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Lecture 8: pricing and Strategy Advanced Micro Theory MSc.EnviNatResEcon. 1/2006 Charit Tingsabadh
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Chapter 13 Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition
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Table 13.1 Properties of Monopoly, Oligopoly, Monopolistic Competition, and Competition
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Table 13.2 Profit Matrix for a Quantity-Setting Game
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Figure 13.1 Competition Versus Cartel
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Figure 13.2 American Airlines’ Profit-Maximizing Output
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Figure 13.2a American Airlines’ Profit-Maximizing Output
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Figure 13.2b American Airlines’ Profit-Maximizing Output
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Figure 13.3 American and United’s Best-Response Curves
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Figure 13.4 Duopoly Equilibria
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Figure 13.4a Duopoly Equilibria
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Figure 13.4b Duopoly Equilibria
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Table 13.3 Cournot Equilibrium Varies with the Number of Firms
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Figure 13.5 Stackelberg Game Tree
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Figure 13.6 Stackelberg Equilibrium
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Figure 13.7 Effects of a Government Subsidy on a Cournot Equilibrium
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Figure 13.7a Effects of a Government Subsidy on a Cournot Equilibrium
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Figure 13.7b Effects of a Government Subsidy on a Cournot Equilibrium
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Table 13.4 Effects of a Subsidy Given to United Airlines
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Page 458 Solved Problem 13.1
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Table 13.5 Comparison of Airline Market Structures
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Figure 13.8 Monopolistically Competitive Equilibrium
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Figure 13.9 Monopolistic Competition Among Airlines
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Figure 13.9a Monopolistic Competition Among Airlines
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Figure 13.9b Monopolistic Competition Among Airlines
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Figure 13.10 Bertrand Equilibrium with Identical Products
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Figure 13.11 Bertrand Equilibrium with Differentiated Products
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Chapter 14 Strategy
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Table 14.1 Simultaneous Entry Game
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Solved Problem 14.1 (Page 483)
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Figure 14.1 Whether an Incumbent Pays to Prevent Entry
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Figure 14.2 Noncredible Threat
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Figure 14.3 Game Trees for the Deterred Entry and Stackelberg Equilibria
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Table 14.2 Entrant’s Best Response and Profit
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Figure 14.4 Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibria
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Figure 14.5 Incumbent Commits to a Large Quantity to Deter Entry
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Figure 14.6 Incumbent Loss if it Deters Entry
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Solved Problem 14.3 (Page 496)
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Figure 14.7 Investment Game Tree
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Figure 14.8 Raising-Costs Game Tree
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Application (Page 503) Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence
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Figure 14.9 Advertising
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Figure 14.10 Shifts in the Marginal Benefit of Advertising
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Table 14.3 Advertising Game
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Cross-Chapter Analysis (Page 515) Magazine Subscriptions
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