1. Issues in Public Administration
MPA 509
Decentralization in Pakistan

2. Agenda What is Decentralization Why Centralize
Benefits and Criticism and Prerequisites on Devolution
History of Decentralization in Pakistan
Repairing the System
The Current Local Government Reforms
Weakening Political Collectivities
Representative Vs. Participatory Decentralization
Conclusions
Policy Recommendations
Quote of the Day

3. Decentralization (Manor, 1997)
the transfer of resources and power (and often, tasks) to lower-level authorities which are largely or wholly independent of higher levels of government, and which are democratic in some way and to some degree
(Manor, 1997)
The local authorities will have the authority and responsibility to address all problems that are, in their determination, within their ability to solve

4. Why Decentralize?
Improves governance and public service delivery by increasing:
Allocative efficiency—through better matching of public services to local preferences.
Productive efficiency—through increased accountability of local governments to citizens, fewer levels of bureaucracy, and better knowledge of local costs.
(Azfar, 1999)

5. Benefits of Decentralization
Dilutes State Authority and Control
Distribution of Power Away from Elite
Incorporation of Marginalized Decision Making
Greater Efficiency of Service Delivery
Greater Perception of Needs of People

6. Criticism of Decentralization
Can Create Complicated Relationship Between Local and National Development Priorities
Can Lead to Regional and Financial Inequality
Leaves Decision Making Open to Capture by Elite Elements and Special Interest Groups

7. Prerequisites of Decentralization
Strong Central State
Strong Civil Society Closely Associated with State
Organized Mass-based Political Party/Force
Structural Reform e.g. Land Reform
Political Competition

8. History of Decentralization in Pakistan

9. The Colonial Legacy
Attempts by Non-Representative Central Government to Legitimize Centralization of Political Power
Despite Increasing Representation, Discretionary Powers in the Hands of Non-Elected Officials
Bureaucratic Control Exercised Through Personal Rule of Powerful District Commissioner
Urban/Rural Divide

10. Ayub Khan 1962 Constitution gave Power to President and Governors
Further Centralization Through One Unit Policy and Interventions Against Political Parties
The Absence of Mass-based Political Parties Created a Lack of Pressure to Decentralize

11. Basic Democracies (BD)
Need for Legitimacy met through this System of Circumscribed Representation at the Local Level
Strong Elements of Bureaucratic Control
Provincial Governments and Non-elected Council Chairmen Given Power to Nominate and Suspend Council Members,
Also Given Power to Overrule Decisions by Councils
Rural Elite Co-opted Through BD System
Introduction of Personalized, Clientelist Politics

12. Bhutto
Repealed Basic Democracies, Promulgated but did not Implement LGO 1972 and LGO 1975
Fear of Losing Power to Regional Mass-based Parties Provided Disincentive for Decentralization
Growing Urbanization Changed the Social Structure
Consequent Political Change, with the creation of a More Organized and Politically Active Urban Middle Class

13. Zia-ul-Haq - I No Constitutional Protection Given to Elected Bodies
Centralization Reinforced Through Direct Military Control of Quasi-Presidential Government
Implemented Bhutto’s LGOs
No Constitutional Protection Given to Elected Bodies
Provision of Municipal Services Primary Objective
Local Governments Given Little Financial Power
Non-Party Basis of Elections Curtailed Power of Parties, and Perpetuated Clienteles Politics and Elite Capture

14. Zia-ul-Haq - II
Urban Councils Enjoyed Higher Levels of Revenue and Income than Rural and semi-Urban Ones
Urban Councils Under No Obligation To Provide Funds to Rural or semi-Urban Areas
Rural and semi-Urban Areas Dependent on Provincial Administrative Tier for Financial Support
Competition between Urban Middle Class and Numerically Strong Rural Elites for Resources

15. Zia-ul-Haq - III
Non-Party Based Elections in 1985 Created Localization of Politics at all Levels
Revival of Party Basis (1988) Did Not Reverse Localization of Politics Due to Weakened Parties
Space Left by Parties Filled by Fluid Local Political Factions

