1. POLI 235A WINTER 2015 LATIN AMERICA IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: REFLECTIONS

2. PURPOSES AND GOALS To understand Latin American perceptions of the contemporary world—and its changing power structures—inquiry thus centered on Latin America To see how the “rest of the world” looks upon Latin America—not only USA To comprehend Latin American policy responses to the resulting challenges and opportunities— reasonable, feasible, effective?

3. COURSE DESIGN INTRODUCTION Jan 06: Queries and Concepts Jan 13: Sizing Up the Neighborhood LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICIES Jan 20: Brazil—An Emerging Giant? Jan 27: Venezuela—After Chávez, What? Feb 03: Mexico—Jockeying for Position Feb 10: Cuba—What Now?

4. COURSE DESIGN (cont) MAJOR POWER CENTERS Feb 17: The European Union Feb 24: What Does China Really Want? Mar 03: Order and Disorder: Laws, Institutions, and Rogues

5. GUEST SPEAKERS David Mares (UCSD) Riordan Roett (Johns Hopkins SAIS) Javier Corrales (Amherst College) Rafael Fernández de Castro (ITAM) H. Michael Erisman (Indiana State) Weiyi Shi (UCSD) Barack Obama (White House)

6. RESOLUTIONS FOR DEBATES (i) 1. Brazil should devote less attention to BRICS and more to UNASUR. 2. Venezuela should drastically revise its policy toward the Middle East [including but not limited to Iran, Syria, Palestine, and Israel]. 3. Mexico should emphasize its affiliation with CELAC rather than its membership in NAFTA. 4. Cuba should attempt to join the Alianza del Pacífico.

7. RESOLUTIONS FOR DEBATES (ii) 5. The European Union should charge its Iberian members (Portugal and Spain) with a special mission to strengthen EU ties to Latin America and provide them with targeted funds for this purpose. 6. The government of China should take immediate steps to halt the construction of a transoceanic canal through Nicaragua that is funded by Chinese investors. 7. The Central American integration system (SICA) should invite the United Nations to dispatch blue- helmeted peacekeeping forces to Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

8. RESOLUTIONS FOR DEBATES (2014) 1. Brazil should give up its demand for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 2. The government of Venezuela should invite the OAS to mediate the current conflict in the country. 3. Mexico should devote all resources at its disposal to CELAC in order to reassert itself as a regional player and to reduce its identification with North America and the United States. 4. Cuba should join the OAS.

9. RESOLUTIONS (2014, cont.) 5. The EU should conclude a trade agreement with Mercosur. 6. The government of China should forge a special relationship with ALBA and provide substantial economic assistance to its member countries. 7. Countries of Latin America should pursue negotiations with world power centers through bilateral (or minilateral) channels, rather than through international organizations (such as the OAS, the UN, or the WTO).

10. NEWS FLASHES 2015 U.S. and Cuba begin negotiations to establish full diplomatic relations. Chinese (Hong Kong) company holds ground-breaking ceremony for transoceanic canal through Nicaragua. Venezuela assumes nonpermanent seat on UN Security Council; Maduro steps up repression at home. Mexico ambivalent about FTA with South Korea. John Kerry continues negotiations with Iran about nuclear program; Netanyahu expresses scorn before U.S. Congress. Argentina unable to solve murder of Alberto Nisman. Dilma Rousseff wins election, loses support; Brazilian profile in decline.

11. QUERIES AND CONCEPTS

12. GAMES AND STRATEGIES Games in play  Geopolitical  Geoeconomic  Depending on issue-arena Policy stages/theaters  Subregional  Regional (i.e. Latin America)  Global (through institutions or not?) Forms of action  Unilateral (go-it-alone)  Selective coalitions  Open-ended coalition  Region-wide institutions

13. ANALYTICAL TOOLS “Grand strategies” vs. ad hoc reactions Regimes and “rules of the game” Geopolitics vs. geoeconomics Ideology vs. pragmatism Hard and soft power

14. INSIGHT #1: LATIN AMERICA Latin America is far from monolithic  Ideological divisions  Sovereignty > cooperation  Formation of blocs (eg Mercosur, ALBA, Pacific Alliance)  Intra-regional rivalries Options depend on resources and opportunities  Brazil: size and strength, soft power  Venezuela: petroleum  Mexico: proximity to USA  Cuba: cubanía, prestige, and soft power

16. INSIGHT #2: POWER CENTERS Power center profile  Preoccupied with internal/domestic issues  Focused on crises elsewhere (Syria, Ukraine)  Strains on resources Who cares about Latin America (and why)?  Spain? EU?  Portugal?  China…. What about the USA?  No urgent crisis or threat  Basic needs met (oil, labor, drug wars, etc)  Emerging opportunities (eg Mexico)  Should seize the moment, not ignore the region

17. Subregional blocs  Alianza del Pacífico, Mercosur, ALBA Latin America  Cuba and Brazil  CELAC South-South relations  BRIC  IBSA  Cuba in Angola Focus on geopolitics or geoeconomics? Thoughtful and feasible responses INSIGHT #3: ALTERNATIVES

18. STRUCTURES OF GLOBAL POWER Unipolarity  Ending of Cold War  Economic and military primacy  U.S. as “balancer of last resort”… “still peerless” Multipolarity  “… the new order will be more like the European state system of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries than the rigid patterns of the Cold War.” Six or seven major powers. Goal: acceptable balance of power among competing states; stability and moderation

19. STRUCTURES (cont.) The World as Flat  “It is now possible for more people than ever to collaborate and compete in real time with more other people on more different kinds of work from more different corners of the planet and on a more equal footing than at any previous time in the history of the world…” The World as Pyramid  U.S. “alone at the pinnacle, with formidable and unique global powers of leadership, but not the power to dominate”  The Eight: BRIC + UK, Japan, France, Germany  Enablers, especially 0il and gas-producing states  Regional Players (e.g. Mexico and South Africa)  Responsibles (N ~ 50, such as Chile)  Bottom Dwellers or Problem States (N~75)

20. FINAL QUESTIONS Do these (or other) scenarios coexist in differing combinations? In what way? Note: Distinguish between structures of geopolitical and geoeconomic power What would be the implications of each scenario for which countries of Latin America? Do they call for long-term strategies? Of what kind? What are the outlooks for the future?

21. The End