1. Responding to the Threat of Bioterrorism: A Status Report on Vaccine Research in the United States
Good Morning. Over the next 1 ½ hours of so I’ll be talking about some of the biological agents that are considered most concerning if utilized as a bioterrorism agent against civilian populations. I’ll mainly be touching on some of the clinical characteristics of the illnesses caused by these agents and their general medical management.
Dixie E. Snider, M.D., M.P.H.
Associate Director for Science
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

2. Biological Terrorism: Why Be Concerned Now?
Low tech, low expense
Multiple means of dissemination
Developed as biological weapons
Economic, political, religious polarization
Contagiousness/lack of immunity
Diseases unfamiliar/covert action easy
Potential for panic/economic impact
Let’s start out by just touching on why we’re so concerned about this topic these days.
From a political analysis standpoint, it is felt that the make-up, goals, and motivations of terrorist groups have changed. In the past, more terrorist groups had motivations that benefited by gaining some amount of public sympathy for their cause. Committing crimes that resulted in overwhelming public outrage was generally counterproductive to their goal of gaining public support to initiate political change. However, more terrorist groups today could be defined as extremist organizations with religious, racial, or non-support seeking motivations. These groups may feel that their terrorist acts are justified by a “higher purpose” as in the case of some extremist religious or hate groups and may not be restrained by the need to gain public support for their cause.
From a scientific standpoint, the breakup of the Soviet Union and its large bioweapons program may have resulted in the availability of stores of biological weapons or scientific expertise to several other nations who are seeking to develop biological weapons programs despite international regulations prohibiting such programs.
Also, as scientific technology advances, it may become easier for a less sophisticated terrorist to develop and successfully use a biological weapon. Advancing technology in the field of genetics may also open up new arenas for nations or terrorists that have the desire, expertise, and financial backing to explore these possibilities.
This next gentleman speaks to another issue of concern, availability. Although it may not be as easy to develop some biological agents into effective weapons, the availability of some of these agents in nature and the seemingly increased interest in exploring their potential certainly raises concern.

3. Biological Agents of Highest Concern
Variola major (Smallpox)
Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax)
Yersinia pestis (Plague)
Francisella tularensis (Tularemia)
Botulinum toxin (Botulism)
Filoviruses and Arenaviruses (Viral hemorrhagic fevers)
Taking all these things into consideration, the following list of 6 biological agents were identified as agents that would be of greatest concern for public health officials if they were released on a civilian population. Identification of these agents was not based on the probability of their use, but on the impact that their use would have. In other words, being prepared for the worst makes you prepared for the more likely.

4. Other Potential Threats
BACTERIAL
Brucellosis
Q fever
Glanders
Melioidosis
Food/water borne pathogens
VIRAL
Viral encephalitidies
TOXINS
Staph Enterotoxin B
Ricin
Tricothecene mycotoxins
UNKNOWNS
Genetically altered agents
New chemicals
Others

5. Why These Agents? Infectious via aerosol
Susceptible civilian populations
High morbidity and mortality
Person-to-person transmission (smallpox, plague, VHF)
Difficult to diagnose and/or treat
Previous development for BW
Characteristics of these agents which help them meet agent selection considerations include:
Infectious via aerosol, so enhanced potential for affecting a large group of people
Most people will develop illness if exposed to the right dose, no general “inherent” immunity
Kill or severely sicken people that are affected
Some can expand their “initial footprint” because they are contagious
All are fairly uncommon and are therefore more difficult to recognize clinically or don’t have established treatment options
And last but not least, other people have also evaluated these agents and thought enough of them to further develop them as biological warfare agents. For someone that is looking around for a cheap means to cause a lot of harm, going with something that has already been evaluated or developed would make sense….

