1. Discussant Comments on The Legacy of ESEA & K-12 School Quality Chapter by Cascio/Reber Rucker C. Johnson, UC-Berkeley & NBER Visiting Scholar, Russell Sage Foundation June 12, 2012 1

2. US County Poverty Rates in 1960 Among the 300 poorest counties 2.1 – 20.99 21 – 31.29 31.3 – 45.62 45.63 – 93.07

3. County Population: Percent African American - 1960 Less than 10% 10 to less than 25% 25 to less than 50% 50% or more

4.  Title I—Financial assistance to local educ agencies for the educ of children of low-income families  Title II—school library resources, textbooks, and other instructional materials  Title III—supplementary educational centers and services  Title IV—educational research and training  Title V—grants to strengthen state departments of education  Title VI—general provisions  New titles created by early amendments to 1965 law  1966 amendments (Public Law 89-750)  Title VI - aid to handicapped children (1965 title VI becomes Title VII)  1967 amendments (Public Law 90-247)  Title VII - bilingual education programs (1966 title VII becomes Title VIII)

5.  $12.7 billion in 2006 appropriations 1/3 of fed K-12 support  Largest fed program past 40 yrs  Goal: increase achievement of poor students by providing funding to poor schools  Evidence of effectiveness is mixed (Matsudaira et al, 2012; Casio et al, 2012; Van der Klaauw, 2005).  Local pub finance reasons why may not work-- crowd-out of local funds. (Gordon, 2004)

6.  Does it increase funding of poor schools?  Does funding appear to displace other sources of funding? If so, what other sources of funding decline?  Does it boost measurable school inputs, e.g. pupil- teacher ratios?  Does it increase student achievement, esp. among targeted subgroups?  Do schools engage in “strategic behavior” to attain funds?

7.  Many diffs between Title I and non-Title I schools-- (esp. poverty level), and the students attending them.

8.  Feds give $ to counties based on Census poverty counts.  State gives $ to districts based on same.

9. 1. Info culled from NARA records by searching program titles & program codes 2. Identify pool of grants potentially for ESEA (included string searches on ESEA grant titles) 3. Most records, ESEA programs listed by community & funding amounts, & info on "stock" of programs at a particular time allows verification of accuracy of grant "flows"

10. 1967-80: cnty-level Fed program outlays (NARA, Title I,II,III)  SEERS: # of 4 yr olds by county, 1965-80  County poverty rate (‘60,’70,’80: linearly interpolate)  Key variable: ESEA spending per 4-yr old in cnty, 1967-80

11. PSID individuals born between 1950-1970 followed up to 2009 Data linked to census block in childhood Resulting Sample: from 6,362 individuals from 1,574 families from 920 school districts  37% black  Matched to…1965-80 cnty ESEA & Head Start spending 1960-1990 Census data, case inventory of desegregation court cases 1955-1990 Office of Civil Rights (Logan, American Communities Project) 1962-1982 Census of Governments, and Common Core data (compiled by National Center for Education Statistics.)

12. Methods  Factors influencing Adult attainments  Individual, time, family, neighborhood, school ● Childhood school factors Per-pupil spending Class size School segregation Court-ordered desegregation plans Teacher salary Childhood family background factors: Parental… - education - family income - health behaviors (smoking, alcohol use) Race Family structure Birth weight Health insurance ● Childhood neighborhood factors Crowding # Neighbors known Informal support Neighborhood poverty Crime Residential segregation Housing quality

13.  School desegregation exposure, by race (Johnson, 2010)  Head Start spending per poor child (cnty) (Johnson, ‘12)  Timing of Kindergarten intro, state-funded initiatives (Cascio, 2010)  County-level gov’t transfer programs (1959-79: REIS (Hoynes et al., 2010)); avg during childhood ages Medicaid/AFDC/Food Stamps/UI…

16. ESEA Per Pupil Spending 1968 0 1 – 1,120 1,121 – 1,681 1,682 – 2,567 2,567 +

17. ESEA Per Pupil Spending 1969 0 1 – 1,120 1,121 – 1,681 1,682 – 2,567 2,567 +

18. ESEA Per Pupil Spending 1970 0 1 – 1,120 1,121 – 1,681 1,682 – 2,567 2,567 +

19. ESEA Per Pupil Spending 1971 0 1 – 1,120 1,121 – 1,681 1,682 – 2,567 2,567 +

20. ESEA Per Pupil Spending 1972 0 1 – 1,120 1,121 – 1,681 1,682 – 2,567 2,567 +

21. ESEA Per Pupil Spending 1973 0 1 – 1,120 1,121 – 1,681 1,682 – 2,567 2,567 +

22. ESEA Per Pupil Spending 1974 0 1 – 1,120 1,121 – 1,681 1,682 – 2,567 2,567 +

23. ESEA Per Pupil Spending 1975 0 1 – 1,120 1,121 – 1,681 1,682 – 2,567 2,567 +

24. ESEA Per Pupil Spending 1976 0 1 – 1,120 1,121 – 1,681 1,682 – 2,567 2,567 +

25. ESEA Per Pupil Spending 1977 0 1 – 1,120 1,121 – 1,681 1,682 – 2,567 2,567 +

26. ESEA Per Pupil Spending 1978 0 1 – 1,120 1,121 – 1,681 1,682 – 2,567 2,567 +

27. ESEA Per Pupil Spending 1979 0 1 – 1,120 1,121 – 1,681 1,682 – 2,567 2,567 +

28. ESEA Per Pupil Spending 1980 0 1 – 1,120 1,121 – 1,681 1,682 – 2,567 2,567 +

29. ESEA School Spending Per Poor Kid 1980 0 1 – 8,692 8,693 – 10,492 10,493 – 12,958 12,958 +

32.  Project Star (a randomized experiment investigating the effects of small class size) cost ~$3,800/student.  Reduced class-size by ~7 students (from a base of 22), and increased student achievement by.2-.25 standard deviations.  A reasonable starting benchmark may be to assume effects are linear in program cost so Title I effects may be slightly <1/10th of Project Star’s effects  Expect effects of ~.7 reduction in pupil-teacher ratios, and a.02 -.025 increase in test scores—VERY SMALL!

33.  Expected effects depend on extent funds are targeted within schools.  e.g, if funds are targeted to 20% of students, expected effects should be 5x as large.

34.  Schools appear to respond to Title I incentives, possibly by enrolling more eligibles in free-lunch programs. The welfare consequences of such behavior—involving zero sum competition among poor schools—are likely negative.  Increases in Title I funding are partially offset by local education agency behavior—local funds are redistributed to partially compensate non-Title I schools.

35.  Lacking info on extent of targeting, effects of funding on treated students remains unclear.