1. Public Economics Introduction to Public Economics John Dobra, Ph.D. University of Nevada

2. Do we need a public sector? Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hand” “…it is only for the sake of profit that any man employs a capital in the support of industry…” and “…he intends only his own gain…,” but in so doing is “…led by an invisible hand…” as “by pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. “ Moreover, he asserts that “I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.”

3. Do we need a public sector? 1 st theorem of welfare economics Any competitive equilibrium is Pareto Optimal

4. Edgeworth Box Person A Person B Good X Good Y Endowment Person B’s Quantity of Good X Person B’s Quantity of Good Y Person A’s Quantity of Good Y Person A’s Quantity of Good X

5. Edgeworth Box Person A Person B Good X Good Y I B1 I B2 I B3 I A1 I A2 I A3 Potential gains from trade Contract Curve

6. Do we need a public sector? Edgeworth Box illustrates 1 st theorem of welfare economics in a trade only setting It can (and has) been extended to include production as well in general equilibrium modeling Upshot: markets work as efficiently as any social planner.

7. Do we need a public sector? Two problems: 1.Equity 2.Efficiency

8. Equity Considerations Person A Person B Good X Good Y I B3 I A3 Equity consideration: All points on contract curve are efficient This first endowment is efficient, where both A and B are almost equally well off So are these two, both of which have a great amount of inequality…in one of them, B is practically A’s slave! Despite the fact that each of these points is efficient, society may care about equity or income distribution

9. Notions of Efficiency Pareto Efficiency Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency (Potential compensation principle) Market decisions are Pareto efficient Public decisions are rarely Pareto efficient, and typically the Kaldor-Hicks criteria are used

10. Efficiency Considerations Proofs of the efficiency of general equilibrium are based on a lot of assumptions! ∞ # of producers and consumers Perfect Information Rivalry and excludability in consumption Lack of externalities Property rights exist for all goods Rule of law is enforced

11. Not ∞ producers and consumers Leads to monopoly/oligopoly/monopsony situation Pricing above marginal cost leads to inefficient outcomes and unrealized gains from trade

12. Rivalry and excludability in consumption Many goods are non-rival and/or non- excludable Public goods, commons goods, etc Consumers have incentives to “free ride” Leads to under-provision

13. Externalities When the actions of one individual/firm affect the profit/utility of some other individual or firm Actor does not bear full cost of actions that create negative externalities and does not receive full benefit of actions creating positive externalities Too much of the actions making negative externalities, not enough of the actions making positive externalities

14. Perfect Information If all agents do not have perfect information, markets are stifled or even eliminated! Lemons model. Leads to unrealized potential gains from trade in equilibrium (not on contract curve)

15. Property Rights and Rule of Law Without property rights for all goods, trading in those goods can not take place, and you have unrealized gains from trade. Rule of Law (the idea that rules are not enforced arbitrarily) allows individuals to engage in long term planning. Without it, production and growth are stunted.

16. Roles of the Government Already hinted at fundamental roles of government on last slide—to create and preserve ability for markets to even work Other fundamental role is to correct so- called “market failures”

17. Market Failure Market failures are common, but how bad are they? Markets have self-correcting mechanisms to mitigate these failures. Coase Theorem Clubs Contestable Market Hypothesis Warrantees, Guarantees, Labeling, Branding

18. Market Failure Market failures, while pervasive, are not all that bad. Still, self correction mechanisms are costly. Scope for government to correct market failure if: They can do it better than the market They can do it more cheaply than the market

19. Public Finance With what is public finance concerned? Redistribution Taxation Regulation Correcting Market Failures Laying groundwork for competitive markets.

20. Redistribution Welfare Unemployment benefits Medicare Old age pensions Minimum wage Education Subsidies

21. Taxation Income Tax Excise Tax “Sin” Tax Tariffs Sales Tax (GST) Stamp Duty Property Tax

22. Regulation Occupational Safety and Health Environment Anti-Trust Drugs Consumer Protection Worker Protection Utilities Telecommunication

23. Correcting Market Failures Encouraging competition by breaking up monopolies/price fixing agreements Providing public goods Discouraging negative externality creating behaviour and encouraging positive externality creating behaviour Improving information asymmetry

24. Laying Groundwork for Competetive Markets Property rights Law and order Rule of law Enforcement of contracts Judicial system Often referred to as minimal government, minarchy, or a “nightwatchman state”

25. Political Compass

26. Most debates in modern democracies are around here Where are you? Try: http://www.politicalcompass.org/ Libertarians and Classical Liberals

27. Public Choice Is all this talk about what the role of a government is simply normative analysis as positive theory? What about the incentives of policy makers?

28. “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” James Madison, Federalist 51

29. Government failure? Information asymmetry Government as a monopolist Divergence between wants of society and wants of politician Corruption Bureaucracy Principal-Agent dilemma Rent Seeking Soft budget constraints/time inconsistency

30. Rent Seeking D P Q MR MC P eff Q eff P* Q* DWL Transfer from consumer to producer (rents) Typically, transfers of this sort are considered to be efficient—at least by Kaldor-Hicks criterion. However, what if real resources are expended to procure this transfer? The practice of wasting resources in trying to get the transfer is called “rent seeking” Not only is the DWL an efficiency loss, but so too is most, if not all--or even more than all--of the value of the rent. There are a lot of situations when rent seeking losses are an important consideration— monopolies, tariffs, subsidies, regulations…