1. Sustainable Energy Options African Case Examples of What Works & Possible Interventions for Parliaments  Opposite ends of Spectrum: Small scale and improved biomass cookstove example from Kenya (perceived as an access option to more efficient option) & more advanced large-scale cogeneration experience in Mauritius  Brief Discussion of Case Studies: Key achievements and results  Policy lessons learned: Could provide basis for Parliament’s interventions.

2. Improved Efficient Charcoal Kenya Ceramic Jiko (KCJ)  Adaptation of a clay-line bucket stove design from Thailand  Reduces charcoal consumption by 30-50%  In use in over 80% of urban households in Kenya (16% of rural homes) - cumulative production now over 15 million  Fully self-sustaining using locally produced materials and skills – generated jobs & new enterprises  KCJ in use in Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, Ethiopia, Sudan, Zambia, Rwanda, Burundi & Senegal & being introduced in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Ghana and Madagascar

3. KCJ – Policy/Strategy Elements  Good Data Base: Ministry of Energy/Beijer Institute Survey, NGOs and research institutes  Micro-level de-regulation: Government allowed informal sector space/freedom and did not attempt to over-regulate. Eased up on taxes and licenses  Provided Minimum Infrastructure: A simple shed and basic sewage amenities. Access to electricity & public lighting would transform the KCJ industry.  Training & Adaptation Research Support: Most of required technologies in public domain with proven experiences in Asia and Latin America. Modest training and research support to adapt technologies to local conditions is all that is needed.

4. Policy Lessons Learned Could Provide Basis for Interventions by Parliament  Importance of Small-Scale/Informal Manufacturing/Assembly Sector: Can account for up 30-40% of jobs. In absence of formal sector employment growth, often only major source of jobs for rapidly growing pool of unemployed youth. Less troublesome than informal trading sector. Resilient sector which relies on local demand – can survive political instability, economic downturns  Micro-Deregulation: Avoid over-regulation. Need protection from sometimes overzealous/capricious city employees. Can be brought into tax net with simple one-time annual estimated turnover tax.  Secure location & basic amenities is often sufficient: Official site, shed and basic sewage plus access to electricity is often all that is needed.

5. Where Micro-Deregulation Has Worked  Nepal: A robust small hydro/micro-hydro local industry that has survived instability and civil war  Thousands of micro-hydro installations: Provide shaft power for grinding grain during day and electricity for lighting during the night.  Micro-Deregulation of micro-hydro industry: Below a certain threshold (up to 1MW), require minimum licensing, can set own tariff that is negotiated with users.  Now grown to major sector with a micro & small hydro capacity (including units under construction) of close to 100MW

6. Cogeneration in Sugar Industry  Most sugar industries in eastern and southern Africa currently practicing co-generation for own use (using bagasse – a waste byproduct) but very limited power exports to grid  Sugar industry directly or indirectly impact on 4-7 million people in Western parts of Kenya  Sugar mills found in most Africa countries (Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, South Africa, Swaziland and many West African countries)  What works in sugar industry can often be replicated in other agro-industries (agriculture & agro-industries can account for over 50% of a typical sub-Saharan Africa country’s GDP)

7. Cogeneration in Sugar Industry  Sugar prices in the region facing long- term decline (not withstanding recent increase in prices arising from greater interest in ethanol as replacement for increasingly costly oil) – cogeneration attractive as it offers alternative revenue stream  In Mauritius, power sales revenue for sugar millers recently exceeded that from sugar

8. Cogeneration in Mauritius Model Example for Regional Replication  Successful in sale of power to the grid  Accounts for close to 40% of a 725MW national generation capacity (of which 25% bagasse)  Began with smaller installations (1.5MW - 5MW, now installing 70MW plants) Others Sugar Industry Power Generation – Mauritius 2004

