1. Building a cctld Support Organisation Developing the ICANN Bylaws Peter Dengate Thrush Montreal, 22 June 2003

2. ICANN The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers President & CEO: Mike Roberts November 1998 - 9 Member Virgin Birth Board ICANN CHAIR: VINT CERF 3 PSO3 ASO4 VB’s 5 @ Large 3 DNSO Domain Name Support Org. Names Council (21) ISPS Trade Marks Business Non-Commercial Registries Registrars Country Code Managers General Assembly Protocol Support Org ITU IETF ETSI WWWC RIPE ARIN APNIC At Large Membership 176,837 GAC Becky Burr Bob Shaw Christopher Wilkinson WIPO Others IRP 4 ccSO Address Support Org Address Council

3. ICANN -Reform: The ccTLD SO Saga ccTLD meeting November 2000 supports a ccSO - working group proposed DNSO reform begins, Melbourne, March 01 PDT cc rep on Names Council working group on Reform June 2001 - cc’s announce withdrawal from DNSO in Stockholm

4. Presentation by E. Porteneuve at Montevideo ccTLD « Countries Village » Reality of the World Policy rules are devised locally by a Local Internet Community including local government Each ccTLD operated under its national law and jurisdiction

5. Presentation by E. Porteneuve at Montevideo Rich world of ccTLD (1) Various business models –Private companies, public organizations, governmental agencies –Private for profit and private not for profit –Registries forbidden to act as Registrars or cooperatives of Registrars and ISPs –Naming authority inside and outside of Registry –Loosly contracting with Registrars or developing accreditation policies

6. Presentation by E. Porteneuve at Montevideo Rich world of ccTLD (2) Trustee for a Nation Developing Local Internet Community Working together with local government Providing arbitration services for various disputes Following ICANN process and acting as information center in national language

7. Presentation by Peter de Blanc at Montevideo The Credibility and Balance ICANN needs ccTLD to provide credibility. Without ccTLD ICANN is clearly US-centric ICANN will attempt to make individual deals with strong countries one by one. In some cases ICANN may succeed with this. This could increase “Internet colonialism” A strong ccTLD is the key to balance of money, power, credibility.

8. Presentation by Peter de Blanc at Montevideo The cart and the horse Top down: ICANN decides ccTLD relation: –ICANN sends down documents to ccTLD –ICANN creates contract for ccTLD Bottom Up: ccTLD creates organizations –ccTLD agrees on documents- sends to ICANN –ccTLD agrees on general form of contract –Individual ccTLD may modify as needed Relationship becomes peer-to-peer Agreements negotiated by “equals”

9. Montevideo -September 2001 Representatives of 60 country code managers met in Montevideo, Uruguay on September 6 and 7, 2001. It will be recalled that in our Stockholm Communiqué of June 2001, the ccTLD constituency reported that members there present had unanimously agreed to form a ccSO and to begin to work with stakeholders in ICANN on implementing that decision.Members in Montevideo have developed a number of key principles that will be influential in the formation of the ccSO. Subject to further development, they are;

10.  There is a carefully definable set of global issues which can be put through the SO to the ICANN policy making process.  Each ccTLD is solely responsible for it’s decision making except for that carefully defined list of global issues mentioned above, when ccTLDs agree to be bound by policies formed through the ICANN process.  The ccSO Articles, bylaws and MoU with ICANN, and any contracts signed between individual ccTLDs and ICANN must ensure the integrity of the consensus decision making process including limiting that process to the set of issues, and to those issues within the ICANN mandate of technical co-ordination of internet names and numbers. Montevideo -Principles of an SO

11. Montevideo -SO Principles 2  The purpose of the ccSO is to protect and promote the common interests of ccTLD managers and their local internet communities; to give advice to ICANN on identified global policy issues, within the context of maintaining global internet stability and interoperability.  Mechanisms for maintaining good communications with the other Support Organisations will be established

12. Montevideo - SO structure The members of the SO shall be individual ccTLD managers. Members shall be able to give their proxies to regional or 'other' groupings within the SO. A member cannot be a voting member of more than one Regional or 'other' organisation for ccSO purposes "Border" ccTLDs may choose which ICANN geographic region they wish to join (self-selection)

13. Montevideo - SO structure There will be a role for Regional associations, and other forms of association which may develop: initial responsibilities for the existing regional associations are the running of elections to the ccSO 'Council', and integral part of any drafting process for "Policy" recommendations to ICANN; There shall be a ccSO Council, composed of three members elected by each region. The ccSO council shall be responsible for conducting the election of ICANN Board members.