6. Anthrax: Overview Primarily disease of herbivores
Humans contract disease by contact with infected animals or contaminated animal products
Soil reservoir worldwide
No person-to-person transmission of inhalational anthrax
Cutaneous, gastrointestinal, and inhalational forms
Inhalational form >85% mortality
Our first contestant today is a spore-forming bacteria named Bacillus anthracis. This organism calls many places home and considers itself a citizen of the world as it can be found in soil throughout the world. It causes a disease called anthrax that primarily effects herbivores such as cows who come into contact with the organism through contaminated soil. In a natural setting, humans contract the disease after contact with infected animals or contaminated animal produces such as hides or meat. Anthrax has 3 clinical manifestations; cutaneous disease which occurs after contact with the spore with broken skin, intestinal anthrax, which occurs after ingestion of the spores (such as with contaminated meat), and inhalational, which occurs after inhaling the spores. Drainage from a cutaneous lesion contains the organism and could be infectious, however, inhalational anthrax is not transmitted from person-to-person.

7. Recognition in Florida Inhalational anthrax
63 yo male photo editor employed by AMI
Onset 9/30
Fever
Altered mental status
Admission 10/2
CSF with gram + rods
Positive blood and CSF cultures
Autopsy consistent with inhalational anthrax on 10/6
63 yo male photo editor employed by AMI
Onset 9/30
Fever
Altered mental status
Admission 10/2
CSF with gram + rods
Positive blood and CSF cultures
CDC notification 10/3
Autopsy consistent with inhalational anthrax on 10/6

8. Senator Daschle & Leahy Envelopes: Postmarked 10/9/01

9. Anthrax Bioterrorism Investigations, 2001-2002
1. Palm Beach County – 10/3
3. Washington, DC – 10/15
2. New York City – 10/12
4. Trenton, NJ – 10/17
Anthrax Bioterrorism
Investigations,
5. Oxford, CT – 11/20

10. Bioterrorism-associated Anthrax: Inhalational and Cutaneous Cases
NYC NJ
Inhalational Case FL DC
CT inhalational anthrax case, date of onset - 11/14
NYC
envelopes
9/18*
Senator
envelopes
10/9* 5 4 3
Cases 2 1
9/17
9/21
9/25
9/29
10/3
10/7
10/11
10/15
10/19
10/23
10/27
Date of Onset
*Postmark date of known contaminated envelopes

11. Anthrax: Treatment Antibiotics (combination therapy) Supportive care
ciprofloxacin or doxycycline,
and 1 or 2 of the following:
Penicillin (if PCN susceptible), rifampin, vancomycin, ampicillin, chloramphenicol, imipenem, clindamycin, clarithromycin
Supportive care
Standard precautions, no need for quarantine/isolation
Duration of treatment dependent on form of anthrax and types of exposures
Early treatment improves prognosis
Several antibiotics show in-vitro activity against organism, but only PCN, Doxy, or Cipro labeled for use.
[go over some of slide]

12. Anthrax: Post-Exposure Prophylaxis
Start oral antibiotics soon (<24 hours) after exposure
Ciprofloxacin
Doxycycline
Amoxicillin or Penicillin (if known PCN sensitive)
Antibiotics for up to 100 days without vaccine
Antibiotics until 3 doses of vaccine given (0, 2, 4 weeks) ~ 40 days
[Go over slide]

13. Smallpox: Overview 1980 - Global eradication
Humans only known reservoir
Person-to-person transmission (aerosol/contact)
Up to 30% mortality in unvaccinated
Variola virus, the agent of smallpox
Routine vaccination stopped in US in 1970’s
Global eradication declared by WHO in 1980
No naturally occurring disease presently
Human only known reservoir
Infectious by respiratory route or direct contact
up to 30% mortality in unvaccinated individuals

14. Smallpox: Management Supportive care ?Role of antiviral agents
Strict respiratory/contact isolation of patient
Patient infectious until all scabs have separated
Immediate vaccination of ALL close contacts
All contacts within 17 days of the onset of case’s symptoms
Surveillance of contacts for 17 days
Currently no specific medical treatment for smallpox other than supportive care.
Isolate to prevent transmission
Identify and vaccinate contacts, watch for symptoms of illness

15. Plague: Overview Natural vector - rodent flea Mammalian hosts
Rats, squirrels, chipmunks, rabbits, and carnivores
About cases/year U.S. (all forms)
Mainly SW states
Bubonic, pneumonic, and septicemic forms
[Go over slide]
Picture is wayson’s stain of peripheral blood smear, showing bipolar staining characteristic of organism
CDC

