1. Warren and Thomson on Abortion Liberal and Moderate Views

2. Warren, " Moral and Legal Status "  In addressing the question of the moral status of abortion Warren starts where we started: with a discussion of how to define the moral community.  As we discovered, defining it requires specifying the property(ies) that establishes DMS.

3. One Answer: Genetic Humanity  As we saw in JPII ' s discussion, some people identify our shared genetic heritage as the property that establishes DMS.  Problem: Without an account of the connection between our biology and our morality (and perhaps even with) this claim is question begging.  " …in the absence of any argument showing that whatever is genetically human is also morally human…nothing more than genetic humanity can be demonstrated by the presence of the human genetic code " (278c2).

4. Warren ' s Answer  Distinguishing genetic humanity from moral humanity, Warren ' s identification of the property that establishes DMS is: " the moral community consists of all and only people, rather than all or only human beings (in the genetic sense) (279c1). "  Not a perfect definition. What about this concept of " Person? "

5. Defining Personhood  One question to ask is: "Is it one thing that makes someone a moral person, or is it a number of things?"  Warren thinks the latter is true. A number of features (or capacities) must be present for the property of personhood to be present. See the list at 279c2.  Warren does not claim that these criteria are exhaustive or even necessary, but she insists that something which meets none of these criteria cannot be considered a person in the moral sense.

6. The Thought Experiment  Warren uses a thought experiment to help us grasp what she thinks is the intuitive appeal of the capacities on the list.  If we encountered an alien species with substantial apparent social/technological development, what capacities would we look for to determine whether they were members of the moral community.

7. Important Implications  Some human beings (in the genetic sense) are not people and some people are not human beings.  If we take this implication seriously, we must recognize that assigning moral rights to a non-person is as unjustified as assigning moral responsibilities to them.

8. Two Important Questions  At what level of fetal development should a fetus be considered a person? Warren insists that we should not let similarities of appearance confuse the issue (280-1).  What about the potential of the fetus to be a person? Though Warren does not deny the significance of this potential, she does insist that the rights of potential persons in no way outweigh rights of an actual person.

9. Postscript on Infanticide  To the objection that the personhood criteria enumerated in the article would seem to lead to the conclusion that there is nothing morally wrong with infanticide, Warren points to the value that children have to other people (instrumental value).  To the counter claim that these sort of concerns also suggest that abortion is wrong, Warren notes that there is a difference. In the case of infants, the mother's rights to self-determination are not impacted (the child is independent). But forcing a woman to carry a baby does impact her rights.

10. Thomson For the " Defense "  Thomson starts where Warren leaves us, with the concept of person.  Like Warren, she's not too complimentary of various attempts to define the fetus as a person, that is to grant it DMS.  She highlights a new line of argument: the problem of line drawing. Her response is to identify it as a slippery slope fallacy.

11. Right To Life?  Even if we granted the claim to personhood, it would not be enough to assign to it a right to life.  Thought Experiment: The Unconscious Violinist. "Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation" (285c2)?  This thought experiment allows her to quickly review and catalog a range of conservative positions.

12. What is a Right to Life?  One of the temptations to talk of a 'right to life' is that the nature of the right is underdetermined.  Some interpret it broadly as a right to the means necessary to sustain life. Certainly can't include subordination of others to your right.  Others interpret it more narrowly as a right not to be killed by anyone. Here too, however, we have to be careful to recognize coordinate rights

13. Do We have a Right to Life?  Does justice require your subordination to the life of the violinist? Only if you have agreed to the use of your kidneys and then renege. So if he does have a right to life, it's not one you violate by unplugging yourself from him.  The upshot of all of this is not that we don't have a right to life, but that, "…having a right to life does not guarantee having either a right to be given the use of or allowed the right to be allowed continued use of another person's body…" (286c2).

14. What about Abortion  For Thomson, the proper understanding of the right to life is the "…right not to be killed unjustly" (287c1).  Thus, in the case of abortion, the issue is not does the fetus have DMS, but, even if it does, does that moral standing make killing it unjust.

15. Is Abortion Unjust Killing?  One important concern is the proximity of pregnancy to the violin player thought experiment.  After all, we've already noted that if you agreed to let the violin player use your kidneys, you are in a much different situation than if you were just an unwilling host.  One common claim (the woman willingly engaged in intercourse knowing that pregnancy was a possible implication) would suggest that the woman has at least partial responsibility for the pregnancy and thus it would be unjust to have an abortion.

16. Implications of Willfulness  A new line of argumentation: dependency of the fetus on the mother (emphasizing the responsibility inherent in willfulness).  Leaves open a series of exceptions including all of those when the will of the woman is constrained or interrupted (occurent or dispositional coercion).  Claim is not as obvious as it is common. Open window does not give a burglar a right to come in; defective bars do not help.  At best, Thomson suggests, willfulness establishes that some cases of abortion are unjust, not that they all are.

17. Argument from Virtue  Leaving justice to the side, Thomson want us to recognize that the right to life doesn't exhaust the issue.  Let's say that the violinist only needed an hour of your time. She suggests that it would be immoral to detach her not because she has a right to life but because the burden on us is so small that to refuse it would be callous and selfish.  In other words, virtue ethical concerns seem operative in these circumstances (e.g., abortion) and should lead us to conclude that some (though not all) abortions are wrong (though not necessarily unjust and not because of RTL).

18. Good vs. Minimally Decent Samaritan  The Good Samaritan is a person who goes out of the way, at some significant personal cost, to help someone out.  The Minimally Decent Samaritan is the person who seeks to help, but not at any significant personal cost or deflection.  Thomson argues that the proper standard, both morally and legally is the MDS. To require GS is to require of moral agents more than they are responsible for (supererogatory actions). That's all that we can ask of pregnant women.

19. Two Liberal Objections  Thomson's view is a moderate one. There may be many cases when carrying a child to terms requires only MDS, and in these cases the mother has a moral obligation to do so. Largely on the basis of VE concerns.  The permissibility of abortion in a number of situations is not equivalent to a right to kill a fetus. She's not explicit here, but she seems to suggest that after viability, methods of abortion which would preserve fetal life (c-section) should be employed.