14. ICANN Reform February 2002, Stuart Lynn - “Icann is failing..” 2nd Draft Application to form a ccSO posted March 2002 Board forms “Evolution and reform Committee (“ERC”) in Ghana ERC publishes papers leading up to the “Blueprint” in June 2002

15. (March 2002) International Council seats: 3 per Region International Assembly Latin America Asia PacificAfricanEuropean North America Member ccTLDS Chair elected by Council LACTLD APTLD AFTLD CENTR NATLD Regional associations by contract Secretariat 3 seats elected to ICANN Board 15 seats: 3 per Region Officers: VP’s for Works, L&R, Membership, F&A Interface with other SO’s

16. Implement as Policy International Council Vice President, Works (Policy Development) GNSO International Assembly An Open List for the discussion of ccTLD matters, announcements, Minutes etc Rapporteur provides synthesis Council reviews Establish a Working Group (plus outside Representatives) Policy Development Process : ccSO June 2002 (see www.wwtld.org/documents) Issue List automatically created by Secretariat/VP Notified. Specified period. Notice of Policy Request Remits for further work

17. ICANN The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers President & CEO: Stuart Lynn 8 “ At Large ” 2 GNSO Names Council (16) ISPS Registries Registrars Non-Commercial Trade Marks Business Selected by the Nominating Committee* General Assembly 2 ASO RIPE ARIN APNIC LACNIC tbd Address Support Org Address Council 5 Liaison TAC IAB/IETF RSSAC SAC GAC g Registries g Registrars c Registries RIR’s ISP’s Large business users Small business users IP organisations Academic/Public Consumer groups Individual Nameholders IAB/IETF TAC GAC 4 unspecified * Nom Com 2 CCSO Board seats Generic Support Org Standing committees Others ? Voting members commit to ICANN policy development CHAIR: VINT CERF ICANN International Council (number unspecified) Country code Support Org

18. ERC PROPOSAL - June 2002 The Country Names Council 1/3 of Council by : - appointments by Nominating Committee (voting), - 1 GAC appointee (non-voting) Unspecified number of regionally elected voting Councillors Unspecified number of regionally elected voting Councillors

19. Recent Events 18 September ERC announces ccAG 4 October 1st AG report 22 October AG publishes “ScopeMatrix” 29 October ccTLDs withdraw from DNSO 11 November ccPDP published 10 December Membership paper published 24 December Council paper published

20. Recent Events 28 January Structure paper published 24 Feb. APTLD’s AGM response to AG 26 Feb. AG Compiled Recommendations posted. 13 March Icann explanations posted 25 March ccTLD Rio Resolution adopted

21. Recent Events 22 April ERC 5th report posted 13 May CENTR response posted 16 May APTLD response posted 16 GAC response posted.

22. APTLD’s response “…work should begin on implementation..” no Nom. Com appointments to Council deferral suggested until more cctld delegates on Nom. Com. Exemptions unless 66%council opposes

23. APTLD’s response -2 Separation of SO membership from IANA services Launch group should be geodiverse cctld appointments Members of Launch Group not eligible for Council* (.jp and.au disagree) APTLD willing to be regional organisation

24. CENTR’S response “ substantially in support of the idea of a self-determining SO within the ICANN process” needs to be open to all cctld managers payments only on an audited,approved budget

25. CENTR’S response -2 Scope needs further definition process must be “bottom up” Board cannot make ccTLD policy clear separation of IANA operation from Icann policy forums -the SO’s

26. CENTR’S response- 3 endorsing the Rio Resolution 40 not 20 members joining process -no letter of intent needed counsel’s opinion not wanted on “value” no rules as to quorum assertion of exemption, not request

27. CENTR’S response- 3 endorsing the Rio Resolution One Nom Com delegate not enough Launch group should be all willing managers who wish to help Council elections after sufficient members, not simply 120 days no PDP on issues outside the Scope

28. The GAC response General approval ….“sound basis”…well balanced”… “ provides guarantees”… Clarity required for scope scope must be limited to stability issues Assumption that policy is local -need to prove its global to involve ICANN

29. The GAC response- 2 Consultation with GAC essential Delegation and re-delegation is a question for national governments to decide, according to local law” no managers from “contested” cctlds on Council

30. The GAC response-3 SO staff, including Issues Manager, should not be Icann employees no commitment to global policy development through Icann should be a membership requirement Current cctld managers should be members, not necessarily the IANA data base -no vote where contested

31. Latest developments 30 May ERC replies to comments 10 June APTLD responds 15 June Centr responds 13 June Draft Bylaws published 18 June Icann explanation published 22 June cctld meeting in Montreal to review

32. ICANN Bylaws -Mission ARTICLE I: MISSION AND CORE VALUES Section 1. MISSION The mission of The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") is to coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet's systems of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems.