16. Summary ( )
Institutionalization of Clienteles, Personalized Politics
Disempowerment of Provincial Elected Tier
Circumscribed Power of Elected Local Governments
Strong Bureaucratic Hold Over Local Governments
Political Power Highly Centralized

17. Repairing the System Increase Powers and Autonomy of Local Government
Reduce/Eliminate Bureaucratic Control
Devolve Some Federal Functions to Provinces
Reduce Patron-Client Politics
Balance Power Between Provincial and Local Government
Provide More Equitable Flow of Resources to Rural/semi-Urban Areas

18. The Current Local Government Reforms

19. Context Local governments in Pakistan
Not recognized by constitution as third tier
Uneven development (military & civilian times)
Every renewal a new experiment without backward-forward linkages
Poor coexistence of LGs with political govts
Bureaucratic and provincial controls
Weak resource base and implementation capacity
Poor participation of people

20. Three Tiered Local Government System
District Administration
Caters to Development
Needs Like Health
Tehsil Administration
Caters To Municipal
Needs and Services
Union Administration
Elects Members of the
Higher Tiers
CCB’s
Advisory Role in Service
Provision

21. Devolution Plan 2000(Cont.)
The Basic Structure

22. Current Reforms - Overview
Provincial to Local Decentralization, with no Federal Devolution
Limited Constitutional Support for Local Governance
Separation of Service Delivery Functions
Some Services Retained by Provinces, Others Devolved to Local Level Such as Health and Education
Budgeting, Planning and Development Functions of Services Devolved to Local Level

23. Overview - II
Legislative Division Between Urban and Rural Areas Eliminated
Pooled Resources and Rural Voting Strength Allow Greater Rural Access to Development Funds
Users (Citizens) Given Role in Service Delivery Through CCB’s
Deputy Commissioner (DC) Replaced by District Coordination Officer (DCO) Answerable to Nazim

24. Overview - III
Accountability to Citizens Through Electoral Process
Electoral Process Creates Linkages Between Different Levels of Local Government
Union Councilors Elected Through Majority Vote
District and Tehsil Council Made Up of Nazims and Naib Nazims From the Union Level
Seats Reserved for Women and Peasants

25. LGO 2001 and Pro-Poor Change

26. Weakening Political Collectivities - I
Attempt to Institutionalize Role of Military at Centre Through Presidential Power and NSC
Elections on Non-Party Basis
Enables Military to Create Complete Tier of Local Level Political Collaborators
Lack of Linkages Between Political Parties and Local Governments Creating Rivalry
Clienteles Politics Continued
In Punjab, 30% Nazims Former MNA’s or MPA’s, 90% Members of Political Families
In Rural Areas, 70% Seats Won by Traditional Elites

27. Weakening Political Collectivities - II
Interventions Against Politicians and Political Parties
Selective Accountability and Disqualification e.g. Education Criterion
Nazims Pressured to Align With Political Parties
Alignment of Nazims Gives Rise to Central Control and Friction With Opposition Parties
Lack of Space for Collective Political Action
CCB’s Only for Service Delivery, Not for Political or Social Reform
Citizens Separate from Decision-making,
Lack of Vertical Political Linkages
CCB’s Sparingly Implemented

28. Extent of Electoral Responsiveness
Nazims Not Necessarily Representative of Majority
Union Councilors Elected by Popular Vote Have Limited Role in Budgeting and Development Plans
Skewed Elections and Lack of Power at the Local Level Can Impair Accountability

29. Bureaucratic Power
Provincial Bureaucracy Cannot Suspend Local Governments
Although DCO Under Nazim, Fiscal Planning and Personnel management remained the Domain of DCO
Nazim Lacked Power to Suspend/Transfer Officials
Provincial Level Bureaucracy Maintained Control Over Appointments Limiting Autonomy of Nazims to Effect Change