9. Policy Measures Installed Capacity (MW) GWh generated YearTotalB&CTotalB&C% 1979Prior to Sugar Sector Reform15927355-- 1985Sugar Sector Action Plan2264439210326.3 1988Sugar Industry Efficiency Act2524254910619.3 1991 Bagasse Energy Development Programme 2944273812416.8 1997 Blue Print on the Centralisation of Cane Milling Activities 37053125214811.8 2001Sugar Sector Strategic Plan660246165771143 2006 Multi-Annual Adaptation Strategy for Sugar Sector 725242192372538 2015Target to be reached-3543015110056 Policy Measures for Promoting Cogeneration Cogeneration in Mauritius

10. Sugar Sector Reform initiatives & Bagasse Energy YearPolicy initiatives Emphasis on 1985 Sugar Sector Action Plan Bagasse energy policy evoked 1988 Sugar Industry Efficiency Act -Tax free revenue from sales of bagasse and electricity -Export duty rebate on bagasse savings for firm power production -Capital allowance on investment in bagasse energy 1991 Bagasse Energy Development Programme -Diversify energy base -Reduce reliance on imported fuel -Modernise sugar factories -Enhanced environmental benefits Cogeneration in Mauritius

11. Sugar Sector Reform initiatives & Bagasse Energy YearPolicy initiatives Emphasis on 1997 Blue Print on the Centralisation of Cane Milling Activities Facilitate closure of small mills with concurrent increase in capacities and investment in bagasse energy 2001 Sugar Sector Strategic Plan -Enhance energy efficiency in milling -Decrease number and increase capacity of mills -Favour investment in cogeneration units 2005 Roadmap for the Mauritius Sugarcane Industry for the 21 st Century -Reduction in the number of mills to 6 with a cogeneration plant annexed to each plant Cogeneration in Mauritius

12. Energy Pricing Power modePower Plant Price – Rs (us ¢)/kWh YearCharacteristics Intermittent -0.16 (0.6)1982Price frozen since 1982 Continuous Medine0.55 (1.9)1982No change in price since 1982 –no changes brought to the plant Continuous 6 PPs1.05 (3.7)199744% of kWh price indexed to changes in oil price and the other 56% is fixed 1.40 (4.9)2000 Firm FUELcoal - 1.63 (5.7) bag. - 1.56 (5.5) 1985Invested in new equipment Indexed to coal price FirmDRBCcoal - 1.53 (5.4) bag. - 1.46 (5.1) 1998Invested in second hand equipment Indexed to coal price FirmCTBVboth - 1.72 (6.0)2000Indexed to coal price, cost of living in Mauritius, foreign exchange rate fluctuations Cogeneration in Mauritius

13. Cogeneration Feed-In Tariffs in Mauritius

14. Revenue Sharing Share Ownership Of Cogen Plants  Firm  Corporate sector 51%  Strategic Partner 27%  SIT (Small planters/workers) 14%  State Investment Corporation 8%  Continuous  Corporate sector 80%  SIT (Sugar Investment Trust)20%  Equitable sharing of ownership of and revenue from cogeneration ensures even smallest low-income farmer gets a portion of revenue  In turn, leads to exceptionally strong & consistent policy support

15. Key Policy Lessons & Possible Interventions by Parliament  OK to start small (Mauritius started with 1 to 2 MW units) which allows a learning experience and sorting out the kinks. Can set an initial target of up to 5% installed capacity. Higher prices can be justified on basis of importance of diversity, elimination of transmission costs & increased through rural electrification – over time prices can come down with the right incentives  Easier to convince Governments/utilities to act. Thereafter, it is possible to expand exponential and initiate large initiatives.  Feed-in tariff is key in promoting co-generation as it provides a strong signal to private sector and financing institutions  Not wise to leave it only to Regulators. Parliament can play an important role.  An important addition to feed-in tariff is a standard “Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)” between agro-industry and power utility. Simplifies negotiations (which can take as long as 7-10years) and removes a major barrier to co-generation investments.  Revenue sharing mechanism which ensures that large majority of population saw tangible benefits was key to maintain policy support.