16. Plague: Medical Management
Antibiotic therapy - Gentamicin, Streptomycin, Tetracyclines,
Sulfonamides, Chloramphenicol (meningitis/pleuritis)
Supportive therapy
Isolation and droplet precautions for pneumonic plague until sputum cultures negative
Contacts of pneumonic cases and those exposed at same time as index case given chemoprophylaxis – Doxycycline, Tetracycline or TMP/SMX
Vaccine no longer manufactured in the U.S.
Streptomycin DOC but gent used successfully in substitution because of limited availability of streptomycin, add chloramphenicol if meningitis present
[go over slide]

17. Tularemia: Overview Disease of Northern Hemisphere
In U.S., most cases associated with rabbits/hares and ticks
~ 200 cases/year in U.S.
most in South central and Western states
majority of cases in summer, some in winter
Low infectious dose
1 to 10 organisms by aerosol or intradermal route
No person-to-person transmission
Tularemia caused by Francisella tularensis. Probably disease of all of them that occurs most commonly in US.
[go over slide]
Low infectious dose, no transmission from person to person

18. Tularemia: Clinical Forms
Ulceroglandular
Ulcer with regional adenopathy
Glandular
Regional adenopathy without skin lesion
Oculoglandular
Painful purulent conjunctivitis with adenopathy
Typhoidal
Septicemia, no adenopathy
Possible initial presentation for BT
Pneumonic (primary or secondary)
Multiple clinical forms seen but typhoidal or pneumonic presentations most likely following aerosol release.

19. Tularemia: Treatment/Prophylaxis
Streptomycin or Gentamicin
Tetracyclines
Prophylaxis
Fever watch for 7 days (preferable)
Doxycycline or Tetracycline for 14 days if febrile
Vaccine investigational, not available
Recommended treatments similar to those used for plague. Treatment with Doxy or TCN require longer duration of 2 – 3 weeks because of higher rate of relapse with shorter duration treatments. Strep or gent duration about 7-10 days. Vaccine currently not available and would have essentially no role in post-exposure treatment regimen but might be useful for laboratory worker protection.

20. Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers (VHF): Overview
Caused by several different viruses families
Filoviruses (Ebola, Marburg)
Arenaviruses (Lassa, Junin, Machupo, Sabia, Guanarito)
Bunyaviruses
Flaviviruses
Natural vectors - virus dependent
rodents, mosquitoes, ticks
Viral hemorrhagic fevers are caused by several different virus families but the ones we’re more concerned with are the filo and arenaviruses. These include ebola, marburg, and several South American hemorrhagic fever viruses.
Natural vectors/reservoirs vary and are unknown for the ebola and marburg viruses. Rodent species are the reservoirs for most of the arenaviruses.

21. VHF: Clinical Presentation
Usual patient history
Foreign travel to endemic or epidemic area in rural environment
Nosocomial exposure
Contact with arthropod or rodent reservoir
Domestic animal blood exposure
Incubation
Typical 5 to 10 days (Range 2 to 16 days)
Symptoms
Bleeding, CNS involvement
Mortality agent dependent (10-90%)
Incubation periods are typically between 5-10 days and in a patient with naturally acquired VHF you will usually find a recent history of:
[read slide]

22. Botulism: Overview Caused by toxin from Clostridium botulinum
Toxin types A, B, E, associated with most human disease
Most potent lethal substance known (LD = 1ng/kg)
C. botulinum spores found in soil worldwide
~ 100 reported cases/year in the U.S.
Infant most common (72%)
Food-borne not common
No person-to-person transmission
Botulism is caused by the neurotoxin produced by Clostidium botulinum. Botulinum toxin is one of the most potent substances know in that a very small amount can cause lethal illness if not treated. The organism is ubiquitous and naturally acquired cases of botulism are reported in the US every year. Since botulism results from ingesting or absorbing the toxin through mucous membranes, it is not transmitted from person to person.

