1. KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON: STRATEGIES FOR COMPATIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN ELECTRIC POWER NETWORKS SURVIVABILITY OF COMPLEX NETWORKS October 27, 2011 1 Ira Kohlberg Kohlberg Associates, Inc. 11308South Shore Road Reston, VA 20190 File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

2. Threat: Historical Evidence EMP damages and disrupts electronics—does not directly harm people Puncture, temporary disconnection of transmission line Safety devices burning Spark gaps breakdown Overhead Transmission Line and Telecommunications Disconnection and Damage Overhead transmission line Malfunction of radio- location Overhead signal line Diesels found damaged, “later” Loss of communications; many examples Ground zero 600 km 400 km 600 km 1000 km Long line problems due to EMP “long tail” Power supply breakdown Amplification location unit Power supply breakdown Signal cable line Figure presented by General Loborev, Director, Central Institute of Physics and Technology, June 1994 Observed EMP Anomalies During USSR Atmospheric Testing (circa 1960) File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

3. Threat: Nature and Magnitude of EMP Threats HOB = 500km EMP May Produce Simultaneous, Widespread Failure Of High Reliability infrastructure Wide area coverage –A million square miles Intensity depends on: –Weapon design –Height of burst –Location of burst Broad frequency range Threat to all electronics in exposure HOB = 100 km Surface Zero File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

4. E1 footprint for a 30kT detonation at 100km altitude east of Chicago (unclassified version) The US power grid is comprised of three interconnected systems, the eastern interconnect, the western, and Texas A relatively modest yield burst over the eastern US can affect 70% of the total national power generation A single relatively small weapon can have a radius of impact of nearly 1,000 miles, affecting nearly 70% of the population and industrial production of the USA and Canada, the financial centers and seat of governments. Vulnerability of Power Grid Components to E1 File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

5. But Everything Depends on Everything Else: Vulnerability of US National Infrastructure One or a few high-altitude nuclear detonations can produce EMP, simultaneously, over wide geographical areas Unprecedented cascading failure of our electronics-dependent infrastructures could result –Power, energy transport, telecom, and financial systems are particularly vulnerable and interdependent –EMP disruption of these sectors could cause large scale infrastructure failures for all aspects of the Nation’s life Both civilian and military capabilities depend on these infrastructures Without adequate protection recovery could be prolonged—months to years File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

6. SCOPE OF PRESENTATION MODELING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN POWER AND TELECOMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURES FOR A HEMP ATTACK 6

7. Electromagnetic terrorism and potential infrastructure failures has become an extremely serious matter that may be viewed as embracing three major issues: Terrorist targets of interest Effect on civilian and military populations National response 7 File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

8. Effect on Civilian and Military Populations Civilian Susceptibility of Infrastructures Survivability of Infrastructures Response of Infrastructures Military Survivability of hardware Communication survivability 8 File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

9. 9 File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

10. PHASE SPACE REPRESENTATION OF POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATION RESPONSE TO HEMP NORMALIZED POWER NORMALIZED TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1.0 0.0 POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS PLANE STATE OF POWER AND TELCOM AFTER HEMP DENOTES POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES AFTER HEMP INITIAL STATE OF SYSTEM 10 File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

11. The following set of vu-graphs show the theoretically derived conditions for the return to equilibrium. 11 File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

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16. The following set of vu-graphs show the breakdown of a large network (power and or telecommunications) caused by a HEMP attack. For illustrative purposes we show this as an evolutionary process although it could happen relatively rapidly. 16 File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

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20. The following set of vu-graphs show the recovery/ breakdown of Probability-of-Call Blocking and electric power from of a theoretical model of combined power and telecommunication networks. 20 File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

21. POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATION INTERDEPENDENCY POWER CONTROL POWER TRANSMISSION POWER DISTRIBUTION SCADA PTN PDN ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION Telecommunications Line Power Line FUEL SOURCE PDN Telecommunications Line a b c d e f a b c g e f d 21 File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

22. 10 -2 10 -1 1101001000 protective system response time after the onset of an event in seconds FACTS exciters and PSS underfrequency load shredding governor control AGC ULTC voltage control operator –initiated/ manual control market price update 1 cycle Data Source: Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions (CERTS) Grid of the Future White Paper on Real Time Security Monitoring and Control of Powers Systems Electric Power Response Time After the Onset of an Event 22 File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com

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26. CONCLUSION Modeling the response of large networks that are heavily dependent on electromagnetic effects is still in the formative stage. Theoretical models can provide much insight into key factors that influence resilience to terrorist attacks Ultimately, detailed models supported by experimental data that predict component and subsystem behavior will be required. 26 File copy provided by http://www.wll.comhttp://www.wll.com