33. ICANN Bylaws- Mission In particular, ICANN: –1. Coordinates the allocation and assignment of the three sets of unique identifiers for the Internet, which are – a. Domain names (forming a system referred to as "DNS"); – b. Internet protocol ("IP") addresses and autonomous system – ("AS") numbers; and – c. Protocol port and parameter numbers. –2. Coordinates the operation and evolution of the DNS root name server system. –3. Coordinates policy development reasonably and appropriately related to these technical functions.

34. ICANN Bylaws- Values Section 2. CORE VALUES In performing its mission, the following core values should guide the decisions and actions of ICANN: –1. Preserving and enhancing the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet. –2. Respecting the creativity, innovation, and flow of information made possible by the Internet by limiting ICANN's activities to those matters within ICANN's mission requiring or significantly benefiting from global coordination. –3. To the extent feasible and appropriate, delegating coordination functions to or recognizing the policy role of other responsible entities that reflect the interests of affected parties. –4. Seeking and supporting broad, informed participation reflecting the functional, geographic, and cultural diversity of the Internet at all levels of policy development and decision-making.

35. ICANN Bylaws - Values –5. Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment. –6. Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial in the public interest. –7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that (i) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process. –8. Making decisions by applying documented policies neutrally and objectively, with integrity and fairness.

36. ICANN Bylaws - Values 9. Acting with a speed that is responsive to the needs of the Internet while, as part of the decision-making process, obtaining informed input from those entities most affected. 10. Remaining accountable to the Internet community through mechanisms that enhance ICANN's effectiveness. 11. While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognizing that governments and public authorities are responsible for public policy and duly taking into account governments' or public authorities' recommendations.

37. ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO 1. There shall be a ccNSO… for “developing and recommending to the Board substantive policies relating to cctlds The Recommendations said: 1. Develop policy recommendations to the board 2.Nuture consensus among the ccNSO community, and 3.Co-ordinating with other SO’s and ICANN entities

38. ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO 2. The SO shall consist of managers that agree in writing to belong, and a Council responsible for managing the Policy development Process (PDP).

39. ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO 3. The council shall be: 3 from each geographic region = 15 3 appointments by Nom. Com. 18 1 GAC Liaison 19 1 At Large Advisory Liaison 20 5 Regional cctld org’s Liaison 25 Plus ASO and DNSO observers 27 Bucharest, Shanghai and Rio resolutions oppose “intellectual property” proposal

40. ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO Councillors term -3 years (staggered) Removal for non attendance (3 meetings) or “inappropriate behaviour” -66% council vote. Manage annual meeting and PDP Elect 2 members to the ICANN board by majority affirmative vote

41. ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO Not less than 4 open* meetings ( can be online) each year, including an Annual Meeting, one with the Board or other ICANN SO Council to determine rules for membership and for operating procedures Membership:those managers in “sponsoring organisation” field of IANA d/b * Council can choose to go into “closed” meeting in special cases

42. ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO Membership application on a form designed by Council, members commit to: recognise the role of the ccNSO in ICANN adhere to membership rules abide by policies adopted by the board pay ccNSO membership fees set by Council Members may resign

43. ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO Access to or registration in the IANA database is not conditional on membership of the ccNSO Membership of the SO is independent of existence (or absence ) of any contractual relationship between a cctld and ICANN Members are in the “Geographic Regions” defined in ICANN bylaws Managers can appoint a person, organisation or entity to represent them in the SO

44. ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO Policies that are adopted by the Board after a ccPDP are binding on members for the duration of their membership of the SO. No PDP is binding in the face of contrary national law Exemptions will be granted on grounds that policy is contrary to custom, religion or domestic national policy, unless 66% of Council opposes

45. ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO Council will designate regional cctld organisations by 66% vote. Council may use ICANN staff, or fund the employment of its own. ICANN will provide admin. and operational support for the SO, on request but excluding travel funding

46. ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO Policy shall be developed using the PDP Changes to the PDP need to go through the PDP and be approved by the Board. The scope of the PDP is not finalised, but is to be defined by a PDP and approved by the board. That PDP is to be based on the principles and method of analysis described in the Framework for the Scope of the ccNSO.

47. ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO The Framework is the written description of the Scope Matrix, and forms Appendix C to the Bylaws. It is designed to assist in “delineating relevant global policy issues” in the “complex relation between ICANN and cctld managers/registries with regard to policy issues” Scope “cannot be established without reaching a common understanding of the allocation of authority between Icann and ccTLD registries.”

48. ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO The Framework defines 2 “core functions” a Data Entry Function (DEF) and a Name Server Function” (NSF). For each of those, it identifies a policy making role, an executive role in carrying out the policy, and an accountability role, for whom the policy is made and by whom approval is required.

49. ICANN Bylaws -ccNSO “Policy role” means the ability and power to define policy. “Executive role” means the ability and power to act upon and implement the policy “Accountability” means the ability and power to hold the responsible entity accountable for exercising its power

50. ICANN Bylaws In the NSF, for the cctld name servers, Policy role lies with the ccNSO-PDP The executive role is held by the cctld manager. Accountability is to “part ICANN (IANA), part Local Internet Community, including local government”

51. International Council 15 seats: 3 per Region International Assembly Latin America Asia PacificAfricanEuropean North America Member ccTLDS Chair elected by Council LACTLD APTLD AFTLD CENTR NATLD Regional associations by contract Secretariat 3 seats elected to ICANN Board 15 seats: 3 per Region Officers: VP’s for Works, L&R, Membership, F&A Interface with other SO’s A reminder: The ccTLD Proposal of March 2002

52. International Council 15 seats: 3 per Region Policy Develoment Process If within “scope” Board cannot amend Latin America Asia PacificAfricanEuropean North America Member ccTLDS Now has up to 7 observers LACTLD APTLD AFTLD CENTR NATLD (Regional associations by contract) Secretariat: Can provide own staff 2 (not 3) seats on ICANN Board 18 (15) seats: 3 per 5 Regions PLUS 3 “appointments” Officers: VP’s for Works, L&R, Membership, F&A Can exchange observers The Structure in the Bylaws Now Proposed

53. What has been achieved? A Support Organisation for cctlds in ICANN with a structure substantially similar to that proposed by the cctlds with a Policy Development Process that ensures policy affecting cctlds is made in the SO, not by the Board

54. Possible Timetable Board adopts bylaws next week Week 1: ERC appoints launching group (“ccLG”) Week 3:ccLG develops application form, and election protocol and schedule. Week 5: Appoints election officers in Regional Associations

55. Possible Timetable 2 Week 10-12 Membership applications reach 30 members, 4 per region Week 15-17 Council elections Week 18 : First Council meets in Tunisia. ccLG disbands, Council begins work

56. Likely Early Work Rules for changing cctld managers Rules for other updates of IANA database ccTLD-Icann contracts Best Practices for cctld registries Re-negotiating GAC Principles Outreach to cctlds Election of 2 members of ICANN board

57. What issues remain which prevent cctlds joining the SO? The 3 Nom. Com. Appointments? Options include: (1) oppose appointments (2) defer until cctld has 3 delegates on the Nom Com. (3)Agree to function with appointees until review

58. What issues remain which prevent cctlds joining the SO? There is no defined scope to the power of the SO. Options include: (1) Expressly limiting the scope to the terms of the Framework (Scope Matrix). (2)Expressly including a defined but wider scope, so that all decisions affecting cctlds in ICANN are made by the SO (3) Allowing the board, in a first PDP, the power to set the scope.

59. What issues remain which prevent cctlds joining the SO? Definition of geographic Regions? 40 members, not 30? 66% vote in every region, not simply 66% of votes cast? Quorum? No PDP on issues outside Scope? Counsels opinion on “value?

60. What issues remain which prevent cctlds joining the SO? Open enough access for all members? Role of managers in “contested” management? No undertaking to abide policies on signing up -if that means a cctld must get domestic policies in line before signup, and, or, it means a member may not challenge past policies

61. What should we do now ? Negotiate some or all of the preceding as preconditions to sign up? What is the effect of new Board members? What is the effect of the ITU….WSIS? Will delay encourage other cctlds to sign ? Will the ERC negotiate….why?

62. What should we do now ? Sign up now, and hope to make changes from the inside? Will amendment be possible? What is the effect on your LIC if changes cannot be made? Might time reveal a different view on some changes which now seem imoportant?

63. Final thought “.. that this version of the SO will not be the last as amendments can be made as experience by the parties gained from operation of the first version of the SO, and trust developed between the parties leads on to improved structures and processes in the future..” (extract from the Rio resolution)