1. Nicholas Weaver International Computer Science Institute
Printed: March 27, 2017
Malice is a Feature or The Inner-Tubes Are Sewer Pipes, and I Like It That Way
Nicholas Weaver
International Computer Science Institute
Internet Worms
Paxson, Savage, Voelker, Weaver

2. Malice is A Feature Malice is a testament to network flexibility
Printed: March 27, 2017
Malice is A Feature
Malice is a testament to network flexibility
The same properties which enable botnets and worms allows Skype, Bittorrent, and BOINC
All are end-host applications which can run over the network
How is BOINC not a botnet, apart from intent?
Locking down malicious activity may have significant collateral damage
Detecting global malicious activity can be decidedly dual-use: A system to detect copyright violations or bots in the network traffic would have capabilities which would make even the Stasi hesitant
Why should the network have to fix the end host?
The only exception is traffic DDoS, which is an attack on the network not the host
As for porn, terrorist information sharing, political dissent
Do we even want the network to handle theses security issues?
Internet Worms
Paxson, Savage, Voelker, Weaver

3. I Don’t Want “Security” to Create A “Phone Network” Internet
Printed: March 27, 2017
I Don’t Want “Security” to Create A “Phone Network” Internet
The Internet billing model: “All you can Eat” or “Bits is Bits”
A billing model I cound probably live with: “Bits at a given QOS (pick your metric) are Bits at a given QOS” (Weak Network Neutrality)
Some implications I don’t understand
But too much network control will create a Phone Network Internet: “Bits are Priced on Intent” like cellphones are today
Data: $20 for 5 GB  2000 Mb/$
Voice: $.04/min at 8 kbps  12 Mb/$
SMS: $.04 for 1 kB  0.2 Mb/$
Not only is SMS the most valuable traffic for the phone company, it also needs the least quality of service
Creates huge incentives for ISPs to muck with traffic (This is why ISPs don’t want Network Neutrality)
IM over IP is a huge potential loss of revenue combared with SMS Skype and Vonage hurt your telecom business
Why do you think the iPhone is so incredibly locked down?
Many security features enable discriminatory treatment of traffic
Internet Worms
Paxson, Savage, Voelker, Weaver

4. And There is Too Much “Security” Already Available
Printed: March 27, 2017
And There is Too Much “Security” Already Available
The Great Firewall of China et al
“The Net treats censorship as damage and routes around it.” (John Gilmore) has proven to be severely strained…
ISPs are beginning to manipulate traffic
Most major ISPs are also telecom & video providers: Why carry the bits of your cheaper competition? Bittorrent uploads?
Verso: Eliminate Skype and P2P in your [carrier] network
Time/Warner Cable: Not using standard ports is a violation of the AUP because it interferes with traffic shaping
Small ISP: Inserting advertisements into all viewed web pages!?
NebuAd/Fair Eagle: Profiling users and inserting adds on the wire!
AT&T: We will enforce copyright violations in the network!
Yes, Virginia, your ISP/Backbone wants to perform deep packet manipulation
As well as build some NSA server rooms…
So how are the current security tools, in the hands of the ISPs, not already a threat to the open Internet of today? Would future security built into the fabric be any better? Why can’t we simply tolerate malice as a feature?
Internet Worms
Paxson, Savage, Voelker, Weaver

5. (Backup) What Little Security I actually want:
Printed: March 27, 2017
(Backup) What Little Security I actually want:
Authenticated and reliable naming and routing:
Obvious. If I ask for foo.com, I need to get to foo.com
Lightweight authenticated pushback:
Traffic DDoS is a Network problem: pushback doesn’t solve this, but it puts an upper bound on the number of packets each zombie can send
Unsolicited conversation is a feature, but the recipient should be able to cheaply say “Go Away and Don’t Bug Me Again”
Mechanism needs to be scalable
Probably also requires “no spoofing”, but ISPs should want this anyway
End to end global fairness/congestion control (and a Pony)…
Fix the biggest bug in the Internet: we need to enforce fairness along the network path, not at the endpoints
But keep the current economics for constructing the network…
I have no clue how to even start to think of how to do this: If I did, I would have submitted the FIND proposal already
Internet Worms
Paxson, Savage, Voelker, Weaver