1. ‘Go Forth and Multiply’ The Politics of Religious Demography Eric Kaufmann and Vegard Skirbekk

2. Outline Religion determined by demography Fertility Migration Cohort variation in affiliation/intensity Implications Religion and politics Conclusion

3. Religious individuals tend to have higher fertility – and often see their childbearing patterns to be an outcome of their religion (Borooah 2004; McQuillan 2004) Total fertility rate (TFR) by affiliation in Austria, 2001 (Goujon 2007) Muslim: 2.3, Catholic: 1.3, Protestant: 1.2, No religion: 0.9 by intensity in Larsmo/Finland 1979, Protestants (Finnäs 1991). Lesthadians (more conservative): 6.5, non-Lesthadian: 1.7 fertility affiliation and religious intensity

4. Country (region) of origin Country of residencePeriodSomaliaPakistanTurkeyIran (Western) Europe 3) Source Austria2000–053.0Kytir 2006 Denmark1999–20035.23.61.81.6 Statistics Denmark 2004 England and Wales 20014.7ONS 2006 France 2) 1991–983.21.7Toulemon 2004 The Netherlands 2005 4.4 (1999) 2.2 1.1 (1999) 1.5CBS 2006 Norway1997-85.23.63.11.92.0Østby 2002 Sweden20053.82.61.31.6Statistics Sweden 2006 Migration Migrants’ fertility (if religious) often relatively high

5. Many studies consider how values affect demography, few study how demographic dynamics affect values cohorts Affiliation may change along cohort lines age Proportion without affiliation by cohort, Spain Birth year Example: Later born cohorts in Spain are more secular (Skirbekk et al. 2008)

6. projection methodology Multi-state cohort-component projection Time t + x Time t A B A B MaleFemaleMaleFemale age Ageing A BA B Mortality by status Migration by status Transitions by status A BA B Fertility differentials by status Intergenerational transmission of status A B A B a a + x

7. projecting beliefs European identity In Science (2006) Lutz, Kritzinger and Skirbekk estimated and projected European identity as a function of cohort and age Survey question: Do you see yourself as having some degree of European identity – as opposed to only national identity? Data: Eurobarometer surveys for EU 15. 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 15-1920-2425-2930-3435-3940-4445-4950-5455-5960-6465-6970-7475-79 Age Per cent with some degree of European Identity 1996 2004 2030 Survey question: Do you see yourself as having some degree of European identity – as opposed to only national identity?

8. Source: Statistics Austria, Census 1900 to 2001, projections IIASA / VID, FcnvMmedTcon Roman Catholics Protestants Muslims Others Without Religion 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 19001911192119311941195119611971198119912001 20112021203120412051 religion Austria

9. Religion and politics directly entwined through establishment or religious regulation (Iran) But even if not, religion bears on politics through: Electoral cleavages Domestic policy (alcohol, school prayer, abortion, religious law) Foreign Policy (alliances, conflict sacralization, missionary unilateralism) Nongovernment actors (such as terrorism) Near-majority of civil wars and terrorism now involves religion (Toft 2007; Philpott 2007) religion Politics

10. Political Demography of Religion Shifts in Groups by Religious Tradition Civilizational (i.e. Christianity, Islam, Hindu, Judaic)– affects IR and can form the basis of domestic conflicts Church/Sect (i.e. Lutheran, Shia, Pentecostal)– affects domestic politics, but often has transnational effects Shifts in Groups by Religious Intensity Attendance, belief/theology (i.e. conservative/Orthodox vs. liberal/modernist; regular v occasional attenders)

11. Why Now? A Demographic Revolution Global demographic disparities + globalization = migration from religious to secular regions In developed world, values increasingly drive fertility Sociological Change Democratization makes population size important Secularization in West, but: –‘Strict churches’: revival of conservative Islam, Pentecostalism Net effect: direct & indirect conservative religious growth

12. religion as civilization Global past and future

13. Domestic religious affiliation

14. religious intensity

15. Conclusion Changing balance of religious traditions/intensities affects domestic and international politics Islam will grow Secularism will grow in the West until 2020-50 Conservative theologies are expanding in major Abrahamic faiths Longer term (2020-50) effects, apart from Israel Proximate mechanism often awareness of change, which can spark anxiety and conflict

17. Source: WVS 1999-2000. N = 2796 respondents in towns under 10,000 and 1561 respondents in cities over 100,000. Asked in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt.

18. Source: 2000 WVS and World Bank. Religiosity and Fertility in Muslim Countries, 2000 Tanzania Jordan Egypt Algeria Bosnia Iran Azerbaijan '95-97 Bangladesh Albania 2000 Turkey Indonesia Pakistan Morocco Nigeria Uganda Albania '95-97

19. Thank you

20. Resident population Net migrants