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Open Source Information: Heads Up for the COCOMs
Robert David Steele Vivas Founder, USMC Intelligence Command Founder, OSS Network
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Plan for the Brief Big Picture—Strategic Transformation
IC Reform—Where OSINT Fits OSINT 101—Beyond Internet Lite COCOM OSINT JROC—Across the J’s COCOM OSINT Oversight COCOM OSINT Budget Bottom Line: Don’t Ask, Don’t Get
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Big Picture Strategic Transformation
Defense Science Board Report: Strategic Communications (July 2004) Defense Science Board Report: Transition to and from Hostilities (December 2004) Inter-Agency Collaboration Centers Multi-National Information Sharing UN Joint Military Analysis Centres
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Defense Science Board Report: Strategic Communications (July 2004)
Must understand global public opinion Need national center for coordinating USG Effort should be centered at State Must redefine public diplomacy and affairs Must elevate ranks of those so engaged USD Policy should be DoD focal point JCS & COCOMs must align all plans & ops
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Defense Science Board Report: Transitions (December 2004)
Contingency planning is a full-time mission Joint inter-agency task forces are needed COCOMs must focus on S&R mission Must integrate NGOs, other civil players Cultural knowledge is equal of combat skill COCOMs must have I&I campaign plans “Open sources can provide much of the….” S&R: Stabilization & Reconstruction I&I: Information & Intelligence
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Inter-Agency Collaboration Centers Sharing Starts with Open Sources
USSOCOM has built the first one—can copy. SOCOM concludes there is a “mission essential need to exploit open source information for operational use. Bottom line: OSINT can increase our capability by 5X to 10X.” SOCOM has asked for—and gotten—$10M a year, beginning this year, for generic OSINT to support all missions areas, not just intelligence.
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Multi-National Networks US Cannot Do It Alone
Africa has an Early Warning & Open Source Information Sharing Network Caribbean is developing a law enforcement information sharing network NATO and Partnership for Peace have created three OSINT reference documents UN is creating regional JMAC, 1st in Africa JMAC: Joint Military Analysis Centres
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IC Reform Where OSINT Fits
Collection Gaps, Context, & Cover Processing Baseline and Linkages Analytic Foundation, Warning, Framework Management Benefits Lowers over-all cost of meeting all needs Reduces time needed to satisfy many needs Increases requirements that can be satisfied Dramatically increases what can be known
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Reinforces Global Collection Open Sources – 5X to 10X Improved Coverage
Digital Analog Oral/Unpublished English Language Foreign Languages* *33 predominant languages, over 3,000 distinct languages in all. NSA FBIS UN/STATE Cascading Deficiencies: 1) Don’t even try to access most information 2) Can’t process most hard-copy into digital 3) Can’t translate most of what we collect CIA/DO NRO We have failed to properly prepare for war in the 21st Century because our IT premises have failed us. We spend $30+ billion a year on stealing a fraction of the information that is relevant to our decision-making. We are not accessing the vast range of openly available foreign language information that we must understand if we are to deal effectively with Islamic, Chinese, and other concerns. If we apply the “T” to the red area, we increase IC productivity by a factor of at least 10, perhaps 100.
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Can Baseline All-Source Processing
50% Less Costly More Satisfying SIGINT OSINT 0% HUMINT IMINT MASINT STATE Does Not Exist The information we do collect never gets processed in an integrated way. Worse yet, we simply cannot make sense out of what we already have in hand--our analytic toolkits--including collaborative work across organizational boundaries--are a disgrace, mostly because management has never been willing to make the trade-offs between collection technology and analysis technology. We must have a single integrated all-source processing agency to make sense of it all and we must have toolkits. If we apply the “T” to these two challenges, we increase IC productivity by a factor of at least 10, perhaps In combination, “TC” and “TP” = an IC 100X better.
