1. US Dependence on Strategic Nuclear Weapons Does shifting to “zero” make sense? Keith Hansen June 15, 2012

2. Introduction  Context – challenge facing Washington policymakers  Request – cover basics and key issues  Proposal – two-part presentation  Context – challenge facing Washington policymakers  Request – cover basics and key issues  Proposal – two-part presentation

3. Outline of Topics Part 1  Key nuclear weapon issues  History of US dependence on nuclear weapons  Development of US strategic nuclear arsenal  Efforts to reduce arsenal  Cost of maintaining & modernizing arsenal  Key nuclear weapon issues  History of US dependence on nuclear weapons  Development of US strategic nuclear arsenal  Efforts to reduce arsenal  Cost of maintaining & modernizing arsenal

4. Outline of Topics Part 2  Challenges of maintaining & modernizing nuclear arsenal  Determining size and mix of nuclear weapon systems  Differences over current role & utility of nuclear weapons  Is going to “zero” feasible and desirable?  Challenges of maintaining & modernizing nuclear arsenal  Determining size and mix of nuclear weapon systems  Differences over current role & utility of nuclear weapons  Is going to “zero” feasible and desirable?

5. Terminology & Concepts  Strategic delivery vehicles:  Bombers, ICBMs, & SLBMs/SSBNs (triad)  Bombs & warheads  MIRVs  Strategic vs. tactical weapons  Offensive vs. defensive weapons  Weapon systems  Strategic delivery vehicles:  Bombers, ICBMs, & SLBMs/SSBNs (triad)  Bombs & warheads  MIRVs  Strategic vs. tactical weapons  Offensive vs. defensive weapons  Weapon systems

6. Key Issues Part 1  Why did the US develop its strategic nuclear arsenal?  How did the US arsenal develop?  Bureaucratic competition between services (Air Force vs. Navy)  How has technology affected size, composition & effectiveness?  Cost of maintaining & modernizing the arsenal  Why did the US develop its strategic nuclear arsenal?  How did the US arsenal develop?  Bureaucratic competition between services (Air Force vs. Navy)  How has technology affected size, composition & effectiveness?  Cost of maintaining & modernizing the arsenal

7.  Are nuclear weapons still useful? If so, how many & which types?  Can we afford to maintain and modernize the arsenal?  What are the arguments for & against retaining nuclear weapons?  Which congressional districts get the bases and jobs?  Are nuclear weapons still useful? If so, how many & which types?  Can we afford to maintain and modernize the arsenal?  What are the arguments for & against retaining nuclear weapons?  Which congressional districts get the bases and jobs? Key Issues Part 2

8. History of US dependence on nuclear weapons  WWII: German threat & ending the war vs. Japan  Cold War: deterring Soviet aggression & ensuring stability  Strategic weapons vs. intercontinental threat  Tactical weapons vs. theater/regional threat  WWII: German threat & ending the war vs. Japan  Cold War: deterring Soviet aggression & ensuring stability  Strategic weapons vs. intercontinental threat  Tactical weapons vs. theater/regional threat

9. Development of US Strategic Nuclear Arsenal 1945-1991  A few bombs to thousands of bombs & warheads  Multiple types of delivery vehicles:  Bombers – IRBMs – ICBMs – SLBMs - Cruise missiles  Advances in technology:  Range, solid fuel, miniaturization, MIRVing & accuracy  A few bombs to thousands of bombs & warheads  Multiple types of delivery vehicles:  Bombers – IRBMs – ICBMs – SLBMs - Cruise missiles  Advances in technology:  Range, solid fuel, miniaturization, MIRVing & accuracy

10. Cold War Strategic Nuclear Force Structure (~10,000 operational bombs/warheads)  Bombers – B-52s, B-1s & B-2s  IRBMs – Jupiter & Pershing IIs  ICBMs – Titan IIs, MM IIIs, & Peacekeepers  SLBMs – Poseidon, Ohio SSBNs w/ Trident II missiles  Cruise missiles – ALCMs, SLCMs & GLCMs  Bombers – B-52s, B-1s & B-2s  IRBMs – Jupiter & Pershing IIs  ICBMs – Titan IIs, MM IIIs, & Peacekeepers  SLBMs – Poseidon, Ohio SSBNs w/ Trident II missiles  Cruise missiles – ALCMs, SLCMs & GLCMs

11. Efforts to Reduce Strategic Nuclear Arsenal  SALT II (1979) - capped growth (~10,000 bombs/whds)  INF (1987) – eliminated all IRBMs & GLCMs  START (1991) - reduced bombs/whds to 6,000  SORT (2002) - reduced bombs/whds to ~3,500  New START (2010) - reducing bombs/whds to ~1,550 (by 2018)  SALT II (1979) - capped growth (~10,000 bombs/whds)  INF (1987) – eliminated all IRBMs & GLCMs  START (1991) - reduced bombs/whds to 6,000  SORT (2002) - reduced bombs/whds to ~3,500  New START (2010) - reducing bombs/whds to ~1,550 (by 2018)

12. Today’s Strategic Nuclear Force Structure  Smaller (heading to 1,550 bombs/whds)  Bombers – B-52s & B-2s (bombs & ALCMs)  ICBMs – MM IIIs  SLBMs – Ohio class SSBNs w/ Trident II missiles & SLCMs  Smaller (heading to 1,550 bombs/whds)  Bombers – B-52s & B-2s (bombs & ALCMs)  ICBMs – MM IIIs  SLBMs – Ohio class SSBNs w/ Trident II missiles & SLCMs

