1. EVOLVING MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS
Col (Ret) Peter Leentjes
Center of Excellence in
Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Assistance

2. PEACE OPERATIONS Examine a Model Establish the Environment
Discuss Evolution in the 90s
Principles and Policies
Challenges and Options

3. The Complex Emergency Model

4. Definition “A complex emergency is a humanitarian crisis in a country,
region or society where there is a dramatic disruption in the
political, economic and social situation, resulting from internal
or external conflict or natural disaster, seriously disrupting the
population’s capacity to survive and the national authorities’
capacity to respond, and which requires a consolidated
multi-sectoral international response”
IASC of the United Nations

5. Modern Complex Emergencies
Disaster
Response
Humanitarian
Assistance
Peace
Operations

6. Modern Complex Emergencies
Range of Military Activity
Support
Combat
Security
Compliance
Operations
Disaster
Response
Humanitarian
Assistance
Peace
Operations

7. Modern Complex Emergencies
Range of Civilian Activity
Support CM
Humanitarian
Mitigation
Disaster
Response
Humanitarian
Assistance
Peace
Operations

8. Modern Complex Emergencies
Civil - Military Coordination
Disaster
Management
Humanitarian
Assistance
Peace
Operations

9. PEACEKEEPING Pragmatic Solution - No Legal Basis
For 40 + years peacekeeping was:
Based on resolution of interstate conflict
Conducted post an agreement
Separated Forces or Monitored Agreements
Classic or Traditional Peacekeeping

10. FEATURES OF CLASSIC PEACEKEEPING
Interstate Conflict
Governments Functioning and in Control
Government Infrastructure intact
Military and Police Structures operating
Judicial Systems in place
International Rules operable
Minimum Contact with Population
Minimum Involvement with Civilian Agencies

11. EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING CHALLENGES
Traditional peacekeeping
Implementation of Complex Agreements and Settlements
Preventive Deployment
Observation of a Non-UN Peacekeeping Force
Co-deployment with Regional Peacekeeping Forces
Provision of Humanitarian Aid
Peace Enforcement

12. FEATURES OF MODERN PEACEKEEPING
Intra-state Conflict
Governments ineffective or not in control
Factional Political Groupings & Leadership
State Infrastructure broken down
Judicial & Police Breakdown
Military factions & Warlords
Weapons proliferation
There are no Rules
Intermingled with Populations
Full Range of Civilian Agencies / NGOs

13. NEW YORK TIMES
“Rethinking and retrenchment are in order ... There should be a shift back towards more limited objectives like policing cease-fires”. “UN peacekeeping does what it can do very well. It makes no sense to continue eroding it’s credibility by asking it to do what it cannot”.
New York Times

14. “Traditional peacekeeping operations of the kind deployed during the Cold War are unlikely to be repeated. Peacekeeping today requires not only re-thinking the means but also the methods of implementing mandates set out by the Security Council Secretary-General Kofi Annan
1998

15. CHAPTER VI
VERSUS
CHAPTER VII

16. CHAPTER VI Peaceful settlement of disputes
The Council provides assistance at the request of the parties
Council has authority to investigate
Investigation is not normally military until accord is arranged – then military assess role a peace operation could play
A PKO under Chapter VI is part of the peaceful resolution of the dispute
PKO assists in consolidating the peace and building confidence
Forces are lightly armed for self defense

17. CHAPTER VI As a result there are conditions to a Chapter VI operation:
Consent of the parties is required
A cease-fire needs to be effective
A comprehensive agreement should be signed
Parties assist the deployment of the force
Parties sign a SOFA (this is very important to establish the status of the forces – there is no other legal basis under Chapter VI)
Self-defense ROE are developed

