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Network Security7-1 Chapter 7 Network Security Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach Featuring the Internet, 2 nd edition. Jim Kurose, Keith Ross Addison-Wesley, July 2002. A note on the use of these ppt slides: We’re making these slides freely available to all (faculty, students, readers). They’re in powerpoint form so you can add, modify, and delete slides (including this one) and slide content to suit your needs. They obviously represent a lot of work on our part. In return for use, we only ask the following: If you use these slides (e.g., in a class) in substantially unaltered form, that you mention their source (after all, we’d like people to use our book!) If you post any slides in substantially unaltered form on a www site, that you note that they are adapted from (or perhaps identical to) our slides, and note our copyright of this material. Modified by Merrie Bergmann 4/29/03 Thanks and enjoy! JFK/KWR All material copyright 1996-2002 J.F Kurose and K.W. Ross, All Rights Reserved
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Network Security7-2 Trusted Intermediaries Symmetric key problem: r How do two entities establish shared secret key over network? Solution: r trusted key distribution center (KDC) acting as intermediary between entities Public key problem: r When Alice obtains Bob’s public key (from web site, e-mail, diskette), how does she know it is Bob’s public key, not Trudy’s? Solution: r trusted certification authority (CA)
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Network Security7-3 Key Distribution Center (KDC) r Alice, Bob need shared symmetric key. r KDC: server shares different secret key with each registered user (many users) r Alice, Bob know own symmetric keys, K A-KDC K B-KDC, for communicating with KDC. K B-KDC K X-KDC K Y-KDC K Z-KDC K P-KDC K B-KDC K A-KDC K P-KDC KDC
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Network Security7-4 Key Distribution Center (KDC) Alice knows R1 Bob knows to use R1 to communicate with Alice Alice and Bob communicate: using R1 as session key for shared symmetric encryption Q: How does KDC allow Bob, Alice to determine shared symmetric secret key to communicate with each other? KDC generates R1 K B-KDC (A,R1) K A-KDC (A,B) K A-KDC (R1, K B-KDC (A,R1) )
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Network Security7-5 Certification Authorities r Certification authority (CA): binds public key to particular entity, E. r E (person, router) registers its public key with CA. m E provides “proof of identity” to CA. m CA creates certificate binding E to its public key. m certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by CA – CA says “this is E’s public key” Bob’s public key K B + Bob’s identifying information digital signature (encrypt) CA private key K CA - K B + certificate for Bob’s public key, signed by CA
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Network Security7-6 Certification Authorities r When Alice wants Bob’s public key: m gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or elsewhere). m apply CA’s public key to Bob’s certificate, get Bob’s public key Bob’s public key K B + digital signature (decrypt) CA public key K CA + K B +
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Network Security7-7 A certificate contains: r Serial number (unique to issuer) r info about certificate owner, including algorithm and key value itself (not shown) r info about certificate issuer r valid dates r digital signature by issuer
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Network Security7-8 Firewalls isolates organization’s internal net from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking others. firewall
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Network Security7-9 Firewalls: Why prevent denial of service attacks: m SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP connections, no resources left for “real” connections. prevent illegal modification/access of internal data. m e.g., attacker replaces CIA’s homepage with something else allow only authorized access to inside network (set of authenticated users/hosts) two types of firewalls: m application-level m packet-filtering
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Network Security7-10 Packet Filtering r internal network connected to Internet via router firewall r router filters packet-by-packet, decision to forward/drop packet based on: m source IP address, destination IP address m TCP/UDP source and destination port numbers m ICMP message type m TCP SYN and ACK bits Should arriving packet be allowed in? Departing packet let out?
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Network Security7-11 Packet Filtering r Example 1: block incoming and outgoing datagrams with IP protocol field = 17 and with either source or dest port = 23. m All incoming and outgoing UDP flows and telnet connections are blocked. r Example 2: Block inbound TCP segments with ACK=0. m Prevents external clients from making TCP connections with internal clients, but allows internal clients to connect to outside.
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Network Security7-12 Application gateways r Filters packets on application data as well as on IP/TCP/UDP fields. r Example: allow select internal users to telnet outside. host-to-gateway telnet session gateway-to-remote host telnet session application gateway router and filter 1. Require all telnet users to telnet through gateway. 2. For authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to dest host. Gateway relays data between 2 connections 3. Router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating from gateway.
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Network Security7-13 Limitations of firewalls and gateways r IP spoofing: router can’t know if data “really” comes from claimed source r if multiple app’s. need special treatment, each has own app. gateway. r client software must know how to contact gateway. m e.g., must set IP address of proxy in Web browser r filters often use all or nothing policy for UDP. r tradeoff: degree of communication with outside world, level of security r many highly protected sites still suffer from attacks.
