1. La Modellazione delle Reti Complesse: il Grand Canyon tra Ricerca e Realtà Sandro Bologna ENEA – CAMO CR Casaccia, 00060 Roma bologna@casaccia.enea.it I Giovedi della Cultura ENEA-Casaccia, Aprile 29, 2004

2. Examples of Large Complex Critical Infrastructures –Energy (oil & gas production and storage, electric power, …) –Finance & Banking –Information & Communication –Transportation (road, airlines, boat, train, …) –Vital Human Services (water, food, health) –Government

3. the italian high-voltage transmission line (380 kv) with 127 nodes and 342 edges

4. The UCTE System: 2100 Twh delivered to 400 ML people UNION FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF TRANSMISSION OF ELECTRICITY

5. Fonte: Corriere della Sera 30.09.03 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM NETWORK

7. Water Banking and Finance Transportation InternetCoreInternetCore Telecommunications GovernmentServices EmergencyServices Electric Any Geographical Area, Any Network, Any Functional Area Is a Place of Vulnerability 7 Oil and Gas The World is a Network of Networks…

8. REPRESENTATION OF THE DIFFERENT LAYERS THAT MAKE A COMPLEX INTERACTIVE NETWORK - human organization node (Social Network) - physical network node (Technological Network) - control & information flows network node (Information Network)        

9. Physical Layer (Material Network) Cyber-Layer (Information Network) Organisational Layer (Human Network) Intra-dependency Inter-dependency LCCI three layer Model

10. Electrical Components: generators, transformers, breakers, connecting cables etc Control and supervisory hardware/software components ( Scada/EMS systems ) Electrical Power Operators Independent System Operator for electricity planning and transmission Intra-dependency Inter-dependency Electrical Infrastructure Interdependencies Electrical Power Transmission Infrastructure Telecomunication Infrastructure Oil/Gas Transport System Infrastructure

11. CyberLayer OrganisationalLayer Intra-dependency Inter-dependency WHY SO DIFFICULT TO MODEL PhysicalLayer Structural Complexity Network Evolution Node Diversity Connection Diversity Dynamical complexity

12. US CANADA BLACK-OUT Power System Outage Task Force Interim Report

13. Oil Electric Power Transpor- tation Natural Gas Telecom Fuels, Lubricants Fuel Transport Shipping Power for pumping Stations, Storage Control Systems Fuel for Generators,,Lubricants Fuels, Lubricants Fuel for Generators, Water Water for Production Cooling Emission reduction Power for Pump & Lift Stations Control Systems Water for Cooling, Emission reduction Water for Cooling, SCADA Communications SCADA Communications Power for Switchers Fuel Transport Shipping Power for compressors Storage, Control Systems SCADA Communications Power for Signalling, Switchers Fuel for Generators, Transportation SCADA Communications Transpor- tation Heat Source: “Critic. Infrastruct Dependencies” Rinaldi, Peerenboom,Kelly 2002 Example of Networked Infrastructures Interdependencies

14. ENEA FaMoS – Multilayer Modelling Activities Topology Model and Analysis nodes and arcs in the net State Machine Model and Analysis processes and links in the net Electricity Network Telecomunication Network Transportation Network Oil/Gas Network Interdependency Model and Simulation all the links with the other nets Physical Model and Simulation generators, transformers, breakers, connecting cables etc Dynamic Model and Analysis processes and links in the net

15. ENEA FaMoS – Multilayer Modelling Activities Topology Model and Analysis nodes and arcs in the net State Machine Model and Analysis processes and links in the net ElectricityNetwork Telecomunication Network Transportation Network Oil/Gas Network Interdependency Model and Simulation all the links with the other nets Physical Model and Simulation generators, transformers, breakers, connecting cables etc Dynamic Model and Analysis processes and links in the net will make use of the latest results on complex systems theory to analyse the network’s property and to understand the emergent behaviors that can take place in the network

16. COMPLEX SYSTEMS APPROACH Recent researches on large-scale networks make evident of some global properties which are not pre-specified by network design and are difficult or impossible to predict from knowledge of its constituent parts. (Barabasi, Strogatz, Watts,…) Poisson distribution Random Network Power-law distribution Scale-free Network

17. A case study: the italian high-voltage transmission line (380 kv) with 127 nodes and 342 edges The complex systems view of these networks might reveal interesting features useful for: a) predicting outage events b) reduce vulnerabilities c) increase self-healing control strategies

18. Pure 2-dimensional networks are less “theoretically interesting” as geometrical constraints inhibit the occurrence of nodes with large degrees. They show single-scale structure with even gaussian-type decay (PNAS 97 (2000) 11149). Cumulative degree distribution P(k>K)

19. The analisys of the node’s centrality allows to identify sites where there is a maximum flow. This informations could be used into network’s design toolsets, with the aim of increasing network’s homogeneity in the node’s workflow. Betweenneess centrality distribution (bc is the # of shortest paths passing through a node)

20. Min-cut decomposition of networks (provided by Laplacian spectral analysis) is a useful tool for locating possible sites of vulnerabilities and/or overload. (Rosato et al., Europhys.Lett. to appear)

21. Present limitations of Complex Systems approach Given a network with N nodes and L links Create a graph with statistically identical topology RESULT: model the static network topology PROBLEM: Real networks are dynamical systems!  Evolving networks OBJECTIVE: capture the network dynamics METHOD : identify the processes that contribute to the network topology develop dynamical models that capture these processes Network as a static graph

22. ENEA FaMoS – Multilayer Modelling Activities Topology Model and Analysis nodes and arcs in the net State Machine Model and Analysis processes and links in the net Electricity Network Telecomunication Network Transportation Network Foreign Electrical Transmission Infrastructure Interdependency Model and Simulation all the links with the other nets Physical Model and Simulation generators, transformers, breakers, connecting cables etc Dynamic Model and Analysis processes and links in the net will make use of complementary risk assessment methods to estimate the probability of unwanted incident that may lead to undesired states