18. CHAPTER VII “The Decision to Use Enforcement Power”
Conflict is ongoing
High risk that conflict may start again
Parties are not in agreement
Rogue elements are not included (increased risk to UN forces – force protection)
Risk of external intervention
Presence of other national forces in the area
Risky internal situation – violence / human rights abuses / banditry / weapons
Self defense insufficient to protect deployed forces
A legal basis to protect deployed forces is needed (SOFA cannot be agreed)

19. CHAPTER VII “The Use of Force”
does not tell you to use force actively
is not combat operation
Provides the full range of options including up to and including enforcement powers
Declaration that the conflict represents a threat to international peace and security
Non use of force options –ie sanctions
Use of Armed force – if necessary and as a last resort
Establishes the legal context for intervention and the use of force

20. CHAPTER VI / VII CHECKLIST
Chapter VII
PKO assists in consolidating the peace
PKO enforces the will of the SC
Parties request assistance
Commit to peaceful resolution
Political will of the parties
Consent to the operation
Effective cease-fire
Comprehensive agreement
Parties assist the deployment
Signature of SOFA
Conflict is ongoing
Risk of renewed conflict high
Parties not in agreement
Risky internal situation
Rogue elements not included
Risk of external intervention
Presence of foreign forces
Self defense judged insufficient
Legal basis for intervention needed
SOFA

21. Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements
PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT
Chapter VII
Chapter VI
Action with Respect to
Threats to the Peace,
Breaches of the Peace,
and
Acts of Aggression
Pacific
Settlement of
Disputes
Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements

22. PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Peace Restoration
Collective
Enforcement
Co - Deployment
Economic Assistance
Demining
Civil Police Operations
Gross Violation of
Human Rights
Human Rights Monitoring
Regional Enforcement
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

23. PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Peace Restoration
Collective
Enforcement
Co - Deployment
Economic Assistance
Demining
Civil Police Operations
Gross Violation of
Human Rights
Human Rights Monitoring
Regional Enforcement
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

24. 1990 ISSUES Wider Range of Tasks
Change in the Composition and Needs of Missions
Only the Traditional Model of Peacekeeping Available

25. SECURITY COUNCIL ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS IN THE 90’s
A wider application of the peacekeeping model
Development of hybrid mandates

26. PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Peace Restoration
Collective
Enforcement
Co - Deployment
Economic Assistance
Demining
Civil Police Operations
Gross Violation of
Human Rights
Human Rights Monitoring
Regional Enforcement
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

27. PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Peace Restoration
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Collective
Enforcement
Co - Deployment
Economic Assistance
Demining
Gross Violation of
Human Rights
Civil Police Operations
Human Rights Monitoring
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Regional
Enforcement
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

28. PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Peace Restoration
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Collective
Enforcement
Economic Assistance
Demining
Gross Violation of
Human Rights
Civil Police Operations
Human Rights Monitoring
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Regional
Enforcement
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

29. Chapter VII Tools Comprehensive Mandate Clear Military Tasks
Robust Force Structures (Equipped and Trained)
Effective Command and Control Structure
Authority to Use Force Appropriately
Robust Rules of Engagement
Legal Basis for Intervention

30. WHAT CAN THE UN DO? WHAT CAN THE UN NOT DO?
Classic Peacekeeping
Chapter VI Reinforced with Chapter VII elements
Any Operation with Sustained Combat Operations – this requires a coalition of the willing / lead nation / multi national force
WHAT CAN THE UN NOT DO?

31. CHAPTER VII - ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS
UN has no Combat Operations Capability
Logistics
no combat logistics system
contractor based support
Authority over National Forces
authority uncertain
inadequate command & control stucture
nations reaction to forces under threat
Different Cultures
military cultures
leadership & managerial backgrounds
training standards

32. OPTIONS FOR UN MANDATES
The UN may authorize a region / coalition to conduct the mission
To a regional organization
A coalition of the willing (MNF)
A framework / lead nation in a coalition
To a Nation capable of executing the mission
The UN may decide to mange the mission
Form a UN multi-national force
Designate a framework / lead nation concept

