricane hit land ◦ Provided police and relief workers with flashlight, batteries, ammunition, protective gear, and meals Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 5

6.  What Was Wal-Mart’s Process?  Wall-Mart Business Continuity Center ◦ A permanent department with a small core staff ◦ Activated two days before Katrina hit ◦ Soon, 50 managers and specialists were at work in the center Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 6

7.  Wall-Mart Business Continuity Center ◦ Before computer network went down, sent detailed orders to its distribution center in Mississippi ◦ Recovery merchandise for stores: bleach and mops, etc. ◦ 40 power generators to supply stores with backup power ◦ Sent loss-prevention employees to secure stores Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 7

8.  Communication ◦ Network communication failed ◦ Relied on telephone to contact its stores and other key constituencies  Response ◦ Stores came back to business within days ◦ Engaged local law enforcement to preserve order in lines to get into stores Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 8

9.  Preparation ◦ Full-time director of business continuity ◦ Detailed business continuity plans ◦ Clear lines of responsibility  Multitasking ◦ During all of this, were monitoring a hurricane off Japan Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 9

10.  Incidents Happen ◦ Protections inevitably break down occasionally ◦ Successful attacks are called security incidents, breaches, or compromises Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 10

11.  Incidents Happen ◦ Protections inevitably break down occasionally ◦ Successful attacks are called security incidents, breaches, or compromises  Incident Severity ◦ False alarms  Apparent compromises are not real compromises  Also called false positives  Handled by the on-duty staff  Waste time and may dull vigilance Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 11

12.  Incident Severity ◦ Major incidents  Beyond the capabilities of the on-duty staff  Must convene a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT)  CSIRT needs participation beyond IT security Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 12

13.  Incident Severity ◦ Disasters  Fires, floods, hurricanes, major terrorist attacks  Must assure business continuity  Maintaining the day-to-day operations of the firm  Need a business continuity group headed by a senior manager  Core permanent staff will facilitate activities  IT disaster response is restoring IT services  May be a subset of business continuity  May be a stand-alone IT disaster Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 13

14.  Speed and Accuracy Are of the Essence ◦ Speed of response can reduce damage  Attacker will have less time to do damage  The attacker cannot burrow as deeply into the system and become very difficult to detect  Speed is also necessary in recovery Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 14

15.  Speed and Accuracy Are of the Essence ◦ Accuracy is equally important  Common mistake is to act on incorrect assumptions  If misdiagnose the problem or take the wrong approach, can make things much worse  Take your time quickly Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 15

16.  Planning Before an Incident or Disaster ◦ Decide what to do ahead of time ◦ Have time to consider matters thoroughly and without the time pressure of a crisis ◦ (During an attack, human decision-making skills degrade) ◦ Incident response is reacting to incidents according to plan ◦ Within the plan, need to have flexibility to adapt ◦ Best to adapt within a plan than to improvise completely Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 16

17.  Team Members Must Rehearse the Plan ◦ Rehearsals find mistakes in the plan ◦ Practice builds speed  Types of Rehearsals ◦ Walkthroughs (table-top exercises) ◦ Live tests (actually doing planned actions) can find subtle problems but are expensive Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 17

18.  Process for Major Incidents  Detection, Analysis, and Escalation ◦ Must detect through technology or people  Need good intrusion detection technology  All employees must know how to report incidents ◦ Must analyze the incident enough to guide subsequent actions  Confirm that the incident is real  Determine its scope: Who is attacking; what are they doing; how sophisticated they are, etc. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 18

19.  Detection, Analysis, and Escalation ◦ If deemed severe enough, escalate to a major incident  Pass to the CSIRT, the disaster response team, or the business continuity team Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 19

20.  Containment ◦ Disconnection of the system from the site network or the site network from the Internet (damaging)  Harmful, so must be done only with proper authorization  This is a business decision, not a technical decision Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 20

21.  Containment ◦ Black-holing the attacker (only works for a short time) ◦ Continue to collect data (allows harm to continue) to understand the situation  Especially necessary if prosecution is desired Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 21

22.  Recovery ◦ Repair during continuing server operation  Avoids lack of availability  No loss of data  Possibility of a rootkit not having been removed, etc. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 22

23.  Recovery ◦ Data  Restoration from backup tapes  Loses data since last trusted backup Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 23

24.  Recovery ◦ Software  Total software reinstallation of operating system and applications may be necessary for the system to be trustable  Manual reinstallation of software  Need installation media and product activation keys  Must have good configuration documentation before the incident  Reinstallation from a disk image  Can greatly reduce time and effort  Requires a recent disk image Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 24

