1. Stephen M. Sohinki Director Office of Price-Anderson Enforcement ASQ 2005 National Energy and Environmental Conference September 18-22, 2005

2. Price-Anderson History t Price-Anderson Act enacted in 1957 provided prompt compensation for a nuclear incident  Provided broad financial coverage for damage, injury, and costs of evacuation (up to statutory limit of $9.43 billion per incident)  Required DOE to indemnify contractors 1

3. t Price-Anderson Amendment Act (1988) extended indemnification for 15 years and required DOE to establish and enforce nuclear safety rules t Nuclear safety rules for radiological protection, quality assurance, safety basis and contractor employee protection have been issued by DOE Price-Anderson History (cont’d) 2

4. t Price-Anderson Amendment Reauthorization  Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act extended current indemnification levels until December 31, 2004.  It also required DOE to promulgate final rules by December 2003 to enforce Occupational Safety and Health requirements. Price-Anderson History (cont’d) 3

5.  Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act extended indemnification until December 2006  Proposal to repeal remission of Civil Penalties for not-for-profits deferred  Proposal to increase coverage to $10 billion per incident deferred  All enforcement requirements were unchanged Price-Anderson History (cont’d) 4

6.  Energy Policy Act of 2005  Indemnifies DOE contractors until December 2025  Increases coverage to $10 billion per incident, subject to adjustment for inflation.  Repeals remission of civil penalties for nonprofits upon signing of new contract. Civil penalties limited to total fees paid to contractor in year of violation.  No reimbursement for legal expenses in retaliation cases in which employee wins, unless required by contract signed prior to statute’s effective date 5

7. Enforcement Philosophy  Relationship with contractors different from NRC’s arms-length relationship with regulated utilities  Use of program as a tool to promote proactive contractor behavior resulting in safety performance improvement  Emphasis on promoting contractor timely identification, reporting, and correction of noncompliances  Noncompliance Tracking System  Mitigation 6

8. The Big Picture Problems  OE perception: Lack of progress being made in nuclear safety performance improvement  Complex still event-driven  Too many recurring violations 7

9. The Big Picture Problems (cont’d)  Failure to learn from operating experience – this means inadequate:  Corrective Actions  Root Cause  Extent of Condition  Performance Assessment  Real senior management commitment lacking  It all comes down to culture 8

10. INPO Nuclear Safety Culture Definition An organization’s values and behaviors – modeled by its leaders and internalized by its members – that serve to make nuclear safety the overriding priority (emphasis added) 9

11. INPO Principles  Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety  Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety  Trust permeates the organization  Decision-making reflects safety first 10

12. INPO Principles (cont’d)  Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique  A questioning attitude is cultivated  Organizational learning is embraced  Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination 11

13.  EFCOG Assessment Guide  Highlights obstacles and approach to overcome obstacles  Available at the following address: http://www.efocg.org/workgroup/paaa  EFCOG PAAA Working Group developing extent of condition guidance Improvement Initiatives 12

14.  OE will examine all options available to encourage senior management to address recurring violations:  Use of full authority in 2004  Escalation for recurring violations expected to be a continuing trend  Compliance audits? Improvement Initiatives (cont’d) 13

15. Nuclear Safety Excellence Model Strong Human Performance Effective Operational Processes Supporting Programs & Safety Features SAFE OPERATIONS 14

16. Nuclear Safety Excellence Model Safe Operations  No serious or potentially serious nuclear safety events  Only rare occurrences of other important events with lesser nuclear safety consequences Safe Operations  No serious or potentially serious nuclear safety events  Only rare occurrences of other important events with lesser nuclear safety consequences 15

17. Safe Operations Serious Events  Loss of all criticality contingencies  TSR safety limit violation  Fire in primary confinement/containment  Explosive safety (ORPS Category 1) 16

18. Safe Operations Serious Events (cont’d)  Radiation exposure (any ORPS reportable)  Radioactive area contamination (100 x 835 value)  Radioactive material loss (100 x 835 value)  Any unplanned offsite release of radioactive material  Personnel contamination requiring medical assistance 17

19. Safe Operations Other Important Events  Loss of one or more criticality controls  TSR and DSA violations (non safety limit)  Actuation of an SSC  Fire (other ORPS reportable) 18

20.  Other Important Events (cont’d)  Explosive safety (other ORPS reportable)  Radioactive area contamination (10-100 x 835 value)  Radioactive material loss (<100 x 835 value)  Personnel contamination (other ORPS reportable) Safe Operations 19

21. Nuclear Safety Excellence Model Human Performance  Management demonstrates effective leadership and commitment to nuclear safety  Workers exhibit a sound nuclear safety culture  Contractor personnel are well qualified Human Performance  Management demonstrates effective leadership and commitment to nuclear safety  Workers exhibit a sound nuclear safety culture  Contractor personnel are well qualified 20

22. Nuclear Safety Excellence Model Effective Operational Processes  Broad and effective efforts to identify safety and quality problems  Problems effectively resolved & corrected  Excellence in work management and conduct of operations Effective Operational Processes  Broad and effective efforts to identify safety and quality problems  Problems effectively resolved & corrected  Excellence in work management and conduct of operations 21

23. Nuclear Safety Excellence Model Strong Supporting Programs & Safety Features  Safety Basis & Criticality Safety Controls  Radiological Program Controls  Other Quality Assurance Programs  Facility & Safety Condition Strong Supporting Programs & Safety Features  Safety Basis & Criticality Safety Controls  Radiological Program Controls  Other Quality Assurance Programs  Facility & Safety Condition 22

24. Serious Nuclear Safety Events Note: Dominated by Radiation Exposure Events 23

25. Other Important Nuclear Safety Events Note: Dominated by SB Noncompliance, Spread of Contamination, and Personnel Contamination Events 24

26. Identifying Problems (NTS W/ORPS) 25

27. Worker Safety and Health Rule 10 CFR 851  Supplemental Proposal issued January 26, 2005  Comment period ended April 26, 2005  Comment resolution essentially complete  Final Rule package to Office of Management and Budget by September 30, 2005 26

28.  Enforcement philosophy same as nuclear  Enforcement process similar to nuclear  Contractors have 180 days from final publication to submit Safety and Health Program  DOE has 90 days to review and comment  Enforcement starts one year from final issuance Worker Safety and Health Rule 10 CFR 851 27

29. Civil Penalties  $70,000 per day per violation potential maximum  No exemption for not-for-profits  Contract or Civil Penalty but not both Noncompliances  Severity Level I   Serious  Severity Level II   Other than serious NTS Reporting  Thresholds to be established Worker Safety and Health Rule 10 CFR 851 28