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1 Earthquake Preparedness and Countermeasures in Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau Kazuya YAMANO.

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Presentation on theme: "1 Earthquake Preparedness and Countermeasures in Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau Kazuya YAMANO."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 Earthquake Preparedness and Countermeasures in Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau Kazuya YAMANO

2 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 2 Osaka Municipal Waterworks Japan OSAKA City Kobe City Purification plants: 3 plants Distribution pipes: 5,000 km Water supply capacity: 2,430,000 m 3 /day Area： 211km 2 Population：2.6 million

3 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 3 Improving earthquake preparedness Review of scenario earthquakes (2004～) Outline of Earthquake Preparedness Efforts Earthquake Preparedness Improvement Plan 21(1996) Damage of distribution pipes Kobe Earthquake (1995) Investigation of seismic motion Tsunami Influence on purification plants Estimation

4 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 4 Improving earthquake preparedness Review of scenario earthquakes (2004～) Outline of Earthquake Preparedness Efforts Earthquake Preparedness Improvement Plan 21(1996) Damage of distribution pipes Kobe Earthquake (1995) Investigation of seismic motion Tsunami Influence on purification plants Estimation

5 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 5 8 Basic Elements Osaka Municipal Waterworks Earthquake Preparedness Improvement Plan 21 (1)Improving Earthquake Resistance of Key Facilities (2)Establishing a Water Supply and Distribution Center Network (3)Improving Compatibility among Different Distribution Systems (4)Countermeasures against Power Failure (5)Expanding Emergency Material Stock System (6)Establishing Stable Water Supply Routes to Man-made Islands (7)Improving Reliability of Information and Communication System (8)Improving Earthquake Resistance of Headquarters Necessary for Disaster Relief and Recovery Activities

6 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 6 Earthquake Preparedness (1) Ductile Iron Pipe Length of cast iron pipes 1,278 km (1997) 870 km (2005) Improving earthquake resistance of distribution pipe network

7 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 7 Sakishima Distribution Plant NAGAISAKISHIMA Osaka City KUNIJIMA JOTO OTEMAE TATSUMI SUMIYOSHI SUMINOE OYODO MINATO Nagai : 42,000 ㎥ Sakishima : 30,000 ㎥ Total : 72,000 ㎥ UP Capacity of distribution reservoir Nagai Distribution Plant Distribution Plant (existing) Distribution Plant (newly-built) Earthquake Preparedness (2) Increasing capacity of drinking water reservoirs

8 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 8 Polyethylene Bag (3L, 10L)Water Supply Truck Temporary Water Tank（4m 3 ） Pipe Stock Earthquake Preparedness (3) Sufficiency of emergency materials

9 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 9 Earthquake Preparedness (4) Realization of effective emergency activity Headquarter s Disaster Site Disaster Information Management System Instructions Report

10 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 10 Improving earthquake preparedness Review of scenario earthquakes (2004～) Outline of Earthquake Preparedness Efforts Earthquake Preparedness Improvement Plan 21(1996) Damage of distribution pipes Kobe Earthquake (1995) Investigation of seismic motion Tsunami Influence on purification plants Estimation

11 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 11 Scenario Earthquakes (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (a) Uemachi fault (b) Ikoma fault (c) Arima-Takatsuki-kozosen fault (d) Chuo-kozosen fault (e) Nankai trough (Tonankai- Nankai Earthquake) Tsunami

12 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 12 Improving earthquake preparedness Review of scenario earthquakes (2004～) Outline of Earthquake Preparedness Efforts Earthquake Preparedness Improvement Plan 21(1996) Damage of distribution pipes Kobe Earthquake (1995) Investigation of seismic motion Tsunami Influence on purification plants Estimation

13 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 13 Japan Osaka Kobe Tonankai Nankai Tonankai & Nankai Earthquake (1) Committee on Tonankai & Nankai Tsunami - Tonankai Earthquake : about 60% - Nankai Earthquake : about 50% Scenario Earthquake Earthquake Occurrence Probability (within next 30 years)