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Multi-Cultural Bottom-Up
Analytic Change #1: Multi-Cultural Bottom-Up TIME IMPACT SHORT TIME IMPACT LONG MULTI-CULTURAL & TRANS-NATIONAL EQUITIES SINGLE-CULTURE SINGLE-ORGANIZATION EQUITIES LEADERS DECIDE PEOPLE DECIDE TOP-DOWN COMMAND & CONTROL SECRET SOURCES & METHODS BOTTOM-UP INFORMATION-SHARING OPEN OBVIOUS DETAIL OBSCURE DETAIL OLD NEW
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Actionable Intelligence Available Information
Analytic Change #2: The Really Big Gap The New Intelligence Gap: the difference between what you can know and what you can use! INFORMATION TIME Actionable Intelligence Available Information Open source information is more complex than secrets…
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Threat Changes with Levels of Analysis
Analytic Change #3: Threat Changes with Levels of Analysis Over time and space Channels & Borders Of strategic value Quantities & Distribution Internally available for use Volatility of sectors Training & Maintenance Mobility implications Cohesion & Effectiveness STRATEGIC Integrated Application OPERATIONAL Selection of Time and Place TACTICAL Application of Finite Resources TECHNICAL Isolated Capabilities Military Sustainability Civil Allies Geographic Location Military Systems One by One Climate Manipulation Civil Power, Transport, Communications, Finance Military Availability Civil Infrastructure Geographic Terrain Geographic Resources Military Lethality Military Reliability Civil Psychology Civil Stability Geographic Atmosphere
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OSINT 101 Beyond Internet Lite
OSINT is 24/7, off-line, complex, costs $$ OSINT includes history back 200 years OSINT demands harnessing seven tribes OSINT demands structured multinational collection, processing, and analytic sharing OSINT integrates sources, softwares, services OSINT enhances analysis & management OSINT is key lever for addressing asymmetric threats
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OSINT Matters Clausewitz Says So…
"By `intelligence' we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country--the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations." Clausewitz, On War, 1832 Emphasis Added. You get no points for just knowing secrets when they are less than 2% of what you need to know, or for answering questions in the most expensive, risky, time-consuming manner possible.
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Definitions Open Source Data Open Source Information
Open Source Intelligence Validated Open Source Intelligence Only the in-house analyst can do this. With that as preamble, I will now spend a few minutes discussing Open Source Intelligence. First, we must distinguish between data—the raw sources in many languages and mediums—information that collates data for generic audiences—and intelligence, which is tailored to the needs of a specific decision-maker. Intelligence is about supporting decisions, not about secret sources. Second, I would emphasize that OSINT should not be controlled by the spies. Ideally we should have an independent agency that is equally responsive to all elements of government. OSINT is not something the classified intelligence community should control—it must be equally responsive to diplomats, policymakers, operators, and logisticians—as well as all-source intelligence analysts.
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WHAT OSINT IS NOT... “…nothing more than a collection of news clippings”. “…the Internet.” “…a substitute for spies and satellites.” I have been working this issue for over 14 years now, and I have learned that there are some common misconceptions about OSINT among the most senior diplomats and other policymakers and operators. Here you see what OSINT is not. At its best, OSINT is the complete marriage of the proven process of intelligence, from requirements definition and collection management to timely analytics, with all—and I do mean all—legally and ethically available sources.
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New Craft of Intelligence 90% of what we need to know is not SEOK
Lessons of History II Global Coverage III National Intelligence IV Spies & Secrecy China, Islam, Ethnic, Etc. Cost-Sharing with Others-- Shared Early Warning Narrowly focused! Harness distributed intelligence of Nation Our national security program must be an informed program. I am quite serious when I suggest that Washington is operating on 2% of the relevant multi-lingual information. We must create a Smart Nation that respects the lessons of history in all languages; creates cost sharing networks with other nations; harnesses the distributed intelligence in our private sector; and focuses a revitalized spy service narrowly, deeply, and effectively. I believe we can double or triple what can be known, relatively quickly, at a cost of less than $125 million in year one. SEOK: Secret, in English, Online, or Known to Anyone in the IC.
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Open Sources in 29+ Languages
Commercial Online Books & Journals Conferences & Dissertations Maps & Commercial Imagery Internet Telephone Surveys Gray Literature Complex Human & IT Services OSINT Universe It is important to emphasize the paucity of those endeavors that are limited to English or the main European languages. If one cannot work in 29+ languages on a 24/7 basis—that is, in near-real-time, one is not serious. Print and broadcast media are actually the smallest part of the open source universe. Untapped perceptions, oral histories, informal exchanges, limited edition local publications, pre-prints, and geospatial as well as imagery information of all kinds—including photos from cells phones with geospatial positioning system information—this is the larger universe.
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Internet Competency No longer a toy--now a serious source
“All-source” means all sources--the Internet is now a major source Search engines vary. Find images and maps. Find experts and groups. Limit to 1-hour efforts. Need an Internet specialist on call.
