1. Arie W. Kruglanski, Michele J. Gelfand, Jocelyn, J. Bélanger START (Center for the Study of Terrorism and the Response to Terrorism) and ICPVTR

2.  An Inseparable Counterpart of the War on Terrorism (cannot “kill them all,” do not want to “kill them all”)  The Penal and Political Problems Involved in Detention (occupation, prevention of escapes, of riots)  Importance of Militants’ Deradicalization in the Overall Counterterrorism Campaign  The Need for Release and Re-Integration: Ex-detainees as potential allies in Counter-radicalization

3.  Preventing Radicalization (Robert Reid, Jose Padilla, Christian Ganczarski, and Pierre Richard Robert all radicalized in prisons).  Why are detainees susceptible to radicalization?  Humiliation and Anger  Quest for a Ideology that Promises Significance  Radical Ideology Promises Significance Through Violence Against One’s Detractors (Real or Imagined)

4.  Disaffection with Militancy and Terrorism, Openness to Alternatives  ETA detainees who deradicalized in prison (Reinares’ 2011 data)

5.  In Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Yemen, Egypt, Iraq  Contain a strong element of religious counter- narrative  Darth of Empirical Data Concerning Their Success  The present Empirical Attempt to Assess a Deradicalization Program: First of Its Kind

6.  Separation of moderate LTTEs from the hard core  No explicit counter-ideological narrative (implicit approach)  Restoration of the detainees sense of significance in various ways (e.g., “beneficiaries”, rather “prisoners,” or “detainees,”)  Setting up conditions for individual focus rather than collective LTTE focus (spiritual programs like Yoga, and Arts activities).  Vocational Ed courses designed to prepare the detainees/beneficiaries for integration into society.

7.  The Possibility of Self Deception  Objective Evidence for the Critics  Affordance of Improvement (Discovering what works and what doesn’t)

8.  Have the detainees/beneficiaries deradicalize in Rehab?  Did the Rehab Program Work? (Perhaps the detainees deradicalize over time but NOT because of the rehab program)

9.  2058 participants (169 women; 1889 men);  Mean age = 27.74 years; SD = 6.68  1906 individuals in Rehabilitation vs.  Administer a series of tests to detainees early on in the incarceration period (December, 2009) and then nine months later (September, 2010)

10. Rehabilitation group

11.  Possibilities of Alternative Interpretations:  Time and historical events in the interim  Away from the atmosphere of battle;  Away from the LTTE organization. A need for a control group So the LTTE Detainees Have Deradicalized But is it Because of the Program?

12. Rehabilitation group Control group

13.  At Time 1, equal to the Rehab Group on All Relevant Characteristics: Psychological, Attitudinal and Demographic  Random Assignment Would Be Ideal..  Tested at Same Times as Rehab Group

14.  The control group a No-Rehab group (FU-OMT) Omantei (N=152) (handicraft, meditation)  What makes it a good control group. Equality to the Rehab group on: (1)Support for armed struggle, (2) Negative attitudes toward Sinhalese (3) Meaning in life (4) Emotions (anger, shame, sadness) (5) self-embeddedness (6) social-dominance (7) Need for closure

15.  Tested at Same Times as Rehab Group (December 2009 and September 2010)  Rehab group Mage = 27.57; No Rehab group Mage = 30.28  Rehab group Meducation = 1.91 (SD 1.10); No Rehab group Meducation = 1.50 (SD= 1.01)  What makes it for a less than perfect control group (they were a higher risk category, involved in anti social crimes and in recruiting, the rehab group involved in more peripheral activities)

17.  Was it Just the Friendly Attitude of the Center Staff?

20.  Thus, not the effect of time as such, or separation from the battle or the LTTE organization that itself accounts for the change  Nor the initial level for support for violence, because initially the same in both groups  Not the mere friendliness of the staff  Nor the several relevant psychological variables, because the rehab and no rehab groups were equal on those  Hence, cautiously, though not conclusively, we may say that exposure to the rehab programs did the trick.  Implication, expose even the hard core to rehab programs

21.  Importance of Re-integration of Beneficiaries  A Two Way Street of Pacification  Importance of Follow up Research