14 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 14 Tonankai & Nankai Earthquake (2) Scenario Earthquake - Simultaneous Occurrence of Tonankai & Nankai Earthquakes - JMA Magnitude : 8.4 Earthquake Occurrence Probability Committee on Tonankai & Nankai Tsunami Japan Osaka Kobe Tonankai Nankai

15 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 15 Tonankai & Nankai Earthquake (3) Chairperson: Prof. Kawata ( Kyoto Univ. ) Making map of inundation by Tsunami Possibility of tsunami going over Yodo River Large Weir revealed Members: Osaka City, Osaka Pref., Wakayama Pref. Scenario Earthquake Earthquake Occurrence Probability Committee on Tonankai & Nankai Tsunami Osaka City Inundation map

16 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 16 Preparedness against tsunami caused by Tonankai & Nankai Earthquake Kunijima P.P 1,180,000m 3 ／day Yodo River Lower Flow (Osaka Bay) Upper Flow Examination of Intake of Kunijima purification plant along Yodo River ： (1) Chloride ion (2) Turbidity Overflow Committee on the Influence on Water Treatment by Tsunami in Yodo River Yodo River Large Weir Intake of Kunijima P.P

17 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 17 Tsunami simulation Tsunami arrives at the Yodo River estuary within 2 hours and the Yodo River Large Weir within 2.5 hours after the earthquake. Japan Osaka Kobe JMA Magnitude : 8.4 Yodo River Yodo River Large Weir Osaka Bay Tonankai Nankai Model of seismic source (River flow : 196m 3 /s)

18 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 18 Chloride Ion Concentration Yodo River Kobe Osaka Maximum height of tsunami ( m ) Tsunami simulation Chloride ion concentration Yodo River Large Weir (River flow : 196m 3 /s) Upper Flow Lower Flow (Osaka Bay) Adjustment gate Main gate Okawa River Yodo River Large Weir Kema Water Gate Kema Lock Gate Adjustment gate Intake point

19 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 19 At Intake point, maximum concentration of Chloride ion is about 1,000 mg/L and maximum duration of concentration level exceeding water quality standards is about 1 hour. Conclusion Necessity of preparedness against tsunami Time of concentration being over standards (h)

20 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 20 Improving earthquake preparedness Review of scenario earthquakes (2004～) Outline of Earthquake Preparedness Efforts Earthquake Preparedness Improvement Plan 21(1996) Damage of distribution pipes Kobe Earthquake (1995) Investigation of seismic motion Tsunami Influence on purification plants Estimation

21 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 21 Making damage ratio equations Collection and organization of data relevant to seismic damage of distribution pipes STEP1 STEP2 Damage estimation of distribution pipes based on scenario earthquakes STEP3 Investigation Flow Chart

22 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 22 Points of the Review  Upgraded seismic damage data obtained from recent research on earthquake engineering  New estimation of the seismic damages of distribution pipes in liquefied area

23 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 23 ◆ Previous research ◆ Data Utilized (1) 【2km×2km data near seismometers （JWWA1996，1998）】 = 29 areas

24 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 24 ◆Present research◆ 【250m×250m data（JWWA1996）】 Data Utilized (2) Seismic Motion of Kobe Earthquake Reproduced Damage Ratio of Distribution Pipes during Kobe Earthquake = about 4,800 meshes

25 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 25 Damage Ratio Equation D 0 : Average Ratio of Damage (points/km) PGV: Peak Ground Velocity (cm/s) a, b: Coefficient Constant D = D 0 x C 1 x C 2 D 0 = a x (PGV - b) D: Rate of Damage (points/km) C 1 : Diameter Correction Factor C 2 : Ground Correction Factor

26 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 26 Classification of Liquefaction (1) Liquefaction Assessment Liquefaction Level as Classified by JWWA PL-value calculated by Osaka Municipal Waterworks Bureau Non-Liquefaction Half-Liquefaction Liquefaction

27 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 27 ◆Liquefied Ground◆ Relation between PL value and liquefied area PL value Liquefaction frequency (%) - : cumulo-probability density function Relation between PL value and liquefied area PL value Liquefaction frequency (%) Classification of Liquefaction (2)