25.  Apology ◦ Acknowledge responsibility and harm without evasion or weasel words ◦ Explain potential inconvenience and harm in detail ◦ Explain what actions will be taken to compensate victims, if any Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 25

26.  Punishment ◦ Punishing employees usually is fairly easy  Most employees are at-will employees  Companies usually have wide discretion in firing at-will employees  This varies internationally  Union agreements may limit sanctions or at least require more detailed processes Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 26

27.  Punishment ◦ The decision to pursue criminal prosecution  Must consider cost and effort  Must consider probable success if pursue (often attackers are minors or foreign nationals)  Loss of reputation because the incident becomes public Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 27

28.  Punishment ◦ Collecting and managing evidence  Forensics: Courts have strict rules for admitting evidence in court  Call the authorities and a forensics expert for help Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 28

29.  Punishment ◦ Collecting and managing evidence  Protecting evidence  Pull the plug on a server if possible  This is a business decision, not an IT decision  Document the chain of custody  Who held the evidence at all times  What they did to protect it  Document the chain of custody Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 29

30.  Postmortem Evaluation ◦ What should we do differently next time? Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 30

31.  Organization of the CSIRT ◦ Should be led by a senior manager ◦ Should have members from affected line operations ◦ The IT security staff may manage the CSIRT’s operation on a day-to-day basis ◦ Might need to communicate with the media; only do so via public relations ◦ The corporate legal counsel must be involved to address legal issues ◦ Human resources is necessary, especially if there are to be sanctions against employees Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 31

32. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 32 DimensionCriminal LawCivil Law Deals withViolations of criminal statutes Interpretations of rights and duties that companies or individuals have relative to each other PenaltiesJail time and finesMonetary penalties and orders to parties to take or not take certain actions Cases brought byProsecutorsPlaintiff is one of the two parties Criterion for verdictBeyond a reasonable doubt Preponderance of the evidence (usually) Requires mens rea (guilty mind) UsuallyRarely, although may affect the imposed penalty Applicable to IT securityYes. To prosecute attackers and to avoid breaking the law Yes. To avoid or minimize civil trials and judgments

33.  Cyberlaw ◦ Cyberlaw is any law dealing with information technology  Jurisdictions ◦ Areas of responsibility within which government bodies can make and enforce law but beyond which they cannot Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 33

34.  The United States Federal Judicial System ◦ U.S. District Courts  94 in the United States  Decisions in trials are only binding on the litigants Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 34

35.  The United States Federal Judicial System ◦ U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal  13 in the United States  Do not conduct trials  Review district court decisions  Decisions are precedents only for the district courts under the circuit court of appeals making a decision Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 35

36.  The United States Federal Judicial System ◦ U.S. Supreme Court  Final arbiter of U.S. federal law  Only hears about 100 cases per year  Usually only reviews cases that involve conflicts between appellate court precedents or important constitutional issues Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 36

37.  U.S. State and Local Law ◦ In the United States, many powers are reserved for the states ◦ This typically includes the prosecution of crimes taking place within a state or that do not affect interstate commerce ◦ For most cybercrimes committed within a state, state law applies ◦ State cybercrime laws vary widely ◦ Local police usually investigate crimes under both local and state laws Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 37

38.  International Law ◦ Differences are wide and rapidly changing (generally improving) ◦ Important to multinational firms ◦ Also important to purely domestic firms  Suppliers and buyers may be in other countries  Attackers may be in other countries ◦ Several treaties exist to harmonize laws and facilitate cross-border prosecution  Generally immature Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 38

39.  Admissibility of Evidence ◦ Unreliable evidence may be kept from juries ◦ Belief that juries cannot evaluate unreliable evidence properly ◦ Example: hearsay evidence  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ◦ Guide U.S. courts ◦ Now have strong rules for evaluating the admissibility of electronic evidence Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 39

40.  Computer Forensics Experts ◦ Professionals trained to collect and evaluate computer evidence in ways that are likely to be admissible in court ◦ Meet with them before there is a need because the initial moments of an intrusion require correct action Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 40

41.  Expert Witnesses ◦ Normally, witnesses can only testify regarding facts, not interpretations ◦ Expert witnesses may interpret facts to make them comprehensible to the jury in situations where juries are likely to have a difficult time evaluating the evidence themselves Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 41

42.  18 U.S.C § 1030 ◦ United States Code Title 18, Part I (Crimes) Section 1030 ◦ Actions prohibited  Hacking  Malware  Denial of service Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 42

43.  18 U.S.C § 1030 ◦ Protected computers  Applicability is limited to protected computers  Include “government computers, financial institution computers, and any computer which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communications” ◦ Often require damage threshold for prosecution  The FBI may require even higher damages to prosecute Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 43