23. Modelling tools for dependability analysis Model checking Extended Petri Nets Fault Tree Bayesian networks

24. Model Checking Given: a System S with initial state and an undesired state BAD We want to know: under which conditions, if any, our system S can reach BAD during its evolution (dynamic properties)

25. Modelling Public Mobile Network (PMN)

26. ENEA FaMoS – Multilayer Modelling Activities Topology Model and Analysis nodes and arcs in the net State Machine Model and Analysis processes and links in the net Electricity Network Telecomunication Network Transportation Network Oil(Gas Network Interdependency Model and Simulation all the links with the other nets Physical Model and Simulation generators, transformers, breakers, connecting cables etc Dynamic Model and Analysis processes and links in the net will make use of logical and qualitative approaches to optimize the network in the presence of different type of constraints

27. ABSTRACT LOGIC VIEW OF A NETWORK

28. ENEA FaMoS – Multilayer Modelling Activities Topology Model and Analysis nodes and arcs in the net State Machine Model and Analysis processes and links in the net ElectricityNetwork Telecomunication Network Transportation Network Oil/Gas Network Interdependency Model and Simulation all the links with the other nets Physical Model and Simulation generators, transformers, breakers, connecting cables etc Dynamic Model and Analysis processes and links in the net will model the grid dynamics over a range of different geographic and time domains

30. ENEA FaMoS – Multilayer Modelling Activities Topology Model and Analysis nodes and arcs in the net State Machine Model and Analysis processes and links in the net Electricity Network Telecomunication Network Transportation Network Oil/Gas Network Interdependency Model and Simulation all the links with the other nets Physical Model and Simulation generators, transformers, breakers, connecting cables etc Dynamic Model and Analysis processes and links in the net will establish probable correlation among different networks to understand cascading failures or unknown and emergent behaviours

31. Oil Electric Power Transpor- tation Natural Gas Telecom Water Water for Production Cooling Emission reduction Water for Cooling, Emission reduction Water for Cooling, Power for pumping Stations, Storage Control Systems Power for Pump & Lift Stations Control Systems Power for Switchers Power for compressors Storage, Control Systems Power for Signalling, Switchers SCADA Communications SCADA Communications SCADA Communications SCADA Communications Fuel for Generators, Heat Source: “Critic. Infrastruct Dependencies” Rinaldi, Peerenboom,Kelly 2002 Fuel for Generators,,Lubricants Fuels, Lubricants Fuel for Generators, Fuel Transport Shipping Fuel Transport Shipping Transportation Transpor- tation Modelling Networked Infrastructures Interdependencies

32. Higher abstraction level formalisms and conceptual models Social Network Model Transpor tation Network Model Electrical Network Model Internet AS Model ?? Common Simulation Platform to run Cooperating Models of Interacting Networks A possible Framework for Interdependencies Modeling and Simulation

33. Electrical System Agent Transport System Agent Users System Agent Health Services System Agent Messages Broker Supervisory System FaMoS Agent Based Simulation Implementation for Interdependencies Analysis

34. SOCIO-COGNITIVE ENGINEERING APPROACH : Human Errors Copy rights: High-Intelligence & Decision Research Group, CAMO, ENEA, http://erg4146.casaccia.enea.it Author: Adam Maria Gadomski, 8/10/2003http://erg4146.casaccia.enea.it Large Complex Critical Infrastructure (LCCI) Technological Grid Human Errors Organisation Human component Physical component Cyber component

35. contributes to the Vulnerability Analysis and to the Improvement of Robustness of Large Complex Critical Systems SOCIO-COGNITIVE ENGINEERING Key Intervention Domains Users Modelling and Simulation Organization Structures and Decision-Making Modelling and Simulation Assessment of Social Risk and Impacts Intrusions and Mismanagement Copy rights: High-Intelligence & Decision Research Group, CAMO,ENEA, http://erg4146.casaccia.enea.it Adam M. Gadomski, 7/10/2003http://erg4146.casaccia.enea.it

36. Pre-incident network in n-1 secure state Island operations fails due to unit tripping NETWORK STATE OVERVIEW & ROOT CAUSES Event tree from UTCE report ITALY BLACK-OUT (From UCTE Interim Report)

37. National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center

38. NISAC A Suite of Models Energy Sector Telecommunications Sector Transportation Sector Public Health Sector Financial Sector ……..

41. IST FP5 Roadmap Project: ACIP Analysis & Assessment for Critical Infrastructure Protection www.eu-acip.de

42. Transportation (Air) Vital Human Services EISAC Government Transportation (Ship) Transportation (Rail) Banking & Finance Energy Telecommunication European Infrastructures Simulation and Analysis Center - EISAC

43. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri GRUPPO DI LAVORO SULLA PROTEZIONE DELLE INFRASTRUTTURE CRITICHE PROTEZIONE DELLE INFRASTRUTTURE CRITICHE INFORMATIZZATE La realtà Italiana

45. Proposta per un Centro Nazionale di Simulazione delle Interdipendenze Il Centro, non necessariamente localizzato in un solo sito geografico, sull’esempio del National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) americano dovrebbe avere l’obiettivo di: 1. Sviluppare Modelli e Metodi di Simulazione per l’Analisi delle Interdipendenze 2. Sviluppare una adeguata Piattaforma HW/SW di Simulazione. 3. Integrare Modelli e Metodi per studiare le Interdipendenze a fronte di diversi Scenari e fornire indicazioni ai Decisori responsabili della Gestione delle Crisi.