1. Aristotle on Knowledge

2. Aristotle 384-322 BC 384-322 BC Student of Plato (429-327) Student of Plato (429-327) Teacher of Alexander (353-323) Teacher of Alexander (353-323) Founded ‘Lyceum’ Founded ‘Lyceum’ We have his lecture notes We have his lecture notes Posterior Analytics Posterior Analytics Metaphysics Metaphysics

3. Forms Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of Forms Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of Forms ‘Third Man’ argument ‘Third Man’ argument We recognise Bob as a man because he participates in the Form of Man We recognise Bob as a man because he participates in the Form of Man We recognise the Form of Man as the Form of Bob because both have something in common We recognise the Form of Man as the Form of Bob because both have something in common Both participate in a further Form of Man – the Third man. Both participate in a further Form of Man – the Third man. We recognise the Third Man as a Form of Man because of a Fourth Man … We recognise the Third Man as a Form of Man because of a Fourth Man …

4. Forms Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of Forms Aristotle rejected Plato’s theory of Forms Forms can’t explain change Forms can’t explain change A thing which is small may become large A thing which is small may become large It began participating in Small It began participating in Small It ends by participating in Large It ends by participating in Large How? How?

5. Forms and Matter Aristotle had a theory of Forms Aristotle had a theory of Forms Forms are the patterns of existing things Forms are the patterns of existing things Forms impose a pattern on Matter Forms impose a pattern on Matter Duck, daisy, dish – same matter, different form Duck, daisy, dish – same matter, different form The two exist together – they are only logically distinct The two exist together – they are only logically distinct Matter and Form constitute Substances – the basic things in the world Matter and Form constitute Substances – the basic things in the world

6. Substance Substances are the things that have properties Substances are the things that have properties Aristotle lists ‘categories’, or kinds of property. Aristotle lists ‘categories’, or kinds of property. Quantity, quality, relation, location, time, position, habit, action, passion Quantity, quality, relation, location, time, position, habit, action, passion Change can now be understood Change can now be understood Substance takes on new properties Substance takes on new properties Socrates was sad but becomes happy Socrates was sad but becomes happy Material of Substance takes on new Forms Material of Substance takes on new Forms Socrates was young but gets old, and dies Socrates was young but gets old, and dies

7. Causes Aristotle proposes 4 type of cause Aristotle proposes 4 type of cause 1. Material The statue is brown because it is bronze 2. Formal The statue has legs because it is the image of a man 3. Effective The statue looks like a man because the bronze was poured into a man-shaped mould 4. Final The statue was made because it honours Pericles

8. Explanations These ‘causes’ are really kinds of explanations These ‘causes’ are really kinds of explanations They are answers to the question ‘Why is S a P?’ They are answers to the question ‘Why is S a P?’ Why is the statue brown? (Why is it a brown thing?) Why is the statue brown? (Why is it a brown thing?) Why is the moon eclipsed? Why is the moon eclipsed? Why is the child ugly? Why is the child ugly? Why go walking? Why go walking?

9. Explanations What explains why S is P? What explains why S is P? Look at the standard ‘syllogism’ in his Logic Socrates is a Man All Men are Persons Socrates is a Person Look at the standard ‘syllogism’ in his Logic Socrates is a Man All Men are Persons Socrates is a Person This justifies believing that Socrates is a Person This justifies believing that Socrates is a Person It also explains why Socrates is a Person (S is P) It also explains why Socrates is a Person (S is P)

10. Explanations Take any argument of the form Take any argument of the form S is M M is P S is P We can say: Why is S a P? Because S is M and M is P We can say: Why is S a P? Because S is M and M is P To find an explanation we just need to find the right M (called the Middle Term) to go between S and P To find an explanation we just need to find the right M (called the Middle Term) to go between S and P

11. Explanations So: Why is the Statue Brown? We have: So: Why is the Statue Brown? We have: Statue is M M is Brown Statue is Brown

12. Explanations So: Why is the Statue Brown? We have: So: Why is the Statue Brown? We have: Statue is Bronze Bronze is Brown Statue is Brown The reason is, because the Statue is Bronze and Bronze is Brown The reason is, because the Statue is Bronze and Bronze is Brown

13. Explanations Similarly for the other questions Similarly for the other questions Why is the moon eclipsed? Why is the moon eclipsed? Because it is darkened by earth’s shadow, and to be darkened by Earth’s shadow is to be eclipsed That is the formal cause

14. Explanations Similarly for the other questions Similarly for the other questions Why is the child ugly? Why is the child ugly? Because the father is ugly and ugly fathers have ugly children That is the efficient cause

15. Explanations Similarly for the other questions Similarly for the other questions Why go walking? Why go walking? Because those who want to be healthy go walking, and we want to be healthy That is the final cause

16. Scientific Knowledge Episteme is a collection of such deductions Episteme is a collection of such deductions We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is (Post. An. 1.2)

17. Scientific Knowledge ‘the cause of that fact and of no other’ Statue is Bronze Bronze is Brown Statue is Brown Given the first two premises only the conclusion follows, and no other Given the first two premises only the conclusion follows, and no other

18. Scientific Knowledge ‘the fact could not be other than it is’ Statue is Bronze Bronze is Brown Statue is Brown Given the first two premises the conclusion Given the first two premises the conclusion could not be other than it is (validity)

19. Scientific Knowledge Episteme requires conditions on such deductions Episteme requires conditions on such deductions the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further related to them as effect to cause Deduction with these conditions is Demonstration (Apodeixis) Deduction with these conditions is Demonstration (Apodeixis) Demonstration thus excludes trivial or irrelevant deductions Demonstration thus excludes trivial or irrelevant deductions

