2. M8.6 EARTHQUAKE STRIKES OFFSHORE BANDA ACHE, INDONESIA: WED. AM, APRIL 11, 2012 Walter Hays, Global Alliance for Disaster Reduction, University of North Carolina, USA

3. WITH A TSUNAMI WANING IN EFFECT, AREA RESIDENTS FEARED A REPEAT OF DECEMBER 26, 2004 Remembering December 26, 2004, residents began evacuating immediately

4. WARNING THE PEOPLE IN BANDA ACHE

5. MASS EVACUATION BEGAN IMMEDIATELY IN BANDA ACHE

7. --- AND IN SRI LANKA

8. The good news: The tsunami wave runup was only 1 meter (3.3 ft) and only 5 deaths, at present.

9. WHY WAS THE TSUNAMI SO WEAK? (Source: USGS) The April 11 th earthquake, unlike the December, 2004 earthquake, occurred 150 km from the sub- duction zone. In addition, the fault rupture was mainly strike-slip; NOT thrust; hence the April 11 th quake was not effective as a tsunami generator.

10. TO EVACUATE OR NOT TO EVACUATE FOR TSUNAMIS A PRIMER

11. NATURAL HAZARDS FOR WHICH EVACUATION IS TYPICAL FLOODS HURRICANES TYPHOONS TSUNAMIS VOLCANIC ERUPTIONS WILDFIRES HIGH BENEFIT/COST FOR SAVING LIVES, BUT LOW BEMEFIT/COST FOR PROTECTING PROPERTY GOAL: MOVE PEOPLE OUT OF HARM’S WAY

12. Natural Phenomena that can Cause Disasters Planet Earth’s Restlessness causes:  Earthquakes

13. Tsunamis Are Associated with Subduction Zone Earthquakes M 7 or larger earthquakes that occur in oceanic subduction zones cause:  Tsunamis

14. SUBDUCTION ZONE

15. A TSUNAMI WAVE CAN REACH 10 M OR MORE IN HEIGHT A TSUNAMI WAVE CAN REACH 10 M OR MORE IN HEIGHT

16. COMMUNITYCOMMUNITY DATA BASES AND INFORMATION HAZARDS: GROUND SHAKING GROUND FAILURE SURFACE FAULTING TECTONIC DEFORMATION TSUNAMI RUN UP AFTERSHOCKS TSUNAMI HAZARDS INVENTORY VULNERABILITY LOCATION RISK ASSESSMENT RISK ACCEPTABLE RISK UNACCEPTABLE RISK TSUNAMI DISASTER RISK REDUCTION PREVENTION/MITIGATION PREPAREDNESS EMERGENCY RESPONSE RECOVERY and RECONSTRUCTION EDUCATIONAL SURGE POLICY OPTIONS

17. TSUNAMI HAZARDS (AKA POTENTIAL DISASTER AGENTS) HIGH-VELOCITY, LONG-PERIOD WATER WAVES WAVE RUNUP FLOODING WAVE RETREAT SHORELINE EROSION

18. HIGH VELOCITY IMPACT OF INCOMING WAVES TSUNAMIS INLAND DISTANCE OF WAVE RUNUP VERTICAL HEIGHT OF WAVE RUNUP INADEQUATE RESISTANCE OF BUILDINGS FLOODING INADEQUATE HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL EVACUATION PROXIMITY TO SOURCE OF TSUNAMI CAUSES OF DAMAGE “DISASTER LABORATORIES”

19. MONITORING TECHNOLOGIES AND WARNING SYSTEMS ARE A VITAL PART OF THE STORY.

20. KNOWING WHERE, WHEN, AND WHY A TSUNAMI OCCURS IS A VITAL PART OF THE ART AND SCIENCE OF INTELLIGENT EVACUATION.

21. INTELLIGENT EVACUATION:LEAVE THE AREA OR EVACUATE VERTICALLY LEAVE, IF ENOUGH ADVANCE WARNING EVACUATE TO A TALL BUILDING OR A HIGHER ELEVATION TO GET BEYOND REACH OF THE TSUNAMI’S WAVE RUNUP. LEAVE, IF ENOUGH ADVANCE WARNING EVACUATE TO A TALL BUILDING OR A HIGHER ELEVATION TO GET BEYOND REACH OF THE TSUNAMI’S WAVE RUNUP.