13. Cost of Maintaining & Modernizing Arsenal  Delivery vehicles, bombs & warheads  Dismantling, refurbishing, or converting  Some upgrades & replacements are needed  Military installations & industrial base  Ensuring safety & reliability  Delivery vehicles, bombs & warheads  Dismantling, refurbishing, or converting  Some upgrades & replacements are needed  Military installations & industrial base  Ensuring safety & reliability

14. Who is involved?  Department of Defense – OSD, USAF & Navy  Department of Energy – various labs & Nevada test site  Industry  Congress  Department of Defense – OSD, USAF & Navy  Department of Energy – various labs & Nevada test site  Industry  Congress

15. Conclusion - Part 1  Questions & Comments?

16. Review of Part 1  History of strategic nuclear arsenal  Build up & build down  Cost of maintaining & modernizing the arsenal  History of strategic nuclear arsenal  Build up & build down  Cost of maintaining & modernizing the arsenal

17. Key Issues Part 2  Are nuclear weapons still useful? If so, how many & which types?  Can we afford to maintain and modernize the arsenal?  What are the arguments for & against retaining nuclear weapons?  Which congressional districts get the bases and jobs?  Are nuclear weapons still useful? If so, how many & which types?  Can we afford to maintain and modernize the arsenal?  What are the arguments for & against retaining nuclear weapons?  Which congressional districts get the bases and jobs?

18. What should be the size of our strategic nuclear arsenal? Should we go to “zero”??  Those (e.g. Shultz & Nunn) who argue for “zero” say:  Not useful vs. today’s threats  Save money; will never be used  US needs to lead global nuclear disarmament  Will help stop proliferation  Others argue for caution  Those (e.g. Shultz & Nunn) who argue for “zero” say:  Not useful vs. today’s threats  Save money; will never be used  US needs to lead global nuclear disarmament  Will help stop proliferation  Others argue for caution

19. STRATCOM & Global Strike Command 2012  Future reductions (beyond New START) depend on a new Nuclear Posture Review, negotiations with Russia, and our national strategy in the next decade.  US can reduce further and manage the risk by properly managing the arsenal and discussing the right size.  Future reductions (beyond New START) depend on a new Nuclear Posture Review, negotiations with Russia, and our national strategy in the next decade.  US can reduce further and manage the risk by properly managing the arsenal and discussing the right size.

20. Kissinger & Scowcroft 2012  Goal is strategic stability & prevention of use  Lower numbers should be the result, not other way around!  Lower numbers do not guarantee stability! Mix is critical.  Verification of reduced numbers is essential to stability!  Not just a US and Russian issue; requires all nuclear powers.  Goal is strategic stability & prevention of use  Lower numbers should be the result, not other way around!  Lower numbers do not guarantee stability! Mix is critical.  Verification of reduced numbers is essential to stability!  Not just a US and Russian issue; requires all nuclear powers.

21. Rand Study 2012  Nuclear weapons are playing an increasing role in China  Russia also gives priority to its nuclear arsenal because of China and NATO  In many parts of the world, nuclear weapons are not seen as old fashioned.  Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has been ineffective in preventing proliferation violations (e.g. Iran, North Korea & Syria)  Strategic surprise and nuclear blackmail are real threats  Nuclear weapons are playing an increasing role in China  Russia also gives priority to its nuclear arsenal because of China and NATO  In many parts of the world, nuclear weapons are not seen as old fashioned.  Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has been ineffective in preventing proliferation violations (e.g. Iran, North Korea & Syria)  Strategic surprise and nuclear blackmail are real threats

22. Obama Administration’s Position 2012  Nuclear Posture Review (2010)  Continued reliance on nuclear weapons  Continued modernization  Nuclear use policy  “1251” reports to Congress tied to New START ratification  Guaranteed continued modernization of arsenal  Nuclear Posture Review (2010)  Continued reliance on nuclear weapons  Continued modernization  Nuclear use policy  “1251” reports to Congress tied to New START ratification  Guaranteed continued modernization of arsenal

23. NATO’s Nuclear Declaration 2012  “Nuclear weapons remain a core component for deterrence … the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies …”  “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”  “Allies concerned will ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective …”  “Nuclear weapons remain a core component for deterrence … the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies …”  “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”  “Allies concerned will ensure that all components of NATO’s nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective …”

24. Current Fiscal Constraints & Political Battles  Congressional deficit reduction deal  Major cuts to Defense budget  Likely to restrict modernization plans  Some in Congress already sounding alarm bells  Congressional deficit reduction deal  Major cuts to Defense budget  Likely to restrict modernization plans  Some in Congress already sounding alarm bells

25. Conclusion – Part 2  Nuclear weapon issues are complex and multifaceted.  They evoke passionate and heated debates.  Experienced and thoughtful people can differ.  Even Reagan proposed “zero” in 1986.  Nuclear weapon issues are complex and multifaceted.  They evoke passionate and heated debates.  Experienced and thoughtful people can differ.  Even Reagan proposed “zero” in 1986.

26. Key Questions 1. Is the possession of nuclear weapons still required for our national security? 2. If so, what nuclear force posture makes the most sense in today’s world? 3. What are the threats to our national security? 4. Can we afford to maintain and modernize the arsenal? 5. Will any president give up our nuclear deterrent in the foreseeable future? 6. How would you advise the President? 1. Is the possession of nuclear weapons still required for our national security? 2. If so, what nuclear force posture makes the most sense in today’s world? 3. What are the threats to our national security? 4. Can we afford to maintain and modernize the arsenal? 5. Will any president give up our nuclear deterrent in the foreseeable future? 6. How would you advise the President?