1. Chapter 1: Introduction

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3. Early police officers had to Avoid getting into trouble Inhibit offenders Reassure victims

4. Since the 1960s Criminals developed new ways to commit crime Public expectations changed Public relationship with the police changed These changes resulted in the investigative, reactive model of policing still popular today

5. The move from prevention Early 1990s survey of one UK police force 40% of personnel assigned to investigation 1% assigned to crime prevention Audit Commission. (1993). Helping With Enquiries: Tackling Crime Effectively. London: HMSO. Page 14.

6. Since the 1960s Community policing Problem-oriented policing CompStat And now… Intelligence-led policing

7. Analysis-driven models As one of the latest analysis-driven models, intelligence-led policing has commonalities with problem-oriented policing and targeted, proactive policing. These strategies attempt to be strategic, future oriented and targeted in their approach to crime control and are more than just catchy phrases; they are representative of a significant and widespread change in the business of policing Maguire, M. (2000). Policing by risks and targets: Some dimensions and implications of intelligence-led crime control. Policing and Society, 9(4), 315-7.

8. Not just about information sharing The challenges for information sharing - arguably a component of a strategic, intelligence-led crime control strategy – are substantial But intelligence-led policing is not just about better information sharing or information collection It is about better resource allocation, priorities and crime reduction decisions

9. Origins Kent Police (UK) and Sir David Phillips Moved resources from reactive, crime investigation departments to proactive units Began tactical operations directed by criminal intelligence analysis Promoted greater intelligence gathering First to practice genuine intelligence-led policing

10. Developments From a business model required to manage crime analysis and criminal intelligence… To a broader management model for policing… To the UK National Intelligence Model

11. Definition Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders. Ratcliffe, JH (2008) Intelligence-Led Policing, Willan Publishing, page 89.

12. Whats in a name? Intelligence-led policing, not intelligence-led police It is theoretically possible to conduct intelligence-led policing without a traditional police service Some people assume the word intelligence has negative connotations, suggesting activity that is secretive, subversive and possibly illegal Intelligence-led policing actually evolves data and information analysis into crime intelligence processes The word intelligence needs to be reclaimed from the secret world, made less threatening to communities and used in their service (Grieve, 2004: 26)

13. Further features Less investigative, more strategic resource allocation Seek a holistic perspective that measures the social harm of threats Closer integration of crime analysis and criminal intelligence Concentration on prolific offenders rather than crime

14. A holistic approach to crime control Instead of tackling crime one laborious investigation at a time, never truly having an impact on the more expansive criminal opportunity structure, the capacity to step back and place threats and risks into a holistic perspective that assesses the social harm of criminality may allow policing to prevent crime across a wide area rather than solve a single event that has already occurred. Ratcliffe, JH (2008) Intelligence-Led Policing Willan Publishing, page 8.

15. Case study: Operation Nine Connect New Jersey State Police (USA) Numerous law enforcement partners Bloods street gang Nine Trey Gangsters

16. Strategic assessment of organized crime threats A 2004 survey of law enforcement agencies in the US state of New Jersey found there were an estimated 148 gangs in the state, and nearly 30 gangs that had over 100 members For a strategic assessment of the situation, New Jersey State Police analysts drew on Information from 300 intelligence reports Data from 177 municipal police departments Over 50 media articles Covert information gathered from nearly 100 confidential informants

17. Strategic assessment Concluded that the Bloods street gang were the major threat to public safety. A subset of the Bloods, called the Nine Trey Gangsters, was identified as an emerging threat. Under the leadership of David Duke Allen from his cell in Trenton State Prison, they were Actively recruiting, and Attempting to coordinate Bloods activities and crime across different counties and police jurisdictions

18. Operation Nine Connect July 2006 arrest of 60 Nine Trey Gangsters Subsequent arrest of a further 30 Many remain in custody