1. UNIT 6 Community Fishing Rights vs. Community Fisheries Management: Forming and implementing a beneficial fisheries management regime within the community Coastal Fisheries Policy and Planning Course, 28/01/08 – 8/02/08, Apia, Samoa Secretariat of the Pacific Community

2. Session objectives:  To show and reinforce the point that community fishing rights do not constitute a fisheries management system  To demonstrate that outcomes of a community fisheries management depends on the dynamics of community group Outcome: Participants should appreciate that inclusion of individual needs within a community is important in achieving consensus in fisheries management decisions

3. Distinguish between Community Fishing Rights and Community Fisheries Management Community fishing rights constitute a subset of the class of management systems referred to as “property rights”. –harvesting rights, TURFs –authority to the group –rights do not take away role of individuals

4. Community fisheries management Community fisheries management refers to the set of management rules adopted by the community to achieve their collective goals and objectives –consists of operational rules : formal and informal

5. Rules determine how the fisheries management regime will function –influenced by the political, legal and social circumstance in which the community fisheries right has developed.

6. Community Fisheries Management as a Bargaining Game Conceptualise the rules of the fisheries management regime to that of a game where the players decide on what rules to adopt and the process of adopting those rules to achieve their goals and objectives (Arnason, 2007)

7. Rules - within the existing set of formal and informal rules outcome of the game is dependent on the group dynamics Level of cohesion Influenced by several complex sociological, political, cultural and economic factors

8. Organised groups - social and political institutions, cohesion is high, division of labour, adherence to rules, distribution of benefits, behaviour and decisions of the group could be predictable Different preferences and expectations- outcome of decisions is less predictable

9. If community is highly motivated towards a common goal of a good and decent livelihood with a longer time horizon: –more concern over the status of the resources –rules of compliance likely to be based on the threat of social, economic, physical, supernatural punishment and in-kind penalties

10. Right holders - through direct participation in the fishery draw upon their individual and collective knowledge on the location and abundance of fishery resources, observation of catches and catch rate, seasonal and annual changes, technological changes, economic returns and other information (Willmann, 2000).

11. Community members may have differences on how the fishery should be managed or on the optimal fishery policy Group dynamics plays a key role Group members play a bargaining game (Arnason, 2007).

12. If each member's pay-off increases with the aggregate pay-off, his or her optimal strategy will work towards the maximisation of aggregate benefits (Arnason, 2007). Rules of the game apply to the management regime as well as management measures

13. “Kaldor-Hicks: Criteria” Implication of policy change – restrictions on effort/ and or catch Person A ($20), Person B ($200) –With policy change – A to cut back on effort and has $40 – B has $190 – A can pay B between $10 and $20 since B is now worse off. –Pareto optimality : maximum gainers pay > minimum losers are willing to accept

14. Community members must be clear in what they want and how best to achieve such goals and aspirations –homogeneous group –small in number –institutions with implicit arrangement for sharing, redistribution –voluntary compliance Large groups - internalisation of externalities diminishes

15. Characteristics of the community influencing the nature of operational rules  Eligibility criteria of group membership – merit, kinship, skills  Rules on transferability of rights – sale, lease, marriage, bequest  Existence of secondary or temporary rights – non-group members in exchange of fee or gifts  Gear and equipment rules – what technology and methods are permitted  Species rules – size limits, quotas  Conservation rules - area closures, MPAs, taboo areas  Sharing rules – distribution of income, catch

16. Forming and Implementing a Beneficial Fisheries Management Regime The context of some elements of the key items: –Political support - recognition by governments and public on -CBFMs, decentralisation of management, –Traditional and formal local institutions in place

17. Legislation -broad powers through legislative means - Fisheries Act, Constitution, by-laws Information - traditional knowledge and experience –Lack of information on external factors- market, prices, innovations –Role of fisheries extension officers

18. Technical Guidance -limited capital, access to appropriate resources, education –individuals- private gains –government advisory role, research information, oversee MCS –NGOs, researchers, scientists and other groups –Donors

19. Decision making framework - a traditional hierarchical structure such as the chiefly system that makes decisions –Modern administrative systems –purpose, functions and responsibilities must be clearly defined, complementary –Inclusive consultations –transparent decision Use decision tools - Cost/Benefit analysis, project management, resource accounting

20. Rights to veto - transboundary nature of resources –conflicts –Security issues Access to expertise/funding - facilitated by fisheries department, NGOs, SPC –Skills in writing project proposal, project management, evaluation and reporting, stock assessment, biological surveys, resource economists, sociologist, etc

21. Implementation Plan Fisheries Management Plan – to implement Policy List of objectives that can be achieved Means to achieve the objectives – strategies What is needed to operationalise ?– resources- (financial, technical, infrastructural) institutional framework, information