23. Botulism: Forms Foodborne Wound Infant
Toxin produced anaerobically in improperly processed or canned, low-acid foods contaminated by spores
Wound
Toxin produced by organisms contaminating wound
Infant
Toxin produced by organisms in intestinal tract
Inhalation botulism
No natural occurrence, developed as BW weapon
Botulism can result from several scenarios of botulinum toxin exposure:
[go through slide]

24. Botulism: Clinical Presentation
Incubation: 18 to 36 hours (dose dependent)
Afebrile, alert, oriented; normal sensory exam
Early nausea, vomiting, diarrhea
Cranial Nerve symptoms
Ptosis, blurry/double vision, difficulty swallowing/talking, decreased salivation
Motor symptoms (progressive)
Bilateral descending flaccid paralysis  respiratory paralysis
Death 60% untreated; <5% treated
No matter the route of exposure, the clinical presentation would be similar, however, the incubation period may be shortened with higher doses of the toxin.
[quickly go through slide, point out decrease in mortality with treatment]

25. Botulism: Treatment/Prophylaxis
Ventilatory assistance and supportive care
Botulinum antitoxin
Licensed trivalent equine product against types A,B, and E available from CDC
Most effective if given early
Antibiotics for wound botulism
PCN
Recovery and supportive care may be prolonged
Toxoid vaccine investigational, not available
Other botulinum antitoxins available as Investigational New Drugs (IND)
Treatment includes ventilatory support as needed and administration of botulinum toxin. The earlier the antitoxin can be given, the better. Even with antitoxin the full recovery may take months.
A toxoid vaccine has been produced by the military but is investigational. Another botulinum antitoxin that is a despeciated equine product has also been produced and is investigational.
Antitoxin could also be considered for prophylaxis following a known exposure. However, there are no standard protocols for the use of antitoxin for this purpose.

26. Anthrax Vaccine Current U.S. vaccine (FDA Licensed)
Culture supernatant containing Protective Antigen (PA) from attenuated non-encapsulated strain
Protective against cutaneous (human data) and possibly inhalational anthrax (animal data)
Licensed 6 dose regimen over 18 months; annual boosters
3 doses (0, 2, and 4 weeks ) appear effective for post-exposure treatment in combination with abx
Limited availability
[go over slide]
Anthrax vaccine currently not a component of NPS. Extended oral regimen appears to be as effective as shortened oral regimen with vaccine.

27. Anthrax Vaccine Adverse Effects
30% or less with mild discomfort at inoculation site for up to 72 hours
tenderness, redness, swelling, or itching
< 2% with more severe local reactions
potentially limited use of the arm for 1- 2 days
Reactions more common in women
Systemic reactions rare
What can you expect to see following vaccination:
[go over slide]
Long-term adverse effects or chronic conditions have not been linked with anthrax vaccine.

28. New Approaches: Anthrax Vaccine
Recombinant vaccines
Mutant-strain vaccines
Purified PA preparations + adjuvant
What can you expect to see following vaccination:
[go over slide]
Long-term adverse effects or chronic conditions have not been linked with anthrax vaccine.

29. AVRP Human Reactogenicity and Immunogenicity Trial to Address Change in Route of Administration and Dose Reduction
Objectives:
To determine impact of AVA route of administration (SQ vs IM) on reactogenicity and immunogenicity among men and women, and
To evaluate the impact of AVA dose reduction from current total of 6 doses with annual booster, to 3 doses with booster every 3 years

30. Anthrax Vaccine Studies
Effect of different doses on immunogenicity and challenge in nonhuman primates (CDC, Battelle)
Serological assays and studies of immune correlates of protection (CDC, FDA, NIH, USAMRIID, Battelle, Emory)
National survey of KSA’s regarding the anthrax vaccine among military personnel (CDC, DOD, RTI)
Survey of health care providers regarding the vaccine and reporting of possible adverse events (CDC, FDA, DOD)
What can you expect to see following vaccination:
[go over slide]
Long-term adverse effects or chronic conditions have not been linked with anthrax vaccine.

31. Anthrax Vaccine Studies
Camparative evaluation of the effect of anthrax vaccine on health-related quality of life (CDC, DOD)
Retrospective study of long –term adverse effects among vaccinated mill workers (CDC)
Study of hormonal correlates of adverse events among female clinical trial participants (CDC, DOD)
Studies of vaccine delivery and follow-up of adverse events (CDC, DOD, NVHCN)
What can you expect to see following vaccination:
[go over slide]
Long-term adverse effects or chronic conditions have not been linked with anthrax vaccine.

