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 President Truman’s ambivalence toward the military coup of November 15, 1948  United States and General Marcos Pérez Jiménez ◦ Reaction to the fraudulent.

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Presentation on theme: " President Truman’s ambivalence toward the military coup of November 15, 1948  United States and General Marcos Pérez Jiménez ◦ Reaction to the fraudulent."— Presentation transcript:

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3  President Truman’s ambivalence toward the military coup of November 15, 1948  United States and General Marcos Pérez Jiménez ◦ Reaction to the fraudulent presidential election of 1952 ◦ Concern to guarantee stable oil supply underpins “hands-off” policy ◦ Anti-communism syndrome ◦ Some United States groups befriend democratic exiles

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5  V.P. Richard M. Nixon – “Stoned” in Caracas  United States comes to view democracy in Venezuela as best guarantee of anti-communist political stability  Venezuela’s most important leftist political leaders accommodate to United States hegemony

6  Training of Venezuela military in counterinsurgency tactics  Alliance for Progress Assistance  Acceptance of nationalization of the petroleum industry  Toleration of Venezuela’s role in OPEC

7  Andean Community (Pact created in 1969) ◦ Caldera and entry into the Andean Pact ◦ Ractivation during second government  Carlos Andres Pérez ◦ SELA ◦ G77 ◦ IMF as “neutron bomb”  Opposition to U.S. policy in international organizations by votes without teeth ◦ Vote in OAS that opposed U.S. invasion of Panama and removal of Noriega

8  Neo-Liberal turn following the Caracazo (February 1989)  Washington and the military government option following the two failed coups during 1992  Washington mistakenly assumes that neo- liberalism has triumphed with Agenda Venezuela

9  President Clinton denies candidate Chávez entry into the United States  Washington’s guarded reaction to Hugo Chávez´s election as president in December 1998  Ambassador John Maisto “Watch what he does, not what he says.”

10  Support for domestic reform – as long as democratic niceties were observed  Encouragement of foreign investment  Ignoring of anti-U.S./anti-capitalist rhetoric  Pivotal benchmarks leading to changes in bilateral relations ◦ Fiasco of flood damage never rebuilt ◦ Flaring tempers over U.S. response in Afghanistan to 9-11 terrorist incident

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12  Forces that staged coup closely associated with the United States and international capitalism  U.S. role in coup ambiguous ◦ Otto Rich sympathetic to coup plotters who ousted Chávez ◦ Instructions from White House to U.S. embassy suggest confusion  Strongest supporters of Bolivarian Revolution turned out to be the urban poor and militant socialists (communists?)

13  United States government pushes mediation by third parties  Anti-Chavez forces stage six weeks of strikes  Bolivarian government weathers the strike by discharging petroleum workers  Relations with Washington – deteriorated sharply after U.S. invaded Iraq War

14  Clash between Lockean and Rousseauan views of democracy  Comprehensive Venezuelan reform within the Lockean milieu (representative democracy dating from 1958) – how feasible?

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16  How much assistance will the United States give to the opposition?  What kind of “democracy” is Chávez creating?

17  Clash related to U.S. over-flights of Venezuelan territory  Problem of certification of anti-drug efforts ◦ Venezuela’s appearance on list of countries whose anti-narcotics efforts are insufficient ◦ Foreign Minister Rangel: Venezuela worries about drug consumption in the USA  Attitude toward Colombian guerrillas

18  Twenty First Century Socialism is anthesis of U.S.A. free market system  Diminishing U. S. economic influence ◦ Oil sales to Asia ◦ Drawing upon Brazilian industrial might (eg: Odebrecht)  Opposition to Globalization/NAFTA  Support for MERCOSUR  Vice President Elias Jaua  U.S. – Venezuela relations reached a low point during the administration of President George W. Bush

19  Choice of economic models  Use of Iran as a counterweight to U.S. influence  Orimulsión and U.S. protection of the coal industry (Florida Light and Power Contract)  Intellectual property rights  Offering of military bases to Russia?

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21 Cuban leaders replaced in power shuffle (February 2009) Did Chavez attempt to meddle in the succession?  Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque  Vice President Carlos Lage

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23  Efforts by anti-Chávez groups to secure United States support tend to backfire  Issues of ongoing tensions between President Chávez and the USA ◦ Has President Obama become the new “Mr. Danger” ◦ Drug issues – Maklid ◦ Will China replace USA as the most important export market for Venezuelan Petroleum? ◦ How extensive are Venezuela’s ties Iran & Hezbolah?

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