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Peter Hilger p_hilger@web.de Interdisciplinary Center of Social Research, Hannover; University of Helsinki Competition vs. Cooperation Patterns, Perceptions and Problems of RTD in European Integration 6cp: Crossing borders, 29.10.2003
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Asymmetrical relationship adaptation of rules of the game decision-making science push and demand pull participation in FP: formal/effective disparities and cohesion
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Competition ERA rationale: compete world-wide within EU, amongst CEEC peer competition in negotiations did speed up process catching-up as objective winners and loosers belong to the game
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Catching-up disparities within EU15 / amongst CEEC / between EU-CEEC generation and transfer of knowledge economic growth through RTD needs absorption capabilities FP complementary to structural funds: skills and infrastructure (Sharp 1998) laggers-behind lack absorptive capacity (Clarysee/Muldur 2001)
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Performance 1
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Performance 2
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Patterns of FP participation 17% of FP5-contracts with CEE-partnership performance below EU average Commission introduced special measures peer orientation up to one fourth rarely coordinators from CEEC entering consortia by invitation
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Cooperation reasons to cooperate: –access to complementarity –risk sharing and critical mass –application of results –recruitment of staff –strategic and subjective preferences incremental definition of common goal norm of reciprocity among equals
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Results 1: choice of partner
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Results 2: goals
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Results 3: roles and benefits almost 2/3 equal actors Lower-Saxony: contacts, publications, financing CEE-partners: financing, knowledge/skills, administration, subjective stabilisation and recognition
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Results 4: experiences methodological and theoretical level about equal - equipment worse no difference to EU-15: 58% cooperate again: 86% wished mobility: incoming CEEC 78% - outgoing CEEC 58%
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Problems on micro-level payment, infrastructure, costs careers, recognition, disrupted hierarchies administrative and managerial experience tacit knowledge personal and organisational goals
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Problems on macro-level environment of RTD: industrial demand knowledge- and brain-drain GERD hardly rising shrinking legitimization for special treatment
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Hilger: competition vs. cooperation Conclusions: Where to influence? objective of researchers is not macro-political: provide for visibility encounters are crucial dont forget bilateral cooperation be present at Brussels excellence-dilemma: selected islands of excellence
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