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Commercial Online Competency 100X more important than Internet
Italian intelligence chief puts Al- Qa'idah's assets at 5bn dollars BBC Monitoring, 05/16/2002, words. Factiva.com DIALOG European Services Value-added is enormous--reputable sources, editorial selection, structured storage and retrieval Need a specialist. CIA 'Probably' Helps Italian Subversive Groups. Xinhua News Agency, 03/20/2001, words.
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Gray Literature Competency Limited edition, must know to ask
Pre-prints, technical reports, company telephone books, university yearbooks, “niche” references. Generally requires human access and special knowledge of availability. Unique and useful.
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Primary Research Competency Knowing Who Knows, Direct Contacts
Citation Analysis is key to finding top experts across different nations. Using the telephone (and the Internet) to reach top experts yields powerful results.
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Citation Analysis Example DIALOG, SSCI, $1000 = Savings
DIALOG access to Social Science Citation Index Use OSS methodology $500 in access charges + $500 in analyst time = list of top experts on any country or topic Then you call them...
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Analytic Toolkit Competency Software can be a curse or a help
Digital conversion, storage, visualization, and retrieval tools Geospatial tools Structured analysis and detection tools Multi-media publication and presentation tools
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Geospatial Competency Maps & images make a difference
Commercial imagery cheaper than ignorance Russian military maps of Third World vital Post-processing support from private sector Desktop tools for plotting information in time & space context
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Analytic Tradecraft Emerging appreciation for its value
CIA University breaking new ground Moving away from “cutting and pasting” Moving away from hard-copy files Focus on learning how to think, and how to structure digital data
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Creating an OSINT Cell Central discovery, distributed exploitation
Six people can leverage global OSINT for an entire Ministry or Service or Command This eliminates need for duplicate open source infrastructure Also saves money Senior All-Source Collection Manager Internet Specialist Commercial Online Expert Primary Research External Contracts All-Source Analyst/ Presentation Manager
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Four Levels of War, All the J’s
Summary: Four Levels of War, All the J’s Strategic Planning Operational Coordination Tactical Employment Acquisition Design History Context Current Awareness Key Personalities/Motivators Imagery & Image Maps Translation Support Strategic Generalizations Critical Technologies J-2 J-3 J-4 J-5 J-6 J-7 J-N This is the slide that got General Peter Schoomaker, then Commander in Chief of the Special Operations Command, and today the Chief of Staff of the Army, to believe that OSINT could make a difference. To his credit, today the U.S. Special Operations Command is the only element of the U.S. Government that is completely proficient in what I call operationally-oriented OSINT—from monitoring terrorist and insurgent web sites in 29 languages, to tribal studies to acquisition studies to Russian military maps integrated with US shuttle mission terrain elevation data, they get it. J-2 J-3 J-4 J-5 J-6 J-7 J-N
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Six Phone Calls, Overnight Response. Need to know who knows….
Burundi Exercise 1995 This is what got Lee Hamilton to recommend OSA on page 413 of 9-11 Commission Report. Top 10 Academics (Institute of Scientific Information) Top 10 Journalists (LEXIS-NEXIS) 20 Pol-Mil Summaries (Oxford Analytica UK) Tribal Orders of Battle (Jane’s Information Group) Russian Military Maps (East View Cartographic) Commercial Imagery (SPOT Image—today many vendors) Six Phone Calls, Overnight Response. Need to know who knows…. Lest you might believe that the U.S. Government does OSINT, but does not advertise, I will simply highlight the fact that in August 1995, in an overnight exercise, I defeated the entire U.S. Intelligence Community—all agencies—in what is now known as the Burundi exercise. I did this with six telephone calls on my way to the airport. It was not a fair contest—if you believe that only secrets matter, then you will tend to not know where to go for the non-secrets. There has been no real change since then due to persistent opposing mind-sets.
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NATO OSINT NATO also gets it. Under the leadership of another great Army general, William Kernan, NATO, when it began expanding, adopted OSINT as its standard for establishing common understandings with Partnership for Peace nations and other coalition partners of the moment, including non-governmental organizations. As of this minute, these three publications, all available free on the Internet, represent the standard of excellence for OSINT.
