1. Specifying autobiographical information alters emotion activation, but not the way you think it does… Pierre Philippot Université de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgique www.ecsa.ucl.ac.be/personnel/philippot/

2. Theoretical background - I  Personal memories comprise differents types of information that are stored separatly –Emotional information (non declarative) –Contextual and factual information (declarative) (Brewin, 2001; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Leventhal, 1984; Philippot et al., 2003; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993)

3. Theoretical background - II  Personal memories can be reactivated through –Direct retrieval –Generative retrieval (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000)

4. Theoretical background - III  Activation of emotional information arouses the corresponding emotional state.  Emotional arousal might disrupt high level cognitive processes such as those required for AM generative retrieval: –Yerkes-Dodson law –Automatic attentional biases –Automatic conceptual priming  Hypothesis : high level cognitive processes inhibit emotional arousal.

5. Theoretical background – IV  It follows from the above rationale that volontarily specifying AM should inhibit emotional arousal.  However, there is a commonly shared belief that the opposite is true.

6. Study 1 Philippot, Douilliez & Ramon, 2003 Naive theories regarding how specifying of AM might alter emotion

7. Hypothesis  Do people hold the naive theory that: « specifying AM leads to an increase in emotional arousal »?

8. Study 1: Method  Participants –94 students (57 women and 37 men), aged between 18 and 32.  Procedure –Participants were asked : 1.to imagine that they were thinking either in a specific or in a general way for 10 minutes about a positive and a negative AM. 2.to report how the intensity of their emotional feeling would evolve, minute after minute on a ten point scale. 3.to qualify the emotional profile of the event on the Differential Emotion Scale (DES).

9. Figure 1. Evolution of Emotional Intensity as a Function of Mode of Thinking about Worries Time (minutes) 10987654321 Emotional Intensity 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 General Thinking Specific Thinking

10. Study 2 Philippot & Verhasselt, 2002 Naive theories regarding how specifying of AM might alter emotion: Comparison of normal versus clinical samples

11. Hypothesis  Do people suffering from anxiety disorders hold a different naïve theory than people exempt from any emotional disorder, especially for negative emotion?

12. Study 2: Method  Participants –18 out-patients (10 women and 8 men) diagnosed with an anxiety disorder according to the DSM IV criteria (APA, 1994) aged between 20 and 56 (Mean: 42.94, S.D.: 10.02). –A control sample of 26 individuals (14 women and 12 men), aged between 22 and 55 (Mean: 39.08, S.D.: 11.29).  Procedure –Participants were asked : 1.to imagine that they were thinking for 10 minutes about a positive and a negative personal event. 2.to report how the intensity of their emotional feeling would evolve, minute after minute on a ten point scale. 3.to qualify the emotional profile of the event on the Differential Emotion Scale (DES).

13. Study 2: Results  Manipulation check : –Anxious patients and controls did not differ regarding the emotional profile and intensity of the events considered.

14. Figure 1. Evolution of Emotional Intensity as a Function of Diagnostic Status and Event Valence

15. Study 3 Philippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, In press, Emotion General versus Specific AM priming during emotion induction

16. Method  Participants : 45 students  Diary for 12 consecutive days –the strongest negative event and an average intensity negative event –description of the event, emotional labelling, and intensity rating

17. Method II  Procedure: –Imagery training –AM recollection –Distraction task –Relaxation (60”) –Priming (60”) –Re-experience in imagery (20”) S-ABM Condition : priming of S-AM G-ABM Condition : priming of G-AM Control Condition : semantic task –Intensity rating of emotion felt during imagery

18. Study 3: Results  3 (Condition) x 2 (Time) Anova –Main effect of Time, F(1,44)=10.70, p <.005 –Main effect of Condition, F(2,88)=3.57, p <.05 –Interaction, F(2,88)=5.12, p <.01

19. Study 4 Schaefer, Collette, Philippot, et al, (2003). NeuroImage, 18, 938-949. Schematic vs. propositional processing of emotional information during induction.

20. Method- I  Design –Schematic vs. propositional processing Schematic: mentally repeating metaphoric sentences Propositional: mentally repeating specific appraisals –Emotion (Anger, Sadness, Happiness, Affection, Neutral)  Measures –Feeling state quality (DES) & intensity –Heart Rate & Skin Conductance –H 2 15 0-PET camera

21. Method- II  Subjects –21 right-handed male volunteers  Procedure –Prior training session –Experimental session 10 standardized scripts, in a random order

22. Method- III Trial Time (s.) Event Measures Subj.Int. Physio. PET RelaxationImagery 0”60”0”70”

23. Results: Subjective Feeling Intensity Condition: F(1, 20)=161.73, p<.0001 Emotion: F(4, 80)=80.97, p<.0001 Condition X Emotion: F(4, 80)=45.08, p<.0001

24. Results: Heart Rate Changes Condition: F(1, 18)=4.63, p<.05 Emotion: F(4, 72)=5.28, p<.001 Condition X Emotion: F(4, 72)=4.21, p<.004

25. Schematic versus Propositional mode of processing Ventromedial prefontal cortex

26. Propositional versus Schematic mode of processing Anterolateral prefontal cortex

27. Etude 5 Philippot, Baeyens & Burgos, 2002 Specific versus General Processing of Anxious Predictions

28. Method  Sixty students were placed in a state of anxious apprehension.  They were randomly distributed in three conditions –specific processing of anxious information –general processing of anxious information –no processing.  Participants filled in the DES and the STAI before and after the manipulation

29. Anxiety Intensity Interaction: F(2,57)=28.68, p<.000,  2 =.45 Anxiety Evolution as a Function of Experimental Condition

30. Study6 Philippot, Douilliez & Ramon, 2003 Reappraisal versus Specific versus General Processing of Anxious Predictions

31. Method  Sixty-nine students were placed in a state of anxious apprehension.  They were randomly distributed in three conditions –Specification of the worst fears in the situation –Positive reappraisal of the situation. –General processing of anxious information  Participants filled in the STAI before and after the manipulation

32. STAI Interaction: F(2,66)=3.78, p<.03,  2 =.10 Anxiety Evolution as a Function of Experimental Condition

33. Conclusions  People share a naive theory stating that specifying personal information increases emotional arousal  However, manipulating the processing of personal information shows that the opposite is true –For present as well as for past (AM) information –With many different operationalizations of this manipulation  This gap between naive theory and empirical evidence might constitute a maintenance factor for emotional disorders.

34. Subjective Feeling Intensity as a Function of Emotion and Cognitive Processing condition