44.  18 U.S.C § 2511 ◦ Prohibits the interception of electronic messages, both en route and after the message is received and stored ◦ Allows e-mail service providers to read the content of mail  A company can read employee mail if it owns the mail system Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 44

45.  Other Federal Laws ◦ Many traditional federal criminal laws may apply in individual cases ◦ For example, fraud, extortion, and the theft of trade secrets ◦ These laws often have far harsher consequences than cybercrime laws Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 45

46.  Event logging for suspicious events  Sometimes, send alarms  A detective control, not a preventative or restorative control Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 46

47. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 47 Management: Configuration, Tuning, etc. Actions: Generate Alarms Generate Log Summary Reports Support Interactive Manual Log Analysis Automated Analysis: Attack Signatures versus Anomaly Detection Event Logging: Individual Events are Time-Stamped Log is Flat File of Events (Sometimes) Data Aggregation from Multiple IDSs

48. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 48

49.  Network IDSs (NIDSs) ◦ Stand-alone device or built into a switch or router ◦ NIDSs see and can filter all packets passing through them ◦ Switch or router NIDSs can collect data on all ports ◦ A NIDS collects data for only its portion of the network  Blind spots in network where no NIDS data is collected ◦ Cannot filter encrypted packets Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 49

50.  Host IDSs (HIDSs) ◦ Attractions  Provide highly detailed information for the specific host ◦ Weaknesses of Host IDSs  Limited Viewpoint; Only one host  Host IDSs can be attacked and disabled Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 50

51.  Host IDSs (HIDSs) ◦ Operating System Monitors  Collects data on operating system events  Multiple failed logins  Creating new accounts  Adding new executables (programs—may be attack programs) Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 51

52.  Host IDSs (HIDSs) ◦ Operating System Monitors  Modifying executables (installing Trojan horses does this)  Adding registry keys (changes how system works)  Changing or deleting system logs and audit files  Changing system audit policies  User accessing critical system files  User accessing unusual files  Changing the OS monitor itself Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 52

53.  Log Files ◦ Flat files of time-stamped events ◦ Individual logs for single NIDs or HIDs ◦ Integrated logs  Aggregation of event logs from multiple IDS agents (Figure 9-12)  Difficult to create because of format incompatibilities  Time synchronization of IDS event logs is crucial (Network Time Protocol) Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 53

54.  Event Correlation (Figure 9-15) ◦ Suspicious patterns in a series of events across multiple devices ◦ Difficult because the relevant events exist in much larger event streams that are logged ◦ Usually requires many analysis of the integrated log file data Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 54

55. Sample Log File (many irrelevant log entries not shown)  1.8:45:05:47. Packet from 1.15.3.6 to 60.3.4.5 (NIDS log entry)  2.8:45:07:49. Host 60.3.4.5. Failed login attempt for account Lee (Host 60.3.4.5 log entry)  3.8:45:07:50. Packet from 60.3.4.5 to 1.15.3.6 (NIDS)  4.8:45:50:15. Packet from 1.15.3.6 to 60.3.4.5 (NIDS)  5.8:45:50:18. Host 60.3.4.5. Failed login attempt for account Lee (HIDS)  6.8:45:50:19. Packet from 60.3.4.5 to 1.15.3.6 (NIDS)  7.8:49:07:44. Packet from 1.15.3.6 to 60.3.4.5 (NIDS)  8.8:49:07:47. Host 60.3.4.5. Successful login attempt for account Lee (HIDS)  9.8:49:07:48. Packet from 60.3.4.5 to 1.15.3.6 (NIDS) Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 55

56. Sample Log File  10. 8:56:12:30. Packet from 60.3.4.5 to 123.28.5.210. TFTP request (NIDS)  11. 8:56:28:07. Series of packets from 123.28.5.210 and 60.3.4.5. TFTP response (NIDS)  12.No more host log entries ◦ (The log would not say this; it would merely stop sending events) Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 56

57. Sample Log File (many irrelevant log entries not shown)  13.9:03.17:33. Series of packets between 60.3.4.5 and 1.17.8.40. SMTP (NIDS)  14.9:05.55:89. Series of packets between 60.3.4.5 and 1.17.8.40. SMTP (NIDS)  15.9:11.22:22. Series of packets between 60.3.4.5 and 1.17.8.40. SMTP (NIDS)  16.9:15.17:47. Series of packets between 60.3.4.5 and 1.17.8.40. SMTP (NIDS)  17.9:20:12:05. Packet from 60.3.4.5 to 60.0.1.1. TCP SYN=1, Destination Port 80 (NIDS)  18.9:20:12:07: Packet from 60.0.1.1 to 60.3.4.5. TCP RST=1, Source Port 80 (NIDS)  19.9:20:12:08. Packet from 60.3.4.5 to 60.0.1.2. TCP SYN=1, Destination Port 80 (NIDS)  20.9:20:12:11 Packet from 60.3.4.5 to 60.0.1.3. TCP SYN=1, Destination Port 80 (NIDS)  21.9:20:12:12. Packet from 60.0.1.3 to 60.3.4.5. TCP SYN=1; ACK=1, Source Port 80 (NIDS) Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 57