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Seven Intelligence Tribes: The Way Ahead
Military Law Enforcement Business Academic National NGO & Media Religions & Clans Now let me dig a little deeper and explore some of the nuances of the open source world. We achieve new efficiencies and effectiveness in national intelligence—and in our international affairs—by recognizing that there are seven tribes relevant to our planning and to our operations. We must nurture these seven tribes, in part by recognizing them, in part by training them, and in part by developing generic standards for migrating the proven process of intelligence from the spy world to the open world. That’s where you come in—only you can do this.
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State of the Tribes Today
National % Military % Business % Academic % Law Enforcement 20% NGO-Media % Religious % We have much to do. There is plenty of room for improvement on all fronts. This is my considered judgment on where we are today. My first book evaluates the U.S. Intelligence Community in great detail, and ends with a 62-page index. Don’t ever be intimidated by a spy claiming to know things you do not know. The problem with spies is they only know secrets—they only believe in what can be stolen, not what can be known. It is you, as diplomats, who can bring these seven tribes together, and nurture a new form of national intelligence.
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OSINT Benefits Statement Every Single COCOM Needs to Focus Now…
Why Focus on OSINT? Non-state, lower tier Complex emergencies Limited secret coverage Information explosion Immediate Benefits Insurance policy Improves coverage Improves coalitions Program Elements Digital History Project NGO Data Network Generic Training Teams Generic Analytic Tools Generic Standards University of the Republic Virtual Task Forces Regional OSINT Centers Never in our history have we been more in need of a professional OSINT endeavor, and I believe that you here in State should provide the leadership. OSINT can cover everything the spies cannot focus on. It provides an insurance policy. It can be shared with anyone. Best of all, it puts State back in charge of foreign affairs. I have posted a detailed budget at OSS.Net, developed for the Senate Armed Services Committee, showing precisely how I would spend $125M a year—on the way to $1.5B a year—to revitalize America’s intelligence.
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Regional Intelligence Center
I created our Nation’s newest all-source intelligence center from 1988 to I have served in three of the four Directorates at CIA, and I understand the real world and what can be known about the real world. I’m here to tell you that the US Government, on its own, with all the money in the world to spend, will never in a million years get it right. We must—we must—lead the way in creating regional intelligence centers that share the burden and leverage local access and local knowledge. From OSINT we can graduate to multinational clandestine and shared technical operations—but first we have to do OSINT. Deputy for Counterintelligence Japan Deputy for Covert Action Thailand
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COCOM OPG VPN Getting a grip on every topic, 24/7
Weekly report Distance learning Virtual library Expert Forum Shared directory Shared calendar Shared budget Shared “plot” (map)
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World War III Players Nation-States Private Sector Bacteria Citizens
Gangs Nation states are only ten percent of the threat. More threatening are private sector organizations that destroy people’s life savings or export their jobs, or that implant immoral capitalism abroad, enriching elites and disenfranchising all others; ethnic criminal gangs such as we see coming out of Russia, China, Vietnam, Korea, Japan, and Colombia; and bacteria. Finally, we have Mother Earth, on the verge of collapse. The Earth is tired of our talk, wants peace, an end to promises, and perhaps an end to us. [Philip Levine, 1979] Mother Earth Water-Air-Green
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Conflict Facts for 2002 23 LIC+, 79 LIC-, 175 VPC
This is the reality that we are not ready to deal with as we are now structured and funded. We have a world that is largely unstable and at war with itself. In 2002 there were 23 conflicts killing over 1000 people a year, 79 killing under 1000 a year, and 175 violent political conflicts internal to a specific country. Neither the CIA nor the media articulate this reality to our public. You must take up this challenge. Pol Terror Level 3 Imprisonment, executions Pol Terror Level 4 Large numbers, torture Pol Terror Level 5 Entire public, no limits Source: PIOOM (NL), data with permission © 2002 A. Jongman
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Global Threats to Local Survival
Complex Emergencies 32 Countries Refugees/Displaced 66 Countries Food Security 33 Countries Child Soldiers 41 Countries Modern Plagues* 59 Countries & Rising Water Scarcity & Contaminated Water** Ethnic Conflict 18 Genocides Today** Resource Wars, Energy Waste & Pollution** Corruption Common 80 Countries Censorship Very High 62 Countries Instability spawns migrations, criminal activity, and disease as well as terrorism. There are 20 or so complex emergencies involving over 32 countries that are considered to be “failed states.” We have millions of refugees, millions of starving people, millions of people subject to plagues and epidemics. You know these challenges well—but until we educate America, and our citizens in turn demand action from Congress and the Executive, these threats to our Nation will continue to multiply and interact. *State of the World Atlas (1997), ** Marq de Villier (Water), John Heidenrich and Greg Stanton (Genocide), Michael Klare et al (Resources), all others from PIOOM Map 2002
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Four Different Threats to America: Require Four Different Security Approaches
PHYSICAL STEALTH, PRECISION TARGETING NATURAL RANDOM CYBER - DATABASE IDEO - MASS GUERRILLAWAR CULTURALWAR HIGH TECH BRUTES (BIG WAR) LOW TECH (GANGS) SEERS (HOME) (POOR) MONEY--RUTHLESSNESS POWER BASE KNOWLEDGE--IDEOLOGY TERRORISM ECONOMICWAR As I discuss in my second book, copies of which are in your library, the real world presents America with four distinct threats, each completely different, each requiring completely different national security capabilities. Three of these four threat classes require very big investments in peaceful preventive measures and in human expertise. That’s where you come in. It is time for State to get back in the business of grand strategy, inter-agency planning, and inter-agency operational campaign management.
