1. Space Weather & EU-FP7 Meeting
GIC research in Finland and Europe
Risto Pirjola
Finnish Meteorological Institute, Helsinki, Finland
Space Weather & EU-FP7 Meeting
Paris, January 23, 2007

2. Ground Effects of Space Weather =
Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GIC) in
-electric power transmission systems
-oil and gas pipelines
-telecommunication cables
-railway equipment
-in principle all long conductors

4. Effects of GIC on power systems -depend much on technological details of the grid, on transformer types, etc -experiences in one country cannot directly be extrapolated to another
Possible GIC problems are due to saturation of transformers, which may lead to:
Production of harmonics
Relay trippings
Increased reactive power demands
Voltage fluctuations
Unbalanced network, even a collapse
Magnetic stray fluxes in transformers
Hot spots in transformers, even permanent damage

5. Québec blackout -- March 13, 1989
Harmonics (created by transformer saturation due to GIC) caused, by a “domino effect”, a collapse of the whole system in about one and a half minutes.
Six million people were without electricity for several hours.
Total costs 13.2 MCAD
Malmö blackout -- October 30, 2003
About customers were without electricity in Malmö, southern Sweden, for minutes.
The first (and so far only?) known power grid blackout due to GIC in Europe
An overcurrent relay was too sensitive to the third harmonic of 50 Hz. It has been replaced by a less sensitive relay later.

7. GIC research in Finland
High-Voltage (400 & 220 kV) power system
Collaboration between FMI and the Fingrid Oyj power company
Started in 1976
GIC recordings in earthing leads of 400 kV transformer neutrals since 1977 (Fingrid, FMI)
At present at three sites
Also a one-year campaign of GIC recordings in a 400 kV line in the 1990’s
Theoretical modelling of geoelectric fields and GIC (FMI)
Several statistical studies of GIC occurrence based on model calculations, geomagnetic data and GIC recordings (FMI)
Tests of the effects of dc currents injected into transformers (Fingrid)

8. GIC research in Finland
High-Voltage (400 & 220 kV) power system (continues)
Conclusions:
GIC are a potential risk in Finland due to the high-latitude location, so contacts between Fingrid and FMI continue.
Largest measured GIC = 201 A (March 24, 1991); only 42 A on October 30, 2003
Only one GIC disturbance so far: A protective relay caused an unwanted tripping in northern Finland in January 2005 because the relay had been configured erroneously.
The resistances provided by neutral point reactors efficiently reduce GIC.
Series capacitors block the flow of GIC.
The transformer structures and design specifications efficiently prevent overheating and gassing problems.
The Swedish high-voltage system is clearly more sensitive to GIC, so FMI and IRF continue research together with Swedish power industry.

10. GIC research in Finland
Natural gas pipeline
Collaboration between FMI and the Gasum Oy pipeline company
Started in 1981
Theoretical modelling of geoelectric fields, GIC and pipe-to-soil voltages (FMI)
Statistical studies of GIC occurrence based on model calculations and geomagnetic data (FMI)
Pipe-to-soil voltage monitoring at several sites (Gasum)
Recording of GIC at one site since 1998 (FMI)
Web-based service “GICNow!” developed for Gasum in the ESA Space Weather Applications Pilot Project in 2003 to 2005 (FMI)

12. Facts to be remembered in the estimation of GIC risks in the European high-voltage power system
The society is more and more dependent on reliable power supply.
Electric energy is much transported from one country to another.
A local disturbance in the power grid may propagate as a “domino effect” to other parts of the network, possibly resulting in a collapse of the whole system.
The blackout in central Europe in November 2006 was a good example though not caused by GIC.
On the other hand, GIC may also impact many sites simultaneously.
Use of higher voltages implies smaller line resistances and larger GIC.
Longer transmission lines imply larger induced geovoltages.
GIC magnitudes do not only depend on the latitude but power system configuration details also affect.
Problems caused by GIC depend on transformer types and other technological matters, so power engineering expertise is needed.
The next sunspot maximum approaches.

13. EU FP6 STREP Pre-Proposal (GREPON) in 2004
NEST INSIGHT area; Call: FP NEST-B-3 closed on September 15, 2004
Title: “Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GIC) Risk in the European Power Network” (GREPON)
Duration 24 months (about July 2005 to June 2007)
Budget 1600 kEuros (request from EU 800 kEuros)
8 consortium partners (with 150 man-months):
FMI, Finland
BGS-Edinburgh, UK
LPCE/CNRS-Orleans, France
DMI, Denmark
IRF-Lund, Sweden
Natural Resources Canada
University of Sheffield, UK
Power industry [ANF Energy Solutions (Canada), RTE/EDF (France)]

14. GREPON evaluation on December 23, 2004
Relevance to the objectives of the programme = 4.0 (threshold = 4)
Scientific and technological excellence = 3.2 (threshold = 4)
Potential impact = 2.5 (threshold = 3)
“The panel considers that GREPON addresses a true risk to society which is relevant to INSIGHT but of moderate novelty and impact.”
“The panel considers that the potential impact of the proposed work is limited since the frequency of GIC storms and the breakdowns of electrical power networks is quite low.”
“More integrated power networks might not increase the risk because a more integrated network has also more connecting nodes that receive energy from other plants.”
“The panel has therefore decided to recommend that the proposal should not be retained for the second stage evaluation.”

15. EU FP6 STREP Pre-Proposal (GREPON-2) in 2005
NEST INSIGHT area; Call: FP NEST-C-1 closed on April 13, 2005
Title: “Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GIC) Risk in the European Power Network” (GREPON-2)
Duration 24 months (about July 2006 to June 2008)
Budget 1860 kEuros (request from EU 960 kEuros)
8 consortium partners (with 186 man-months):
FMI, Finland
LPCE/CNRS-Orleans, France [+ NRCan (Canada), CETP (France)]
IRF-Lund, Sweden
DMI, Denmark
BGS-Edinburgh, UK
University of Sheffield, UK [+ ANF Energy Solutions (Canada)]
RTE/EDF power company, France
NGT power company, UK

16. GREPON-2 evaluation on July 18, 2005
Relevance to the objectives of the programme = 3.5 (threshold = 4; GREPON 4.0)
Scientific and technological excellence = 3.9 (threshold = 4; GREPON 3.2)
Potential impact = 3.0 (threshold = 3; GREPON 2.5))
“The panel considers that the phenomenon addressed is not really that new and does not seem to be of such high concern with a relevant potential for serious problems or risks to European society.”
“The panel has therefore decided to recommend that the proposal should not be retained for the second stage of the evaluation.”
50 pre-proposals out of 330 were accepted for the second stage.

17. Evaluation summaries of SWEET and SW-RISK
Relevance: st- 4, sr- 2 (threshold 3/5)
Potential impact: st- 3, sr- 2 (threshold 3/5)
S & T excellence: st- 3, sr- 3 (threshold 4/5)
Quality of the consortium: st- 2, sr- 3 (threshold 3/5)
Quality of the management: st- 2, sr- 3 (threshold 3/5)
Mobilisation of the resources: st- 3, sr (threshold 3/5)
===> total: SWEET: 17 (threshold 21/30)
SW-RISK: (threshold 21/30)