1. Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH Security SVGA Image Sensor VISION 2005, Dr. P. Stifter

2. Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM I NTRODUCTION S YSTEM D ESIGN M IXED S IGNAL A UTHENTICATION SPIE 2005, 26,09.05 T ransition Real World Virtual World Some of our real world aspects are mapped into a digital representation and stored in large databases. The digital identity has to be protected ! FR Software

3. Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM I NTRODUCTION S YSTEM D ESIGN M IXED S IGNAL A UTHENTICATION SPIE 2005, 26,09.05 A pplication Scenario of optical Sensors Ethernet based physical layer with TCP/IP as a transport and routing layer. Sensors capture images, generate sensitive data and transfer data packets over an open and insecure channel to dedicated servers

4. Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM I NTRODUCTION S YSTEM D ESIGN M IXED S IGNAL A UTHENTICATION SPIE 2005, 26,09.05 S ecure Sensor Design Requirements: Data Authentication Authentication Protocol Cryptographic Checksum (MAC) Cryptographic hardware modules Usage of publicly known and proven algorithms Secret Unique Identifier Key storage Key programming

5. Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM I NTRODUCTION S YSTEM D ESIGN M IXED S IGNAL A UTHENTICATION SPIE 2005, 26,09.05 S ystem Design large and busy digital core

6. Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM I NTRODUCTION S YSTEM D ESIGN M IXED S IGNAL A UTHENTICATION SPIE 2005, 26,09.05 F loorplan Problem: CMOS imager is susceptible to various noise sources. Noise level is increased by the activity of the digital core.

7. Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM I NTRODUCTION S YSTEM D ESIGN M IXED S IGNAL A UTHENTICATION SPIE 2005, 26,09.05 M ixed Signal Design Most prominent noise: FPN Modules on the same substrate Use CDS Separation with multiple guard rings Differential signal lines Large blocking capacitors Signal integrity Stable reference voltages

8. Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM I NTRODUCTION S YSTEM D ESIGN M IXED S IGNAL A UTHENTICATION SPIE 2005, 26,09.05 K ey Storage Selection between Polysilicon fuses or EEPROM cells D-MatrixPro Poly silicon EEPROM cells Con Simple interfaceExternal programming voltage Not buried under metal layers Burn-through process may damage pixel Buried under shielded metal layer No external access, on- chip charge pump Encapsulation Hardware overhead: controller

9. Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM I NTRODUCTION S YSTEM D ESIGN M IXED S IGNAL A UTHENTICATION SPIE 2005, 26,09.05 Checksum Authentication O perational Flow

10. Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM I NTRODUCTION S YSTEM D ESIGN M IXED S IGNAL A UTHENTICATION SPIE 2005, 26,09.05 D ata Protection Data transfer with TCP/IP can be easily manipulated in the context of raw sockets. Application of cryptographic methods (MAC) protects against bit manipulations and faked identities Block cipher E of length n encrypt the message x to the cipher text c with key K of length k.

11. Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM I NTRODUCTION S YSTEM D ESIGN M IXED S IGNAL A UTHENTICATION SPIE 2005, 26,09.05 D ata Protection Data transfer with TCP/IP can be easily manipulated in the context of raw sockets. Application of cryptographic methods (MAC) protects against bit manipulations and faked identities MacDES (1) Padding (2) Splitting (3) Initial Transformation (4) Iteration (5) Output Transformation

12. Copyright AIM INFRAROT-MODULE GmbH AIM I NTRODUCTION S YSTEM D ESIGN M IXED S IGNAL A UTHENTICATION SPIE 2005, 26,09.05 C onclusion One can obtain real end-point security on open and insecure data channels. On-chip cryptographic module provide real-time encryption and secure key storage. Challenge/Response method give any host in possession of the secret key the assurance of the data origin. Even a single bit manipulation is detectable. On-chip integration provides a high protection level against key recovery attacks.