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Network Security7-14 Internet security threats Mapping: m before attacking: “case the joint” – find out what services are implemented on network Use ping to determine what hosts have addresses on network m Port-scanning: try to establish TCP connection to each port in sequence (see what happens) m nmap (http://www.insecure.org/nmap/) mapper: “network exploration and security auditing”http://www.insecure.org/nmap Countermeasures?
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Network Security7-15 Internet security threats Mapping: countermeasures m record traffic entering network m look for suspicious activity (IP addresses, ports being scanned sequentially)
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Network Security7-16 Internet security threats Packet sniffing: m broadcast media, e.g., Ethernet LAN m promiscuous NIC reads all packets passing by m can read all unencrypted data (e.g. passwords) m e.g.: C sniffs B’s packets A B C src:B dest:A payload Countermeasures?
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Network Security7-17 Internet security threats Packet sniffing: countermeasures m all hosts in organization run software that checks periodically if host interface in promiscuous mode. m one host per segment of broadcast media (switched Ethernet at hub) A B C src:B dest:A payload
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Network Security7-18 Internet security threats IP Spoofing: m can generate “raw” IP packets directly from application, putting any value into IP source address field m receiver can’t tell if source is spoofed m e.g.: C pretends to be B A B C src:B dest:A payload Countermeasures?
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Network Security7-19 Internet security threats IP Spoofing: ingress filtering m routers should not forward outgoing packets with invalid source addresses (e.g., datagram source address not in router’s network) m great, but ingress filtering can not be mandated for all networks A B C src:B dest:A payload
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Network Security7-20 Internet security threats Denial of service (DOS): m flood of maliciously generated packets “swamp” receiver m Distributed DOS (DDOS): multiple coordinated sources swamp receiver m e.g., C and remote host SYN-attack A A B C SYN Countermeasures?
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Network Security7-21 Internet security threats Denial of service (DOS): countermeasures m filter out flooded packets (e.g., SYN) before reaaching host: throw out good with bad m traceback to source of floods (most likely an innocent, compromised machine) A B C SYN
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Network Security7-22 Secure e-mail : efficient confidentiality Alice: generates random symmetric private key, K S. encrypts message with K S (for efficiency) also encrypts K S with Bob’s public key. sends both K S (m) and K B (K S ) to Bob. Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob. K S ( ). K B ( ). + + - K S (m ) K B (K S ) + m KSKS KSKS KBKB + Internet K S ( ). K B ( ). - KBKB - KSKS m K S (m ) K B (K S ) +
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Network Security7-23 Secure e-mail : efficient confidentiality It is hard to ensure privacy via symmetric key cryptography, since it is hard to distribute a symmetric key that only the sender and sharer know Thus, public key cryptography is preferable. However, email messages can be very long and public key encryption is computationally expensive. Example of Security at the application level
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Network Security7-24 Secure e-mail Bob: uses his private key to decrypt and recover K S uses K S to decrypt K S (m) to recover m Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob. K S ( ). K B ( ). + + - K S (m ) K B (K S ) + m KSKS KSKS KBKB + Internet K S ( ). K B ( ). - KBKB - KSKS m K S (m ) K B (K S ) +
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Network Security7-25 Secure e-mail (continued) Alice wants to provide sender authentication and integrity Alice digitally signs message. sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature. H( ). K A ( ). - + - H(m ) K A (H(m)) - m KAKA - Internet m K A ( ). + KAKA + K A (H(m)) - m H( ). H(m ) compare
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Network Security7-26 Secure e-mail (continued) Alice wants to provide secrecy, sender authentication, message integrity. Alice uses three keys: her private key, Bob’s public key, newly created symmetric key H( ). K A ( ). - + K A (H(m)) - m KAKA - m K S ( ). K B ( ). + + K B (K S ) + KSKS KBKB + Internet KSKS
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Network Security7-27 Pretty good privacy (PGP) r Internet e-mail encryption scheme, de-facto standard. r uses m symmetric key cryptography (triple-DES, CAST, or IDEA) m public key cryptography (RSA) m hash function (MD5 or SHA) m and digital signature as described. r provides secrecy, sender authentication, integrity. ---BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE--- Hash: SHA1 Bob:My husband is out of town tonight.Passionately yours, Alice ---BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE--- Version: PGP 5.0 Charset: noconv yhHJRHhGJGhgg/12EpJ+lo8gE4vB3mqJ hFEvZP9t6n7G6m5Gw2 ---END PGP SIGNATURE--- A PGP signed message:
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Network Security7-28 Network Security can be implemented in several layers Basic techniques…... m cryptography (symmetric and public) m authentication m message integrity m key distribution …. used in many different security scenarios. Examples: m Applications layer -- secure email m Transport layer -- secure sockets layer (SSL): client and server authentication, encryped session m Network layer -- Ipsec: source authentication, data integrity, security
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