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COCOM OSINT JROC IMHO, We Have Not Really Done JROC Right…
J-2: Warning, Historical, Ethnic, Basic J-3: OOTW, Coalition, S&T, NGOs, PMIs J-4: Maps, Geospatial, Fuel, Water, Etc. J-5: Mid & long-term plans support J-6: Telecommunications, IO, PSYOP? J-7: Joint & Coalition Inter-operability J-N: RW-RT Simulation Feeds, Etc. JROC: Joint Required Operational Capability
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COCOM OSINT Oversight Direct Report to DCC, All J’s Oversee
Congressman Simmons has a view on this. J-3 manages external liaison via Civil Affairs J-2 manages internal validation & integration BUT may not interdict direct support to other J’s BUT may not control nor reduce OSINT budget COCOM OSINT is a direct report to DCC All J’s serve on oversight board.
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COCOM OSINT Context No One Else Is Going To Meet Your Needs
Unrealistic to expect national to collect, process, or analyze open sources for military 90% of what we need comes from people that do not want to meet or share with intelligence Cannot predict the future—can only be alert to all weak signals in all languages all the time Next four slides address generic capability.
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COCOM OSINT People 25 People—Six at HQS, 6 Three-Person Teams
Double-hat as inter-agency collaboration Six people at Headquarters Branch Chief/Collection Manager, Deputy Branch Chief & All-Source Analyst, Master Librarian, Action Officer, Contracts Officer, Geospatial Specialist, Online Search Specialist Six three-person “information A teams” Section Chief, Translator/Analyst, Webmaster
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COCOM OSINT Outposts There Is No Substitute for “Being There”
CENTCOM EUCOM PACOM SOUTHCOM Alamaty Accra/Dakar Hanoi Bogotá Beijing Cairo Jakarta Caracas Istanbul Madrid Kuala Lumpur Montevideo Moscow Paris Kyoto Trinidad New Delhi Pretoria Manila Panama Stockholm Rome Singapore Rio de Janeiro NOTE: DoD Teams form integrated mesh, e.g. Beijing team serves all COCOMs, for example, telecomms for PACOM, trade for SOUTHCOM.
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COCOM OSINT Budget $10M Buys “Just Enough, Just in Time”
$3.75M for 25 trained, dedicated OSOs $1.00M for information technology & travel $1.50M for information sharing grants $1.00M for Digital Marshall Plan across AOR $2.00M for Vendor OSINT acquisition $0.50M for Vendor digitization/visualization $0.25M for Training across the AOR
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COCOM OSINT Sharing Taking Intelink to a New Level
Open Source Information System-External OSIS-X Extends Intelink protocols, look & feel, to all Open to NGOs, PMIs, coalition partners, etc. Harvested every five minutes back to NIPR+ Leverages SOCOM “hub” for processing Leverages Tampa as location of two COCOMs, offer up space for DoD-wide help desk
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Don’t Ask, Don’t Get USDI is playing cards close to its chest.
Defense Open Source Agency is possible. $125M IOC, $2B FOC, is a do-able do. Congressman Simmons owns OSINT. Congressman Davis is now interested. This is not going away. Don’t ask, don’t get.
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