20. Scientific Knowledge ‘the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be true’ False premises make a syllogism unsound All men are vegetables All vegetables are mortal All men are mortal False premises make a syllogism unsound All men are vegetables All vegetables are mortal All men are mortal This syllogism doesn’t give us knowledge This syllogism doesn’t give us knowledge

21. Scientific Knowledge ‘ ’ ‘the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be better known than and prior to the conclusion’ There is a difference between what is prior and better known in the order of being and what is prior and better known to man. I mean that objects nearer to sense are prior and better known to man; objects without qualification prior and better known are those further from sense. Now the most universal causes are furthest from sense and particular causes are nearest to sense, and they are thus exactly opposed to one another

22. Scientific Knowledge ‘ ’ ‘the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be better known than and prior to the conclusion’ Things may be known immediately to our senses Things may be known immediately to our senses That triangular patch of grass is green That triangular patch of grass is green Such things are not certain or universal or eternal Such things are not certain or universal or eternal

23. Scientific Knowledge ‘ ’ ‘the premises of demonstrated knowledge must be better known than and prior to the conclusion’ Other things may be known less immediately Other things may be known less immediately The internal angles of a triangle sum to 180 o The internal angles of a triangle sum to 180 o Such things can be known more certainly as they are universal and eternal Such things can be known more certainly as they are universal and eternal

24. Scientific Knowledge The demonstrations that constitute episteme The demonstrations that constitute episteme Form a structure of linked deductions Form a structure of linked deductions Each link in the chain of deductions is such that the causes are more general than the subject and predicate being explained Each link in the chain of deductions is such that the causes are more general than the subject and predicate being explained

25. Intuitions Demonstrations are only as good as their premises Demonstrations are only as good as their premises How do we come to know them? Choices are: How do we come to know them? Choices are: 1. Chain of premises and conclusions is endless Episteme is impossible 2. Chain is circular Knowledge has no foundation 3. First premises exist They are not knowable by demonstration

26. Intuitions First premises are known by induction from sense data First premises are known by induction from sense data Therefore we must possess a capacity of some sort [for getting knowledge without demonstration.]... And this at least is an obvious characteristic of all animals, for they possess a congenital discriminative capacity which is called sense- perception.

27. Intuitions First premises are known by induction from sense data First premises are known by induction from sense data But though sense-perception is innate in all animals, in some the sense-impression comes to persist, in others it does not. So animals in which this persistence does not come to be have either no knowledge at all outside the act of perceiving, or no knowledge of objects of which no impression persists; animals in which it does come into being have perception and can continue to retain the sense-impression in the soul.

28. Intuitions First premises are known by induction from sense data First premises are known by induction from sense data And when such persistence is frequently repeated a further distinction at once arises between those which out of the persistence of such sense-impressions develop a power of systematizing them and those which do not. So out of sense- perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience; for a number of memories constitute a single experience.

29. Intuitions First premises are known by induction from sense data First premises are known by induction from sense data From experience again – i.e. from the universal now stabilized in its entirety within the soul, the one beside the many which is a single identity within them all – originate the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being.

30. Intuitions First premises are known by induction from sense data First premises are known by induction from sense data Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premises by induction (epagoge); for the method by which even sense- perception implants the universal is inductive.

31. Intuitions First premises are known by induction from sense data First premises are known by induction from sense data Now of the thinking states by which we grasp truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of error – opinion, for instance, and calculation, whereas scientific knowing and intuition (noûs) are always true: further, no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge, whereas primary premises are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge is discursive.

32. Intuitions First premises are known by induction from sense data First premises are known by induction from sense data From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premises, and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premises – a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge.

33. Investigations Episteme is a structure of demonstrations Episteme is a structure of demonstrations Leading upwards from more general to more particular truths Leading upwards from more general to more particular truths Giving the causes of things Giving the causes of things Based on undemonstrated conceptual truths Based on undemonstrated conceptual truths We discover the bases through intuition We discover the bases through intuition How do we discover the demonstrations? How do we discover the demonstrations?

34. Investigations Collect facts of appearances (phenomena) Collect facts of appearances (phenomena) It is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. The senses are generally reliable The senses are generally reliable It is their function to tell us about the world It is their function to tell us about the world

35. Investigations Consider reputable opinions (endoxa) Consider reputable opinions (endoxa) As in other cases, we must set out the appearances and run through all the puzzles regarding them. In this way we must test the credible opinions about these sorts of experiences – ideally, all the credible opinions, but if not all, then most of them, those which are the most important.

36. Investigations Apply dialectic (elenchus/Socratic Method/…) Apply dialectic (elenchus/Socratic Method/…) Dialectic is useful for philosophical sorts of sciences because when we are able to run through the puzzles on both sides of an issue we more readily perceive what is true and what is false.

37. Investigations Apply dialectic (elenchus/Socratic Method/…) Apply dialectic (elenchus/Socratic Method/…) Furthermore, it is useful for uncovering what is primary among the commitments of a science; for it is impossible to say anything regarding the first principles of a science on the basis of the first principles proper to the very science under discussion, since among all the commitments of a science, the first principles are the primary ones.

38. Investigations Apply dialectic (elenchus/Socratic Method/…) Apply dialectic (elenchus/Socratic Method/…) This comes rather, necessarily, from discussion of the credible beliefs (endoxa) belonging to the science. This is peculiar to dialectic, or is at least most proper to it. For since it is what cross-examines, dialectic contains the way to the first principles of all inquiries.