1. Conflict in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia

2. 2 Overview  History of the Region  Operations Review  Lessons Learned

3. 3 A Brief History - Yugoslavia emerged around a Serbian core as the Ottoman Turkish Empire gradually lost control of its Balkan territories - In 1917, the Pact of Corfu proclaimed that all Yugoslavs (meaning southern Slavs) would unite after World War I to form a kingdom under the Serbian Royal House

4. 4 A Brief History - Occupied by Germany during World War II - Two guerrilla armies -- the Chetniks under Draza Mihajlovic supporting the monarchy and the Partisans under Marshal Tito leaning toward the U.S.S.R - Both fought the Nazis for the duration of the war

5. 5 A Brief History - After World War II, monarchy abolished - Communist Party leader Tito proclaimed the country the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, with himself as prime minister - Eliminating opposition, the Tito government executed Mihajlovic in 1946 - Tito died in 1980, and the fragility of the federation he ruled quickly became apparent

6. 6 Three ethnic groups fell into conflict Serbs - dominant in Yugoslavia's politics and army, orthodox Christianity makes them natural allies of Russia. Croats - Roman Catholics, closer to the West than Serbs and exposed to Western influences Muslims - living mainly in ethnically mixed towns and cities in Bosnia -Herzegovina.

7. 7 Map of Region

8. 8 Kosovo Crisis  Kosovo lies in southern Serbia and has a mixed population of which the majority are ethnic Albanians (Muslims).  Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic altered the status of the region, removing its autonomy and bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade, the Serbian capital.  The Kosovar Albanians strenuously opposed the move.

9. 9 U.S. and NATO Interests at stake  Serb aggression threatened peace throughout the Balkans and the stability of NATO’s SE region  Belgrade’s repression in Kosovo created a humanitarian crisis of staggering proportions  President Milosevic’s conduct directly challenged the credibility of NATO.

10. 10 NATO Action  After the failure of repeated international diplomatic efforts - since the Spring of 1998 - to peacefully resolve the conflict in Kosovo the North Atlantic Council decided on 23 March 1999 to authorize NATO air strikes against strategic targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, aimed at ending the repression of Kosovar Albanians by the Yugoslav government.

11. 11 NATO’s Objectives  a stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;  the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces;  the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;

12. 12 NATO’s Objectives cont’d  agree to work on basis of past agreements in conformity with international law and the UN charter;  the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons

13. 13 Military Objective  Degrade and damage the military and security structure President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo William Cohen, SECDEF 15 April 99

14. 14 Lessons Learned on Kosovo War Objectives US Grand Strategy  Maintain a peaceful, prosperous US-led Europe  Convince NATO to transition from old Cold War common defense against external threats to new Continental security coalition  Persuade NATO to acquire means and will to conduct “out of area” military ops Kosovo War Aims  Stop the Serbian slaughter & expulsion of ethnic Albanians  Remove Milosovic from power  Accomplish the above with minimal collateral damage and NATO casualties Common Effort Concealed Widely Differing Objectives European Strategy Maintain a peaceful, prosperous & independent Europe Prevent spillover into Albania & Macedonia,thence to Greece & Turkey Maintain NATO relationship with Russia and give it a role in helping end the crisis Demonstrate European unity

15. 15 Lessons Learned by US Military  Global reach can work but duration uncertain  Reach back can work  Force structure “numbers” & resources are inadequate for current level of commitments (all services)  Older platforms with smart weapons may be seen as good enough  Smart weapons may be better than smart platforms  Need the right force structure for the future  Support and training as important to victory as strike  C4ISR is currently the weakest link in joint & coalition ops  On the brink of another “Hollow Force”  Biggest lessons may be in future consequences of Kosovo

16. 16 Political Lessons Learned by Europeans  Militarily, Europe remains dependent on Americans Best technology, weapons & platforms “Made in U.S.A.” Pols unwilling to pay the cost of matching unique U.S. capabilities  U.S. cannot always be counted on to serve the Alliance’s interests U.S. focus shifted with opinion polls Fear U.S. commitment could falter if U.S. forces take heavy casualties  EU can provide diplomatic muscle (Martti Ahtisaari saves the day) Many foreign policy interests are similar among EU Nations Refugee issue Humanitarian (ethnic cleansing) Threat of rising Islamic fundamentalism Need to build external identity  Europe can overcome internal diversity to maintain cohesion German Luftwaffe conducted first combat missions since 1945 Greece provided logistical support despite popular opposition Italy and France (which have Communist ministers) offered air bases

17. 17 Impact of Kosovo Lessons Learned on Future DOD Budget Trends  No DOD/Allied spending surge like post Desert Storm  International defense market continues to shrink  Readiness & Retention will increasingly consume $$$$ for Modernization  Inevitable Tax Cut legislation will further erode DOD budgets  Services must eventually deal with the bow wave  Old platforms with smart weapons were good enough  Congress may balk at big bills for new platforms(JSF, F-22, CVX, DD-21)  Support Forces will need big $$$$ too “We have to make a trade between smart weapons and platforms...We need to encourage the services to concentrate more on smart weapons.” Jacques Gansler “We have to make a trade between smart weapons and platforms...We need to encourage the services to concentrate more on smart weapons.” Jacques Gansler

18. 18 Summary  History of the Region  Operation Allied Force Review  Lessons Learned

19. 19 There is an old saying that: “We are always learning how to fight the last war.” Your challenge though is to win the next one. Your challenge though is to win the next one. Air Power!