33. WHY AUTHORIZE
The operation has a high risk of combat operations taking place
UN missions take a long time to deploy and deployment time is critical
Support for funding cannot be generated
A region or coalition offers forces

34. UN MANDATED OPERATIONS
COALITION OF THE WILLING / MNF
UN mandate authorizes the mission
Lead nation generates the forces
Lead Nation appoints Force commander
Participating Nations pay all costs
Lead Nation coordinates & provides day to day political direction
Lead Nation coordinates & provides ROE
UN FORCE
UN sponsored mission
UN generates the forces
UN appoints Force Commander
Mission paid by assessed contributions
Political direction by UN (through DPKO)
UN ROE

35. TYPICAL COALITION / MNF MANDATE
PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Peace Restoration
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Collective
Enforcement
Economic Assistance
Demining
Gross Violation of
Human Rights
Civil Police Operations
Human Rights Monitoring
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Regional
Enforcement
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

36. TYPICAL UN PKO FORCE MANDATE
PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Peace Restoration
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Collective
Enforcement
Economic Assistance
Demining
Gross Violation of
Human Rights
Civil Police Operations
Human Rights Monitoring
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Regional
Enforcement
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations

37. CHANGING PRECEPTS Revision of principles Impartial status
Sovereignty
Consent
Impartial status
Broader range of tasks
Time constraints
Limitations on
Resources
Political effort
Military sacrifice
Humanitarian Basis
for Intervention

38. CONSENT Who Gives Consent?
International Bodies
UN Security Council
UN General Assembly
TCNs
Third Parties
Parties to the Conflict
Military Organizations
Military Factions
Local Commanders
Warlords
Provides
Legitimacy
Strategic Level
Environment
Operational &
Tactical Level
Environment

39. End state can only be political, economic and social in nature
NO MILITARY SOLUTION
End state can only be political, economic and social in nature
Expensive tool
Military can
temporize
maintain situation
reduce levels of violence
induce compliance
Blunt instrument of political power

40. OPERATIONAL PHASES MILITARY CRISIS STABILISATION CIVILIAN MILITARY
OPERATIONS
SUPPORT
OPERATIONS
CRISIS
STABILISATION
LIFE
SUPPORT
POLITICAL
LIFE
SAVING
ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL
CIVILIAN
5 to 10 years?

41. SRSG UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSION STRUCTURE UN SG Deputy SRSG
National Authorities
UN SG
SRSG
Human Rights Component
Deputy SRSG
Military Force
Humanitarian Component
Observer Force
Police Component
Administrative component
Election Component

42. COALITION OR LEAD NATION PEACEKEEPING MISSION STRUCTURE
Coalition NCAs
UN SG
Military Force
SRSG
Deputy SRSG
Human Rights Component
Humanitarian Component
Election Component
Police Component
Administrative component
Observer Force
Component
Component
Component
Component

43. Military Role in Peace Operations
SRSG
Manage the mandate
Coordinate effort of components
Deputy
Provide unity of effort
Military Force
CIVPOL
Humanitarians
Elections
Development
Human Rights
Reconstruction
Primary
military
mission
security
training support
security / protection / transport
emergency medical
security on sites / protection / transport / medical
assistance to the election process
secure environment / engineering /transport / materiel
assistance to the reconstruction process
assistance to long term development

44. REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL PEACE OPERATION
Legitimacy
Consent -at key levels
Legal Basis
Credibility
Credible Force
Achievable Mandate and Military Plan
Operating Environment
Signed Agreement
End State with achievable goals
Integration of Effort with other Components
REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL PEACE OPERATION

45. SUMMARY OF CHANGES Chapter VII Operations will be the norm
Multi-dimensional, Multi-national Operations
Focus on Integrated Political, Economic and Social Solutions
Integration of Tasks under One Mandate
Full Range of Civilian Intervention
New Coordination Mechanism
Broader Range of Military Tasks
Complementary Roles for Components