1. 1 Biosecurity in the International Futures Programme of the OECD www.biosecuritycodes.org David B. Sawaya OECD International Futures Program Matrahaza, Hungary May 13, 2006

2. 2 A Global Outreach OECD Member Countries Countries/Economies Engaged in Working Relationships with the OECD

3. 3 What is the International Futures Programme? Established in 1990 Provides the OECD with early warning of emerging issues, pinpoints major developments, and analyses key long- term concerns to help governments map strategy

4. 4 Risk Management in the International Futures Programme

5. 5 Driving forces Demography –population growth, ageing, migration, urbanization The Environment –climate change and its impact on natural disasters and infectious diseases Technology –connectedness, technological change Socio-economic Developments –concentration, income disparities, shifts in regulation capacities A number of forces are modifying the risk landscape

6. 6 Major Recommendations Research has led to a number of recommendations for action: l Adopt a new policy approach to risk management. l Develop synergies between the public and the private sectors. l Inform and involve stakeholders and the general public. l Strengthen international co-operation. l Make better use of technological potential and enhance research efforts.

7. 7 Trends in Bioagent cases (20 th century) Source: W. Seth Carus, “Working Paper: Bioterrorism and Biocrimes” (Center for Counter-proliferation Research, National Defense University, Feb 2001 Revision of 1999) TerroristCriminal Other/ Uncertain Total 1990’s 194094153 1980’s 3609 1970’s 3238 1960’s 0101 20 th Century Total 275697180

8. 8 Risk Issues For Biotechnologies - Dual Use Technologies - How do we maintain an open democratic society and maintain security at the same time? –How do we maintain scientific openness? Can we even effectively control dual-use equipment, materials, and information? What measures need to be taken to assure the public that the desired level of security has been achieved?

9. 9 Conference on Responsible Stewardship of the Life Sciences Meeting in Frascati, Italy in September of 2004 55 participants from government, academia, industry, public research organizations, scientific societies, and the science publishing field Discussion of how to achieve a balance between scientific freedom and security concerns

10. 10 What behaviour patterns for what tools? A spectrum of individual behaviour is the object of oversight tools: –Psychopathic, sociopathic, criminal (national laws, treaties) –Negligent or thoughtless (laws, guidelines, principles) –Right-minded professionals with a narrow view of the consequences of their work (voluntary codes)

11. 11 Creating Tools for Managing Oversight Formal treaties, agreements or arms control conventions among governments –ex: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Consensus pacts among voluntary partners to the agreement –ex: Australia Group export control program (non-binding)

12. 12 Tools for managing oversight National Legislation –ex: Japan’s Infectious Disease Law (2003), US Patriot Act (2001), Singapore’s Biological Agents and Toxin Bill (2005) Informal agreements among individuals or non-state actors –ex: Codes of Ethics, Codes of Conduct, Guidelines, Principles

13. 13 Codes of Conduct Target Audience: scientific communities, research funding agencies Mechanism: raise awareness of problem, provide guidance on professional best practice Utility: one tool among others to address the issue of dual-use

14. 14 Why use Codes? To raise individual scientists’ awareness of their personal responsibilities To ensure funding agencies and administrative oversight bodies of common approaches to potential problems To reassure the public

15. 15 What are the problems with Codes? A sense of ownership by individuals (who drafted the Code?) What measures of enforcement do Codes have? If none, how useful are they? What sanctions are foreseen if code is not followed?

16. 16 What should a Code look like? Avoid national, regional or cultural preoccupations It should be drafted with specific communities in mind It should provide both professional standards and an means to empower teams to act to enforce the Code

17. 17 Frascati Conclusions The impact of existing security systems on delivering the twin goals of protecting science and the public in an age of terrorism need to be further evaluated. There is a need for a more transparent and better informed debate to consolidate existing activities, including through the provision of a more comprehensive information resource. Existing regulatory frameworks need to be bolstered with self-regulation measures.

18. www.biosecuritycodes.org

19. Biosecuritycodes in French

20. Biosecuritycodes in Japanese

21. 21 Biosafety vs. Biosecurity Need to establish a common international understanding of key terminology In English the difference is often poorly understood and the term biosecurity is used in a number of different ways: –for protection against non-native species in Oceania –as protection of livestock from infections in rural communities –the protection against the malicious misuse of pathogens in the security community)

22. 22 Biosafety vs. Biosecurity Problem in translating the terms into other languages: –In many languages the distinction between safety and security does not exist. –This clearly represents a problem when translating biosecurity and biosafety, and may pose a serious problem when attempting to compare legislation across borders. OECD’s network and non-member connections to survey the ways in which the two terms are translated into other languages (inter alia – French, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, German)

23. 23 Open Question: Are Codes Effective? There is very little no consensus as to the efficacy of codes because evidence is scattered and poor Post studies on the effectiveness of self regulatory mechanisms, in the life sciences and other domains, at curbing intentional and unintentional misuse of resources. A new web forum allowing users to discuss experiences in implementing and using codes of conduct and other voluntary regulatory agreements in the life sciences and other areas.

24. 24 Thank you David.sawaya@oecd.org David.sawaya@oecd.org