1. Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik M.P. Theelen Robert Böhm RWTH Aachen University Ryan O. Murphy Kurt A. Ackermann ETH Zurich 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas, 2015

2. Background Real-world social dilemmas often have negative outcomes. Böhm & Theelen (submitted)  Repeated PGG, positive vs. negative outcomes  More cooperation when there were negative outcomes Murphy & Ackermann (submitted) Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 2 Social Preferences Beliefs -About other’s cooperative behavior -About other’s social preferences Cooperative Behavior

3. Research Questions Does outcome valence lead to differences in cooperation, SVO and beliefs? Do personality characteristics explain possible shifts in cooperation, SVO and beliefs between positive and negative outcome domains?  Honesty-Humility, HEXACO (Lee & Ashton, 2004; Ashton & Lee, 2009)  Loss-Aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 3

4. Design & Experimental sequence Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 4 Positive OutcomeNegative Outcome Personality Characteristics SVO SVO Beliefs Cooperation & Beliefs SVO SVO Beliefs Cooperation & Beliefs Honesty-Humility Loss-Aversion 96 students (45 women, age = 22.94) Within-subject (counterbalanced) Cooperation, SVO and beliefs measures were incentivized

5. SVO measures Slider Measure (Murphy, Ackermann & Handgraaf, 2011) Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 5 SVO Positive

6. SVO measures Slider Measure (Murphy, Ackermann & Handgraaf, 2011) Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 6 SVO Positive SVO Negative

7. One-Shot Public Good Game Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 7 Positive OutcomeNegative Outcome Endowment per round20 Public account0-240 MPCR0.5 Payoff range in tokens 10 / 50-50 / -10 Group Size 4 Exchange rate100 tokens = 1,50 euro

8. Personality Characteristics Honesty-Humility (HEXACO)  Example: »I wouldn’t pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me. »5-point Likert scale Loss Aversion  Example Item 1 o Nothing happens (Status Quo) o 50% chance to win 100 Euro and 50% chance to lose 100 euro Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 8 Succeeding items increased by 20

9. Does outcome valence lead to differences in cooperation, SVO and beliefs? Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 9

10. Descriptives Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 10 Mean (SD) SVO 29.93 (12.55)29.26 (12.34) SVO Beliefs 29.93 (10.72)27.6 (10.06) Cooperation 7.09 (6.05)7.66 (6.23) Cooperation Beliefs 8.1 (4.6)8.63 (4.67)

11. Cooperation beliefs pos – neg Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 11 Cooperation Beliefs Positive Cooperation Beliefs Negative

12. Do personality characteristics explain possible shifts in Cooperation, SVO and Beliefs between positive and negative outcome domains? Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 12

13. Cooperation Belief diff – Cooperation diff Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 13 Difference score = negative outcome – positive outcome Cooperation Belief Difference Cooperation Difference

14. Indirect Effect Honesty-Humility Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 14 Honesty- Humility Cooperation beliefs difference Cooperation difference Indirect effect b = 0.128, BCa 95% CI [0.038,0.244] k 2 = 0.138, BCa 95% CI [0.039,0.270] + +

15. Indirect Effect Loss Aversion Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 15 Loss Aversion Cooperation beliefs difference Cooperation difference Indirect effect b = 0.105, BCa 95% CI [-0.004, 0.267] k 2 = 0.111, BCa 95% CI [0.009, 0.288] + +

16. Conclusion Considerable amount of variance between positive and negative outcome measures Shifts in cooperation beliefs explain shifts in cooperation. Honesty-Humility and Loss-Aversion drives these differences in beliefs. Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 16

17. Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 17 Maik Theelen RWTH Aachen University Aachen, Germany maik.theelen@rwth-aachen.de Thank you for your attention!

18. Design 96 students (45 women, age = 22.94) Within-subject design 4 sessions (counterbalanced) Written instruction (envelopes) Slider measure and PGG incentivized Duration: 1:15 (including payment) Average earning: € 11.10 Social preferences, beliefs, and cooperation in games with positive and negative outcome valence Maik Theelen | 16th International Conference on Social Dilemmas | 23.06.2015 18