1. Formal Methods for Privacy Formal Methods 2009 Eindhoven, The Netherlands November 4, 2009 Jeannette M. Wing Assistant Director Computer and Information Science and Engineering Directorate and President’s Professor of Computer Science Carnegie Mellon University

2. 2FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Broader Context: Trustworthy Systems Trustworthy =  Reliability  Security  Privacy  Usability

3. 3FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Broader Context: Trustworthy Systems Trustworthy =  Reliability Does it do the right thing?  Security How vulnerable is it to attack?  Privacy Does it protect a person’s information?  Usability Can a human use it easily?

4. 4FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Technical Progress: Reliability Formal definitions, theories, models, logics, languages, algorithms, etc. for stating and proving notions of correctness. Tools for analyzing systems—from code to architecture—for desired and undesired properties Use of languages, tools, etc. in industry. –“Reliable” [= “good enough”] systems in practice: telephony, the Internet, desktop software, your automobile Examples: –Strongly typed programming languages rule out entire classes of errors. –Database systems are built to satisfy ACID properties: atomicity, consistency, isolation, durability –Byzantine fault-tolerance, n > 3t+1 –Impossibility results, e.g., distributed consensus with 1 faulty node Current challenge: Nature and scale of systems and their operating environments are more complex, forcing us to revisit these fundamental results. E.g., cyber-physical systems, safety-critical systems.

5. 5FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Formal definitions, theories, models, logics, languages, algorithms, etc. for stating and proving notions of security. Tools for analyzing systems—from code to architecture—desired and undesired properties Use of languages, tools, etc. in industry. –Secure [= “secure enough”] systems in practice: telephony, the Internet, desktop software, your automobile (today) Examples: –Cryptography –Systems designed to satisfy informally CIA properties (confidentiality, integrity, availability). –Logic of authentication [BurrowsAbadiNeedham89], logic for access control [LampsonAbadiBurrowsWobber92] Technical Progress: Security Current challenges: (1) Assumptions have changed; revisit the blue. (2) Fill in the gray. (3) Nature and scale of systems and their operating environments are more complex, forcing us to revisit the fundamentals. E.g., today’s crypto rests (mostly) on RSA, i.e., hardness of factoring.

6. 6FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Technical Progress: Privacy ? Examples: - Privacy-preserving data mining [DworkNissam04] - Private matching [LiTygarHellerstein05] - Differential privacy [Dwork et al.06] - Privacy policy language [BarthDattaMitchellNissenbaum06] - Privacy in statistical databases [Fienberg et al. 04, 06] - Non-interference, confidentiality [GoguenMeseguer82,TschantzWing08]

7. 7FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Aspects to Privacy Philosophical Societal Legal Political Technical

8. Philosophical Views on Privacy Rights

9. 9FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Two Approaches Descriptive –Attempts to answer the question “What is privacy?” –Gives a precise definition or analysis of concepts –Need not justify ethical questions as part of analysis Prescriptive –Explains why we value privacy and why privacy should be respected by others (individuals, organizations, governments) Often intertwined, masking the distinctions

10. 10FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Descriptive (What is Privacy?) Restrictions on the access of other people to an individual’s information. vs. An individual’s control over personal information.

11. 11FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Prescriptive (Value of Privacy) Fundamental human right vs. Instrumental: value of privacy derives from the value of other, more fundamental values privacy allows –E.g., autonomy, fairness, intimate relations

12. Philosophical Views on Privacy Violations [Solove 2006]

13. 13FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Model Data Subject Data Data Holder

14. 14FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Four Classes Invasions Information collection Information processing Information dissemination

15. 15FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Invasions Physical intrusions –Trespassing –Blocking passage Decisional interference –Interfering with personal decisions E.g., use of contraceptives, abortion, sodomy Perhaps reducible to violations of other rights o property and security  intrusions o autonomy and liberty  decisional interference

16. 16FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Information Collection Surveillance Interrogation Making observations } Makes people uncomfortable about how collected information will be used, even if never used. Puts people in awkward positions of having to refuse to answer questions. Even in the absence of violations, collection should be controlled in order to prevent other violations, e.g., blackmail. Credit: Apple, Inc.

17. 17FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Information Processing (I) Aggregation - Combines diffuse pieces of information - Enables inferences otherwise unavailable Identification - Links information with a person - Enables inferences, alters how a person is treated Insecurity - Makes information more available to those unauthorized - Leads to identity theft, distortion of data Secondary Uses - Makes information available for purposes not originally intended Exclusion - Inability of data subject to know what records are kept, to view them, to know how they are used, or to correct them Credit: Abingdon Press

18. 18FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Information Processing (II) All types create uncertainty on the part of the data subject Even in the absence of abuse, uncertainty can cause people to live in fear of how information may be used

19. 19FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Information Dissemination Disclosure Making private information known outside the group of individuals expected to know it Exposure Embarrassing information shared, stripping data subject of dignity Appropriation (related to distortion) Associates a person with a cause/product he did not agree to endorse Increased accessibility Data holder makes previously available information more easily acquirable Confidentiality breach Trusted data holder provides information about data subject, e.g., doctor-patient, lawyer-client, priest-parishioner Blackmail Threat of dissemination unless demand is met, creating a power relationship with no social benefits Distortion Presentation of false information about person, harming not just subject, but also third parties no longer able to accurately judge subject’s character