30. Tension Between Provincial and Local Tiers
No Federal to Provincial Decentralization, While there has been Provincial to Local Devolution
Lack of Political Ownership by Political Parties Resulted in Competition Between Parties and Local Governments
Emergence of Parties as Principals Aggravated Competition and Rivalry
Encroachment On Each Others’ Perceived Territory Lead to Inter-Tier Conflict, Hampering Efficiency

31. Extent of Financial Empowerment
Rule Based System of Transfer (Provisional Finance Commission Awards) Controlled by Bureaucracy
Inability of Districts to Increase Own-source Revenue Impairs Ability to Increase Development Spending
No Major Revenue Sources Devolved From Provinces
Dependence On External Revenue Provides Reduced Political Incentive to Respond to Citizens, and for Them to Hold Governments Responsible
Declining Per Capita Transfers Will Hamper Development
Increased Transfers in Favor of Areas of Medium and Low Development

32. Representative Vs. Participatory Decentralization

33. Representative and Participatory Decentralization
Representative Decentralization Allows Citizens To Elect People To Make Decisions For Them
Participatory Decentralization Requires Citizens To Directly Play a Role in Decision-making
Participatory Decentralization Allows Citizens To Take Charge Of Development Priorities
Decentralization in Pakistan is Representative

34. Representative Decentralization in Pakistan - I
Lack of Citizen Role in Planning
Citizen Participation Restricted to Service Delivery Through CCB’s
Development Planning and Budgeting in Hands of Representatives and Bureaucrats
Lack of Training and Awareness
No Provisions For Capacity Building of Citizens
Very Little Awareness Of CCB’s and LGP 2000

35. Representative Decentralization in Pakistan - II
Lack of Space For Demanding Structural Change
While Service Provision Can Be Discussed, No Avenue For Debating Issues Such As Land Reform and Inequality
Lack of Legal Protection
No Safeguards to Ensure Citizen Proposals or Priorities Considered in Development Plans

36. Representative Decentralization in Pakistan - III
Danger of Elite Capture
Local Elites Can Dominate Elections, Leaving the Poor as Marginalized as Before
Clienteles Politics Resulting in Resource Allocation to Particular Support Bases
CCB’s and Musalihat Anjuman Susceptible to Elite Capture
Lack Of Political Competition
Citizens Unable to Choose Between Differing Ideologies
In the Absence of Party Support and Organization Less Influential Candidates are Overshadowed by Elites

37. Representative Decentralization in Pakistan - IV
Top-Down Approach
System Imposed and Designed By State Elite
Emphasis On Institution Building
People Not Consulted, Especially In the Absence of a Vibrant Civil Society
Power Struggles
Competition Between Local and Provincial Governments Precludes Devolution of Decision-making to Citizens
Attempts By Local Government To Gain Local Support Could Alienate National and Provincial Politicians

38. Conclusions One formula fits all, implementation in one go
Devolution – phases (from center to province and from province to districts)
Failure to undertake financial repercussions-the transition committees never submitted their reports
Increased political participation yes, sustainability & effectiveness in doubt
Unfinished agenda- un established bodies, departments, failure to make changes in the ordinance due to rigidity
New agenda- Provincial & National Assembly Elections and emerging conflicts
Party or non-party based elections
to have or have not
Constitutional protection without endorsement of parliament

39. Policy Recommendations
Independence for provinces to manage local govt. through constitution of a high powered body from LGs
Ending uncertainty on constitutional position of LGs
Holding of next elections in one go for each province
Capacity building of political representatives with opportunities to play a role
Special focus on women councilors for enabling them to play a meaningful role
Mechanisms for creating symbiotic relationship between LGs and other political tiers
Education qualification may be relaxed for a person elected twice to LGs for competing for higher political levels

40. Highly Responsive Local Government
“invited” space
“jointly defined” space
Fully engaging
Civil Society
Non-engaging
Civil Society
“claimed” space
“legally defined” space
Unresponsive Local Government
Source: Nierras, 2002

41. Quote of the Day
Where there is little or no public opinion, there is likely to be bad government, which sooner or later becomes autocratic government.
William Lyon Mackenzie King