1. NASA EEE Parts Challenges for Spaceflight Electronics National Aeronautics and Space Administration www.nasa.gov Quality Leadership Forum March 21, 2013 Michael J. Sampson NASA GSFC Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate (Code 300) michael.j.sampson@nasa.gov 301-614-6233

2. SMILE – It’s NOT that BAD 2 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

3. Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS), Electronic Parts The obvious driver is COST NASA uses many COTS parts and always has MIL/Hi Rel parts can have a selling price 1000 X COTS COTS parts can also be more powerful, faster, more volumetrically efficient The challenge is to know enough about the COTS parts to reach an acceptable risk – Total Cost of Ownership The position stated here is not new, see NEXT SLIDE What may have changed are options for how and when to develop the knowledge to manage the risk Changes to NASA’s ways of business are imperative for greater use of COTS and cost savings from COTS Only One Challenge Matters - COTS 3 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

4. INHERENT RISK INVERSELY PROPORTIONAL TO KNOWLEDGE If a part is KNOWN to be high risk, this knowledge can be used to avoid its use or take appropriate actions to move to medium or low risk Lack of knowledge means good parts cannot be distinguished from bad Obtaining reliable knowledge about COTS EEE Parts requires: – Expertise – Time – Vendor visits – Testing and Analysis – BIG BUCKS ONLY a LIMITED number of COTS part types can be reliably deployed in any one system EEE Parts Risk Assessment - Risk versus Knowledge From QLF July 2001 4 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

5. UncertaintyCost Risk A Notional View of the Key Tradeoffs 5 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

6. UncertaintyCost Risk A Notional View of the Cost Tradeoffs Class S NASA Level 3 COTS Class B 6 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

7. Inherent Risks - for EEE Parts Manufacturing Factors – Spec – Vendor – Maturity/Qualification Status – Knowledge of Changes – Radiation Sensitivity – Traceability (added 3/1/2013) These are risks inherent to the part regardless of: – Redundancy – Derating – Mission Requirements – Mission Budget From QLF July 2001 7 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

8. Traceability? From QLF March 2003 8 MJS QLF 3/21/2013 S

9. Manufacturer hi-rel catalog part based on MIL-PRF-38534 Class Level S GSFC project suffered hybrid failures traced to LEDs used to trigger a photodetector, hybrid failure rate ~ 2%, LEDs ~ 1.5% Very unusual failure involving total bond pad lift Poor Traceability Records mean lack of ability to identify the specific wafer lot, impeding ability to determine root cause Traceability is Important 9 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

10. DYNAMIC BURN-IN RESULTS Dynamic Burn-In Per the Application is Recommended Value added step when done in conjunction with a data review for part performance and reliability. More effective than static burn-in for many part types. NEPP/NEPAG FY03/04 – COTS Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuits Evaluation Example of COTS PEMS Evaluation Findings Dynamic Burn-In Screening Captures Failures in 4 out of 5 Lots Tested 10 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

11. Goals & Objectives LOT VARIATIONS EXAMPLE Demonstrated: COTS Products May Demonstrate Distinctly Different Lot to Lot Parametric Variations Post Burn-In Recommendation: Evaluate ALL Lot Date Codes Procured to Determine Flight Worthiness and Application-Specific Acceptability LDC 0112 LDC 0122 LDC 0127 Three Lot Date Codes of One Part Type From A Single Source NEPP/NEPAG FY03/04 – COTS Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuits Evaluation 11 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

12. Impact of Radiation Assurance With Upgrading On Parts Costs (incl. parts cost) Cost in $1,000,000’s 12 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

13. Learn a lot about parts before installation – Works well for one-off, long duration, low risk missions – Minimizes post installation costs in correcting parts problems Learn a lot about parts after installation – Works well for mass production, short duration missions – risk? – Limited variation, standardization of key common functions: attitude control, communication, power, etc. Perhaps there is a middle ground for NASA? – Basic qualification at the part level – Limited part types used for standard functional modules – Screening for compliance to key parameters – Extensive testing at the module level – Automotive parts? So What About Options? 13 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

14. Time at which defect is caught The later a defect is caught, the more: Layers have to be removed Work has to be “undone” Testing has to be redone AND Likely the project will fly with residual risk. Cost to remove a single defect Launch Date Mission Cost+ Cost of a Single Defect 14 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

15. Microcircuit Manufacturer Statement (3/3/2013) Restructuring: “… reduce our staffing by 18%” “… our Space Products (High Rel business), … was NOT affected by the announced action. In fact, X has added R&D dollars to the high rel group to support our space customers with new products. Rest assured, High Rel/Space products continue to be a core competency that X will continue to develop and grow. Part availability issues are overstated 15 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

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17. Xilinx Package Change Future Package Current Package – Now Obsolete 17 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

18. A 1752 I/O Column Grid Array From: Reliability of CGA/LGA/HDI Package Board/Assembly by Reza Ghaffarian Ph.D, JPL Available at http://nepp.nasa.govhttp://nepp.nasa.gov 18 MJS QLF 3/21/2013

19. Amusing Metal Whiskers MJS QLF 3/21/2013 19 Image Courtesy of Peter Bush, SUNY, Buffalo Image Courtesy of Lyudmyla Panashchenko NASA GSFC

20. MJS QLF 3/21/2013 20 Image Courtesy of Peter Bush, SUNY, Buffalo QUESTIONS

21. 21 SignOffPage http://nepp.nasa.gov