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Auctions for robotics panel: talking points Robotics setting –Incentives usually don’t matter –Problems are combinatorial/multi-attribute => modern work on complex auctions & exchanges can be helpful –Similar to other MAS (at least from a coordination perspective)
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Peer-to-peer negotiation Marginal cost based contracting [AAAI-93, ICMAS-95, PhD-96] –Automated cost computation –Issues emerging from distributed implementation Parellellism vs monotonicity Avoiding msg saturation Termination, … –Contracting as hill-climbing [AAAI SS-98] –OCSM-contracts [AAAI SS-98, ICMAS-98, AAAI-99, ICDCS-00] Leveled commitment contracts [ICMAS-95, AAAI-96, IJCAI-99, GEB-01, AIJ-02] –Sequences – cascades [ICMAS-98, J. Econ. Dynamics & Control-01]
![Peer-to-peer negotiation Marginal cost based contracting [AAAI-93, ICMAS-95, PhD-96] –Automated cost computation –Issues emerging from distributed implementation Parellellism vs monotonicity Avoiding msg saturation Termination, … –Contracting as hill-climbing [AAAI SS-98] –OCSM-contracts [AAAI SS-98, ICMAS-98, AAAI-99, ICDCS-00] Leveled commitment contracts [ICMAS-95, AAAI-96, IJCAI-99, GEB-01, AIJ-02] –Sequences – cascades [ICMAS-98, J.](http://images.slideplayer.com./23/6665135/slides/slide_2.jpg "Econ. Dynamics & Control-01].")
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Mediated markets Removes negotiation process uncertainty => better allocations Usually faster as well Package bidding expressive competition [DCR-01, GEB- 06, Interfaces-06, IAAI-06, …] –Rich forms of offer constructs –Side constraints –Multi-attribute functionality Preference elicitation from the different parties (studied for CAs & CEs already) [EC-01, AAAI-02, EC-03, …] –Focuses the agents’ marginal cost/value computations
![Mediated markets Removes negotiation process uncertainty => better allocations Usually faster as well Package bidding expressive competition [DCR-01, GEB- 06, Interfaces-06, IAAI-06, …] –Rich forms of offer constructs –Side constraints –Multi-attribute functionality Preference elicitation from the different parties (studied for CAs & CEs already) [EC-01, AAAI-02, EC-03, …] –Focuses the agents’ marginal cost/value computations](http://images.slideplayer.com./23/6665135/slides/slide_3.jpg "Mediated markets Removes negotiation process uncertainty => better allocations Usually faster as well Package bidding expressive competition [DCR-01, GEB- 06, Interfaces-06, IAAI-06, …] –Rich forms of offer constructs –Side constraints –Multi-attribute functionality Preference elicitation from the different parties (studied for CAs & CEs already) [EC-01, AAAI-02, EC-03, …] –Focuses the agents’ marginal cost/value computations")
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Deliberation control Heuristically in peer-to-peer negotiation [AAAI-93, ICMAS-95, PhD-96] Game-theoretically –Impossibility results [ICMAS-96, ICEC-00, AAMAS-05] –Using performance profile trees in auctions [TARK-01, AGENTS WS-01, AAMAS-03, AAMAS-04] in bargaining [AIJ-01, AAMAS-02]
![Deliberation control Heuristically in peer-to-peer negotiation [AAAI-93, ICMAS-95, PhD-96] Game-theoretically –Impossibility results [ICMAS-96, ICEC-00, AAMAS-05] –Using performance profile trees in auctions [TARK-01, AGENTS WS-01, AAMAS-03, AAMAS-04] in bargaining [AIJ-01, AAMAS-02]](http://images.slideplayer.com./23/6665135/slides/slide_4.jpg "Deliberation control Heuristically in peer-to-peer negotiation [AAAI-93, ICMAS-95, PhD-96] Game-theoretically –Impossibility results [ICMAS-96, ICEC-00, AAMAS-05] –Using performance profile trees in auctions [TARK-01, AGENTS WS-01, AAMAS-03, AAMAS-04] in bargaining [AIJ-01, AAMAS-02]")
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Online problem Has been studied for multi-unit –auctions [Lavi & Nisan EC-00, …] –exchanges [Blum, Sandholm, Zinkevich SODA-02, JACM-06] Thank you for your attention!
![Online problem Has been studied for multi-unit –auctions [Lavi & Nisan EC-00, …] –exchanges [Blum, Sandholm, Zinkevich SODA-02, JACM-06] Thank you for your attention!](http://images.slideplayer.com./23/6665135/slides/slide_5.jpg "Online problem Has been studied for multi-unit –auctions [Lavi & Nisan EC-00, …] –exchanges [Blum, Sandholm, Zinkevich SODA-02, JACM-06] Thank you for your attention!")
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Preference elicitation from multiple agents
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Monsters Local planning complexity Communication complexity (Loss of privacy)
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Clearing algorithm What info is needed from an agent depends on what others have revealed Elicitor Conen & Sandholm IJCAI-01 workshop on Econ. Agents, Models & Mechanisms, ACMEC-01 Elicitor decides what to ask next based on answers it has received so far $ 1,000 for $ 1,500 for ? for
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