32. Smallpox: Current Vaccine
Live Vaccinia virus (not smallpox virus)
~15 million doses in US stores
ID inoculation with bifurcated needle (scarification)
Pustular lesion/induration surrounding central scab/ulcer 6-8 days post-vaccination
Low grade fever, axillary lymphadenopathy
Scar (permanent) demonstrates successful vaccination
Immunity not life-long
[go over current vaccine and how to vaccinate]
Certain type of site reaction indicates successful vaccination
Immunity wanes, really good for about 5 years if vaccinated only once, waning protection for up to 10 year
Longer protection if vaccinated more than once (longer lasting high neutralizing antibody titer)
WHO

33. Smallpox Vaccination: Complications
Approximately 25AR’s/100,000 vaccinations
Most common
Inadvertent inoculation (skin, eye, etc.)
Less Common
Generalized vaccinia
Post-vaccination encephalitis (2.8/million)
Fetal vaccinia
Eczema vaccinatum (4.5/million)
Vaccinia necrosum (0.7/million)
Primary vaccination - 1 death/million
Revaccination deaths/million
Although considered a safe vaccine, some complications can occur. Generally about 25 AE’s (mild to severe)/100,000 vaccinations.
Most common is accidental transfer of virus from vaccine site to another area of body with resultant lesion. Usually only of concern if involves the eye because of edema, possible keratitis, etc.
Other less common AE [read off]
Generalized vaccinia usually mild, patient usually not sick, only requires treatment if severe and pt. Toxic appearing
Death following vaccination usually due to encephalitis or vaccinia necrosum

34. Smallpox: Vaccinia Immune Globulin (VIG)
Treatment of adverse reactions (AR)
Post-exposure prophylaxis
Pregnant patients (VIG + Vaccinia vaccine)
Eczema (VIG + Vaccina vaccine)
Immunocompromised patients, No consensus (VIG alone vs. VIG + Vaccinia vaccine)
Current supplies very limited – reserved for treatment of severe AR’s, not prophylaxis
Go over slide

35. Other Vaccines Plague Vaccine Tularemia Vaccine
Used effectively in WWII and Vietnam
May not protect against aerosol infection
Very reactogenic
Tularemia Vaccine
Agent developed for BW
Questionable efficacy
[go over slide]

36. Other Vaccines Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers Botulism Toxin
Vaccines at early stages of development
Botulism Toxin
Pentavalent toxoid available under IND
Local reactions increases as number of doses increase
Types F and G toxoids absent
High cost
[go over slide]

37. Bioterrorism Vaccine Issues
Should we invest in developing these vaccines?
Who has responsibility for R&D and production– ie, roles of government, academia, private industry developing and evaluating vaccines for BT threats?
Impediments to R&D and production – select agent rule, limited facilities, limited resources
How can we assure R&D will not lead to unintended adverse effects?
How do we set priorities among the agents?

38. Bioterrorism Vaccine Issues
How do we determine efficacy? Role of animal models and in vitro studies
How will we obtain safety data prior to licensure and how much will be enough?
How will we organize and implement safety and efficacy studies post-licensure?
How will we develop protocols and consent forms? Who should be involved in the review, how to we engage them, and how do the IRBs assimilate and incorporate them?
For licensed products, will “off-label” use be permitted?. Who has responsibility for developing and evaluating vaccines for BT threats?
Would importation of a vaccine unlicensed in the U.S. ever be considered?

39. Bioterrorism Vaccine Issues
Who will pay for the purchase and distribution the vaccines?
Who will distribute and administer the vaccines?
How will we ensure appropriate and fair distribution?
How will guidelines for use of vaccines be developed?
Should vaccine be stockpiled or administered or is a combination approach the most appropriate
Who should be targeted for vaccine and when should they be vaccinated (e.g., pre-exposure vs. post-exposure)?

40. Bioterrorism Vaccine Issues
Should vaccination be mandatory or permissive and how does risk of attack and necessity of quarantine affect that decision?
Can we maintain the principle of autonomy in such an environment?
How can we obtain true informed consent in a situation in which risk data is considered protected by national security concerns?
Who assumes liability for vaccine-related injury?