20. Technology Raises New Privacy Concerns

21. 21FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Technology vs Legal The courts often lead the examination of these questions. –Cameras [Warren and Brandeis 1890], wiretapping, aerial observation, tracking devices, hidden video cameras, thermal imaging, … –Leads to new regulations in US (e.g., HIPPA), France (e.g., SAFARI), Canada (e.g., PIPED), … Often flip-flopping decisions, e.g., US Total Information Awareness data mining program Technological advances represent progress, but often raise new privacy concerns. – –How does the new technology affect privacy? – –How should we mitigate ill effects? Credit: Sony Corporation

22. Technology Helps Preserve Privacy

23. 23FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Diversity of Technical Approaches Technology can make some violations impossible –Cryptography One-time pads guarantee perfect secrecy Voting schemes that prevent attacks of coercion –Formal verification Secure operating systems kernels Technology can mitigate attacks of intrusion –Intrusion detection systems, spam filters Technology can preserve degrees of privacy –Onion routing for anonymity –Privacy-preserving data mining Technology can provide assurance –Logics of knowledge for reasoning about secrecy and anonymity

24. 24FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Computer Scientists Have Focused Primarily on Disclosure and Aggregation Invasions –Physical –Decisional Information collection –Surveillance –Interrogation Information processing –Aggregation –Identification –Insecurity –Secondary Uses –Exclusion Information dissemination –Confidentiality breach –Disclosure –Exposure –Distortion –Appropriation (related to distortion) –Increased accessibility –Blackmail Future work: Many other aspects of privacy have not been addressed

25. 25FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Recent Work on Disclosure and Aggregation Linkage attacks Anonymizing search query logs, databases –K-anonymity Deleting private information –Vanishing data, unvanishing data Statistical approaches –Releasing tables of data: frequencies or aggregations of individual counts –Releasing micro-data: sanitization of individual responses Semantic approaches –Differential privacy

26. 26FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Vanishing Data: Overcoming New Risks to Privacy (University of Washington) [USENIX June 2009] Yesterday (Data on Personal/Company Machines) Private Data Tomorrow (Data in “The Cloud”) Data passes through ISPs Data stored in the “Cloud” Sept 18: Unvanishing Data (Princeton and Rice) breaks Vanishing Data

27. 27FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Differential Privacy Add noise to value of statistic. Adversary cannot learn about any one individual. Motivation: Dalenius [1977] proposes the privacy requirement that an adversary with aggregate information learns nothing about any of the data subjects that he could not have known without the aggregrate information. Dwork [2006] proves this is impossible to hold. Dwork et al. [2006] introduces a tunable probabilistic differential privacy requirement.

28. Opportunities for Formal Methods

29. 29FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Generic Formal Methods Models Logics Policy Languages Abstraction and Refinement Policy Composition Code-Level Analysis Automated Tools

30. 30FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Models Traditional –Reliability: System + Environment –Security: System + Adversary Privacy –Data Subject + Data Holder + Adversary Traditional –Algebraic, compositional Privacy –Trust is not transitive X trusts Y, Y trusts Z does not imply X trusts Z Future Work: New models to capture new relationships Data Subject Data Data Holder X Y Z

31. 31FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Logics Traditional Properties are assertions over traces, e.g., sequences of states and/or transitions Privacy Some information-flow properties cannot be expressed as trace properties [McLean 1994] –E.g., non-interference, “secrecy” Future Work: Logics for specifying and reasoning about such non-trace properties and other privacy properties s 1 s 2 s 3 s 4 s 5 … t 1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t 5 …

32. 32FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Policy Languages Informal –Corporate privacy policies Formal notation, informal semantics –Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) –Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) Formal policy language by Barth et al. –Linear temporal logic, semantics based on Nissenbaum’s “contextual integrity” Future Work: Richer set of formal privacy policy languages with tool support

33. 33FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Policy Composition (Open) Given: Components A and B Privacy policies P 1 and P 2 If A P 1 and B P 2, A  B P 1  P 2 Example: National Science Foundation (NSF) and National Institutes of Health (NIH) reviewer policies conflict. ?

34. Privacy-Specific Needs

35. 35FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Statistical/Quantitative Reasoning Traditional –Correctness: yes/no –Security: information-flow yes/no Statistical aggregration –A “small” amount of flow may be acceptable E.g., average weight hides weights of individuals Future work: Combine traditional formal methods with statistical models/methods

36. 36FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Broader Context: Trustworthy Systems Trustworthy =  Reliability  Security  Privacy  Usability Tradeoffs among all four.

37. Privacy and Usability

38. 38FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Clicking Your Way Through Privacy (IE)

39. 39FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Clicking Your Way Through Privacy (Firefox)

40. 40FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Do You Read These? What Are They Saying? This privacy statement goes on for seven screenfuls! Windows Media Player 10 Privacy Statement

41. 41FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Privacy: A Few Questions to Ponder 1.What does privacy mean? 2.How do you state a privacy policy? How can you prove your system satisfies it? 3.How do you reason about privacy? How do you resolve conflicts among different privacy policies? 4.Are there things that are impossible to achieve wrt some definition of privacy? 5.How do you implement practical mechanisms to enforce different privacy policies? As they change over time? 6.How do you measure privacy? (Is that a meaningful question?)

42. 42FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Postlude My talk is based on a paper with my student, Michael Tschantz. My talk is a bit US-centric. Please share your views on privacy with me. Our paper has 77 references. Please let me know of work we missed.

43. 43FM 2009Jeannette M. Wing Thank you!

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