58.  Tuning for Precision ◦ Too many false positives  False alarms  Can overwhelm administrators, dull vigilance ◦ False negatives allow attacks to proceed unseen Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 58

59.  Tuning for Precision ◦ Tuning for false positives turns off unnecessary rules, reduces alarm levels of unlikely rules  For instance, alarms for attacks against Solaris operating systems can be deleted if a firm has no Sun Microsystems servers  Tuning requires a great deal of expensive labor  Even after tuning, most alerts will be false positives Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 59

60.  Updates ◦ Program, attack signatures must be updated frequently  Processing Performance ◦ If processing speed cannot keep up with network traffic, some packets will not be examined ◦ This can make some IDSs useless during attacks that increase the traffic load Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 60

61.  Storage ◦ There will be limited disk storage for log files ◦ When log files reach storage limits, they must be archived ◦ Event correlation is difficult across multiple backup tapes ◦ Adding more disk capacity reduces the problem but never eliminates it Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 61

62.  Business Continuity Planning ◦ A business continuity plan specifies how a company plans to restore or maintain core business operations when disasters occur ◦ Disaster response is restoring IT services Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 62

63.  Principles of Business Continuity Management ◦ Protect people first  Evacuation plans and drills  Never allow staff members back into unsafe environments  Must have a systematic way to account for all employees and notify loved ones  Counseling afterwards Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 63

64.  Principles of Business Continuity Management ◦ People have reduced capacity in decision making during a crisis  Planning and rehearsal are critical ◦ Avoid rigidity  Unexpected situations will arise  Communication will break down and information will be unreliable  Decision makers must have the flexibility to act Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 64

65.  Principles of Business Continuity Management ◦ Communication  Try to compensate for inevitable breakdowns  Have a backup communication system  Communicate constantly to keep everybody “in the loop” Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 65

66.  Business Process Analysis ◦ Identification of business processes and their interrelationships ◦ Prioritization of business processes  Downtime tolerance (in the extreme, mean time to belly-up)  Importance to the firm  Required by higher-importance processes ◦ Resource needs (must be shifted during crises)  Cannot restore all business processes immediately Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 66

67.  Testing the Plan ◦ Difficult because of the scope of disasters ◦ Difficult because of the number of people involved Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 67

68.  Updating the Plan ◦ Must be updated frequently ◦ Business conditions change and businesses reorganize constantly ◦ People who must execute the plan also change jobs constantly ◦ Telephone numbers and other contact information must be updated far more frequently than the plan as a whole ◦ Should have a small permanent staff Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 68

69. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 69 Business Continuity: Keeping the entire firm operating or restoring the firm to operation IT Disaster Response: Keeping IT resources operating or restoring them to operation

70.  IT Disaster Recovery ◦ IT disaster recovery looks specifically at the technical aspects of how a company can get its IT back into operation using backup facilities ◦ A subset of business continuity or for disasters the only affect IT ◦ All decisions are business decisions and should not be made by mere IT or IT security staffs Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 70

71.  Types of Backup Facilities ◦ Hot sites  Ready to run (power, HVAC, computers): Just add data  Considerations: Rapid readiness at high cost  Must be careful to have the software at the hot site up-to-date in terms of configuration Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 71

72.  Types of Backup Facilities ◦ Cold sites  Building facilities, power, HVAC, communication to outside world only  No computer equipment  Less expensive but usually take too long to get operating Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 72

73.  Types of Backup Facilities ◦ Site sharing  Site sharing among a firm’s sites (problem of equipment compatibility and data synchronization)  Continuous data protection needed to allow rapid recovery Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 73

74.  Office Computers ◦ Hold much of a corporation’s data and analysis capability ◦ Will need new computers if old computers are destroyed or unavailable  Will need new software  Well-synchronized data backup is critical ◦ People will need a place to work Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 74

75.  Restoration of Data and Programs ◦ Restoration from backup tapes: Need backup tapes at the remote recovery site ◦ May be impossible during a disaster  Testing the IT Disaster Recovery Plan ◦ Difficult and expensive ◦ Necessary Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 75

76. Or, as we say in Hawaii, “All pau” Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2009 76