28 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 28 D 0 =0.0065 x (PGV－15)D 0 =0.0153 x (PGV－15) Damage Ratio Equation (Non-Liquefied Ground) 0 1 2 050100150200 【Kobe earthquake】 □ 2km mesh area data ● 250m×250m data 【function】 ━ Osaka(2006) ━ Osaka(1997) ━ JWWA(1998) 0 1 2 3 4 050100150200 PGV (cm/s) Damage ratio (points/km) Damage ratio (points/km)

29 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 29 Average Damage Ratio=2.56 Damage Ratio (Liquefied Ground) Average Damage Ratio=4.00 [Reference] 2.56 0 2 4 6 8 10 050100150200 4 0 2 4 6 8 10 050100150200 PGV (cm/s) Damage ratio (points/km) Damage ratio (points/km) 【Kobe earthquake】 □ 2km mesh area data ● 250m×250m data 【function】 ━ Osaka(2006) ━ JWWA(1998) [Reference]

30 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 30 Making damage ratio equations Collection and organization of the data relevant to seismic damage of distribution pipes STEP1 STEP2 Damage estimation of distribution pipes based on scenario earthquakes STEP3 Investigation Flow Chart  Examining upper value of damage ratio  Examining value of damage ratio in liquefied ground

31 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 31 Advanced Investigation Plan Damage Estimation of Distribution Pipes1 Simulation of Areas Affected by Water Suspension 2 Estimation of Seismic Damage to the Water Supply System 3 Examination of Effective Earthquake Countermeasures 4

32 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 32 Thank you for your attention!

33 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 33 Vertical Two-Dimensional Box Model Depth Direction Flow Direction Cell: Move of water and suspended solid is ignored

34 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 34 Tsunami Simulation

35 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 35 Items of settingSetting value Equations Basic EquationNonlinear Long Wave Equation Difference SchemeStaggered Grid and Leap-Flog Method Overflow EquationHonma Equation Conditions Fault ModelShown in Slide No.4 Grid Scale1350m→450m→150m→50m→25m→12.5m Initial Tidal Height H.W.L.（O.P.+2.10m） ※T.P.±0.0m＝O.P.±0.0m＋1.30m River Flow 62m 3 /s, 196m 3 /s, 300m 3 /s, 500m 3 /s, 820m 3 /s, 3000m 3 /s Gate HeightDecide the Gate Height every River Flow Time StepΔt=0.3s Reproduce Time6hours, 12hours Offshore Boundary ConditionPermeable Condition Onshore Boundary ConditionReflect Condition Eddy Viscosity CoefficientAH=0.0 Roughness Coefficientn=0.025 Equations and Conditions (Tsunami Simulation)

36 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 36 Calculation ModelVertical 2-D Box Model Grid Scale Flow DirectionDx = 200m Depth DirectionDz = 1m Time StepDt = 1s Velocity Distribution Tsunami Run-upUniform Velocity Profile OtherLogarithmic Velocity Profile Overflow EquationHonma's Equation Pick-up Mass of Bed Material Applying the pick-up rate of mud and clay Multiplying the mass fraction of clay component material in bed to pick-up mass Bed material only pick-up from the river estuary to 11 km upper point Manning's roughness 0.025 Fall VelocityTsuruya's Equation Equations and Conditions (Calculation of the chloride ion concentration)

37 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 37 Seismic Motion & Damage of pipes Seismic Motion of Kobe Earthquake Reproduced Damage Ratio of Distribution Pipes during Kobe Earthquake Strongest Shaking Area

38 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 38 PL Value w(z) =10 – 0.5 x z F =1 – FL (FL<1.0) 0 ( FL>=1.0) z : Depth from surface

39 OSAKA Municipal Waterworks Bureau 39 Disaster Information Management System Support for information to citizens and Osaka City Disaster Countermeasures Headquarters Pipeline restoration Seismic damage simulation function Disaster Emergency Activities Information Management Functions Integrated Management Emergency water supply Facility restoration

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