1. Where now for Article 82? Amelia Fletcher Chief Economist Office of Fair Trading BIICL Transatlantic Dialogue 15 May 2008 (The views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of the OFT)

2. Background ● Few Ch2/Art82 cases at OFT ● No sign of long-awaited EC guidelines ● Few s2 cases in the US and no imminent promise of guidelines ● Is this….

3. ….a death knell for Art 82? ARTICLE 82

4. No! The DGComp caseload…. Rambus Intel RWE ENI Alcan EDF Boehringer Qualcomm Microsoft II Electrabel

5. No! UK High Court judgments ● Attheraces v BHRB (Feb 07) ● EW&S v E.ON (Mar 07) ● AAH v Pfizer (Mar 07) ● Chester City Council v Arriva (June 07) ● Software Cellular Network v T-Mobile (Jul 07) ● Virgin Media v BSkyB (case pending)

6. So why no EC guidelines? ● Do the current DGComp cases provide a clue?

7. EDFLong-term exclusive supply agreements ElectrabelLong-term exclusive supply agreements ENICapacity hoarding Strategic under-investment RWEHigh access prices Artificially inflated costs, Capacity hoarding Artificial network fragmentation Microsoft IIRefusal to supply Tying QualcommNon-FRAND licence terms within standard Rambus‘Patent ambush’ Unreasonable royalties IntelLoyalty rebates Below AVC predation Payments to OEMs to delay competitor launches AlcanTying BoehringerMisuse of the patent system

8. So why no EC guidelines? ● Do the current DGComp cases provide a clue? ● Might guidelines restrict the types of abuse that could be examined? ● Or is conflict with past precedent the greater worry?

9. Do we care? ● Art 82 Business ‘pretty brisk’ ● DGComp - and others - broadly taking a more economic approach ● DGComp not losing Art 82 cases

10. Yes! ● The Commission’s ‘more economic approach’ needs Court buy-in ● Guidelines needed for this (prioritisation guidelines would be a start but not enough) ● Guidelines also important for ensuring consistency across EU ● So what can be done?

11. Non-horizontal mergers: a parable ● Cast your mind back 2 years…  Some high profile losses for DGComp  Basic problem: no clear story of harm and no clear empirical testing of logic  Recognised need for change/guidelines ● Guidelines very principles-based: not tools/rules ● Working well - eg TomTom/Tele Atlas

12. Parallels with Article 82? ● Much behaviour categorised as potentially abusive could equally be pro-competitive:  Low pricing and discounting  Offering a second product cheap (or free) with a first  Choosing the right business partner ● Potential for exclusion depends critically on market circumstances ● A clear story of harm would examine ability, incentive, likely effect and efficiency benefits

13. Refusal to Supply by Microsoft: The Commission’s Key Findings Ability to foreclose ● Interoperability necessary for server OS vendors to be effective competitors. There are no substitutes. Incentive to foreclose ● The ‘one monopoly profit’ argument fails on the facts Likely impact on effective competition is substantial ● All competitors refused interoperability ● Microsoft’s share in server market rising fast and indeed now dominant Efficiency benefits do not outweigh harm ● Risk of harm to innovation from abuse outweighs potential harm to innovation incentives from intervention

14. An approach for Art 82 guidelines? ● Principles instead of detailed rules ● Harm to competition (and consumers) is crucial ● Four elements of a clear story of harm:  Ability to foreclose  Incentive to foreclose  Likely impact on effective competition  Efficiency benefits ● Plus: Dynamic ‘trumps’ static

15. Where now for Article 82? Amelia Fletcher Chief Economist Office of Fair Trading BIICL Transatlantic Dialogue 15 May 2008 (The views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of the OFT)