22. THE ART AND SCIENCE OF KNOWING WHEN TO EVACUATE BEFORE A TSUNAMI WAVE ARRIVES AND WHERE TO GO CAN BE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH.

23. EVACUATION FOR A TSUNAMI IS COMPLICATED BY: 1) THE SHORT TIME BETWEEN THE EARTHQUAKE AND THE TSUNAMI WAVE ARRIVAL, AND 2) DAMAGE AND LOSS OF FUNCTION TO BUILDINGS AND INFRASTRUCTURE CAUSED BY THE EARTHQUAKE AND ITS AFTER SHOCK SEQUENCE.

24. WHEN YOU CHOOSE NOT TO EVACUATE, OR YOU ARE UNABLE TO EVACUATE, THE ODDS FOR SURVIVAL ARE LOWER, BECAUSE ---

25. YOU CAN’T OUTRUN OR DIVERT 10-M-HIGH, DEBRIS-LADEN, OCEAN WAVES THAT ARRIVE WITH A HIGH VELOCITY (E.G., 30 TO 300 KM/HR) AND MOVE RAPIDLY INLAND FOR 2-3 KM, OR MORE

26. DETAILS OF THE STORY

27. EXAMPLE 1: GREAT SUMATRA EARTHQUAKE-INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI DISASTER DECEMBER 26, 2004 (A Sunday morning)

28. ABOUT ½ HOUR FOR TSUNAMI WAVES TO REACH BANDA ACHE; LONGER FOR OTHER LOCATIONS

30. TSUNAMI TRAVERSES INDIAN OCEANI: 26 DECEMBER 2004

31. THE FACTS THE TSUNAMI WAS GENERATED BY A SHALLOW, M 9.3 EARTHQUAKE LOCATED 260 KM (155 MI) FROM BANDA ACEH, SUMATRA

32. THE FACTS THE TSUNAMI WAVES HAD HEIGHTS OF 4 TO 10 M AND RUNUP OF 3.3 KM OR MORE ON THE COAST LINES OF 12 NATIONS

33. THE FACTS THE EXISTING TSUNAMI WARNING SYSTEM WAS INEFFECTIVE. LITTLE OR NO EVACUATION.

34. THE FACTS (Continued) AN ESTIMATED 220,000 PEOPLE WERE KILLED (120,000 IN INDONESIA) AND 500,000 INJURED IN 12 COUNTRIES BORDERING THE INDIAN OCEAN

35. THE FACTS (Continued) THE MOST URGENT IMMEDIATE NEED WAS FOR FOOD, WATER, AND HEALTH CARE SERVICES. DISEASES APPROACHING AN EPIDEMIC, “A DISASTER AFTER THE DISASTER,” DID NOT HAPPEN.

36. BEFORE DECEMBER 26, 2004 EARTHQUAKE-TSUNAMI

37. AFTER DECEMBER 26, 2004 EARTHQUAKE-TSUNAMI

38. BEFORE DECEMBER 26, 2004 EARTHQUAKE-TSUNAMI

39. AFTER DECEMBER 26, 2004 EARTHQUAKE-TSUNAMI

40. IMPACTS OF TSUNAMI DISASTER MILLIONS DISPLACED AND HOMELESS LOSSES IN $ BILLIONS INTERNATIONAL DONORS CONTRIBUTED OVER $ 1 BILLION IN EFFORT COORDINATED BY THE UN, USA, INDIA, AUSTRALIA, & JAPAN.

41. INTERNATIONAL DONORS RESPOND INTERNATIONAL DONORS CONTRIBUTED OVER $ 1 BILLION IN EFFORT COORDINATED BY THE UN, USA, INDIA, AUSTRALIA, & JAPAN.

42. TSUNAMI WARNING SYSTEM FOR INDIAN OCEAN REGION UNESCO, IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZTIONS, TOOK THE LEAD FOR DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING AN INPROVED TSUNAMI WARNING SYSTEM FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN.