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2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security A Modeling Framework for Evaluating Effectiveness of Smart-Infrastructure Crises.

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Presentation on theme: "2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security A Modeling Framework for Evaluating Effectiveness of Smart-Infrastructure Crises."— Presentation transcript:

1 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security A Modeling Framework for Evaluating Effectiveness of Smart-Infrastructure Crises Management Systems Tridib Mukherjee and Sandeep K. S. Gupta Impact Lab (http://impact.asu.edu)http://impact.asu.edu School of Computing & Informatics Arizona State University sandeep.gupta@asu.edu

2 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Outline Motivation. Smart-Infrastructure Crises Management. Criticality Response Modeling (CRM) framework to evaluate crises response for smart-infrastructure. Application of CRM to fire emergencies in offshore Oil & Gas Production Platforms (OGPP). Simulation based verification of the framework. Conclusions & Future Work.

3 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Goals of Homeland Security Department of Homeland Security (DHS) missions include –Prevention of terrorist attacks within the US. –Reduction of vulnerability to terrorism. –Minimizing the damage from potential attacks and natural disasters. –In summary: be prepared for potential national crises and planning proper responses. DHS combines 22 federal agencies into four policy directorates –Border and Transportation Security. –Emergency Preparedness and Response. –Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. –Science and Technology.

4 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Importance of crises response and preparedness to DHS In 2004, over $4 billion of Homeland Security Grants allocated for assistance to the first responders. In 2005, $7.4 billion fund budgeted for Emergency Preparedness and Response (around 20% of the total budget). –over $3.5 billion (50%) budgeted for assistance to first responders. Since March 1, 2003, approximately $8 billion awarded to state, tribal and local governments to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism and all hazards.

5 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security What are Crises? Massive (cascading) catastrophic events leading to loss of lives/property –natural disasters – hurricanes (e.g. Katrina), earthquakes. –man-made disasters – terrorist attacks (9/11). –other disasters – fire in building, leakage in nuclear plant.

6 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Management of Crises Systematic attempt to prepare, avoid and/or respond to crises Four operational phases –Response – immediate actions to protect lives/property. –Recovery – efforts in the aftermath of crises. –Mitigation – lessen the impact of the crises. –Preparedness – effort to reduce impact in future. Courtesy: City of Crookston Motivation: evaluation of response processes essential for preparedness

7 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Smart-Infrastructure & Crises Response Integrated computing systems for physical processes (including crises response). Operations in computing entities affect the physical world & vice versa. Courtesy: Vanderbilt University & Drexel University Requirements Autonomy – self healing, self configuring, self optimizing Validation – performance evaluation Problem: quantitative measures required to evaluate crises response processes to incorporate autonomy

8 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Crises Management – Fire in Smart-Building Crisis Response Recovery Preparedness Detect fire using information from sensors Causing Event Detection Notify 911 provide information to the first responders Analyze the Spatial Properties how to reach the source of fire; which exits are closest; is the closest exist free to get out; Determine the required actions instruct the inhabitants to go to nearest safe place; co-ordinate with the rescuers to evacuate. Trapped People & Rescuers Additional Events Detect trapped people Detection Evaluate Effectiveness of Response Process Learning Research Focus Mitigation

9 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Modeling Framework to Evaluate Crises Response Effectiveness

10 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Definitions & Concepts Critical events –Causes emergencies/crisis. –Leads to loss of lives/property. Criticality –Effects of critical events on the smart-infrastructure. –Critical State – state of the system under criticality. –Window-of-opportunity (W) – temporal constraint for criticality. Manageability – effectiveness of the criticality response actions in minimizing the disasters. Critical Event Timely Criticality Response within window-of-opportunity Mismanagement of any criticality NORMAL STATE CRITICAL STATE DISASTER (loss of lives/property)

11 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Zoom into Critical State. –System in different sub-state for different criticalities. –Hierarchical organization of sub-states. Criticality Link (CL) – takes the system down the hierarchy –associates with probability of criticality occurrence. Mitigative Link (ML) – takes the system up the hierarchy –associates with 1.response action. 2.probability of success. 3.time to take action. State Based Stochastic Model for Criticality Response NORMAL STATE CRITICAL STATE Mitigative Link (ML) Criticality Link (CL)

12 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Manageability in terms of Q- value or Qualifiedness of actions –probability of reaching normal state based on 1.Probabilities of MLs. 2.Probabilities of CLs at intermidiate states. 3.Conformity to timing requirements. State Based Stochastic Model for Criticality Response NORMAL STATE CRITICAL STATE Mitigative Link (ML) Criticality Link (CL) Q-value is a quantitative measure to evaluate crises response. Goal: develop enabling framework to apply Q-value metric.

13 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Crisis Response Recovery Preparedness Mitigation Identify the critical events Determine the Window-of-opportunity Determine the possible occurrences of multiple criticalities Determine the states & transition probabilities Apply the Stochastic Model Evaluate the Q-value of Criticality Response Process CRM Framework Evaluate Effectiveness of Response Process Criticality Response Modeling (CRM) Framework Learning

14 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Application of CRM

15 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Fire Emergencies in offshore Oil & Gas Production Platforms (OGPP) – example process flow* * D. G. DiMattia, F. I. Khan, and P. R. Amyotte, “Determination of human error probabilities for offshore platform musters,” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, vol. 18, pp. 488–501, 2005.

16 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security CRM for fire emergencies in OGPP – Identify Criticalities criticality 1 (c1) criticality 2 (c2) criticality 3 (c3) criticality 4 (c4) Identify the decision boxes of the process flow as criticalities.

17 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security CRM for fire emergencies in OGPP – Identify Response Actions Identify the appropriate decision branches of the process flow as response actions. Response to c1 c1 c2 c3 c4 Response to c3, c4 Response to c2

18 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security CRM for fire emergencies in OGPP – Identify States and Determine Window-of-opportunity Fire Alarm Fire Alarm & Imminent Danger Fire Alarm & Non-tenable Path Fire Alarm & Assistance Required Fire Alarm & Non-tenable Path & Assistance Required Fire Alarm & Imminent Danger & Assistance Required Fire Alarm & Assistance Required & Non-tenable Path Criticalities 1. c1 – Fire Alarm. 2. c2 – Imminent danger e.g. health hazards. 3. c3 – Assistance required to others e.g. trapped personnel. 4. c4 – Evacuation path not tenable. Window-of- opportunity  survival time under asphyxiation.

19 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security CRM for fire emergencies in OGPP – Determine State Transition Probabilities Fire Alarm Fire Alarm & Imminent Danger Fire Alarm & Non-tenable Path Fire Alarm & Assistance Required Fire Alarm & Non-tenable Path & Assistance Required Fire Alarm & Imminent Danger & Assistance Required Fire Alarm & Assistance Required & Non-tenable Path State transition probabilities derived from established probability distribution in [1]. [1] D. G. DiMattia, F. I. Khan, and P. R. Amyotte, “Determination of human error probabilities for offshore platform musters,” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, vol. 18, pp. 488– 501, 2005. 0.1634 0.284877 0.40365 0.1755 0.1634 0.2965 0.4897 0.5862 0.5717 0.2649 0.481 0.1977 0.1892 0. 2094 0.41861 0.3348 0.4138

20 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Response Action Selection Policies –Greedy – response actions corresponding to ML with maximum probability Oblivious of subsequent criticalities. –Mitigative Action based Criticality Management (MACM) – response actions corresponding to MLs with maximum Q-values Not oblivious of subsequent criticalities. Simulation Goal –Compare different response action selection policies. –Evaluate impact of timing factors to manageability of criticality response Criticality detection delay. Response action actuation delay. –Verifies applicability of Q-value as manageability metric. Simulation Study

21 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Greedy and MACM action selection Comparison Low manageability for Greedy response action selection (sec) (Q-value) (MACM) Zero manageability for high detection delay Low manageability for increase in number of simultaneous criticalities

22 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Effect of Actuation and Detection Delay for two simultaneous criticalities Low manageability for high action time (sec) (Q-value) Low manageability for high action time

23 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Effect of Actuation and Detection Delay for three simultaneous criticalities Low manageability for increase in number of simultaneous criticalities (sec) (Q-value)

24 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Conclusions CRM framework developed for evaluating effectiveness of crises response processes. CRM applied to real crisis situation – fire emergencies in Oil & Gas Production Platforms. CRM enables –Q-value based quantitative evaluation of crises response. –automated learning from the outcome. –steeper learning curve – improved preparedness for crises response.

25 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Future Work Q-value calculation computationally expensive –good metric for evaluation. –bad for on-line planning. Probabilistic planning to select response actions based on the stochastic model. –determine optimal response selection policy. –computation complexity within temporal requirements. Develop simulation tools and visualization of the planned actions and their effects –for use by the disaster manager.

26 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Questions ?? Impact Lab (http://impact.asu.edu)http://impact.asu.edu Creating Humane Technologies for Ever-Changing World

27 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Additional Slides

28 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Effectiveness Evaluation for the Response Actions Generally in terms of cumbersome documents –Reports / recommendations –Qualitative & subjective –Inadequate for smart-infrastructure Requires quantitative evaluation Objective comparison between different response actions for steeper learning curve Evaluate impact of different parameters to the effectiveness of criticality response Quantitative Evaluation –What are the evaluation criteria & metrics? Theoretical Foundation Established in our previous work – crises characterized as criticalities. –How to perform evaluation for any crises response process? Research Goal: Develop generic evaluation framework for crisis response. Contributions –Criticality Response Modeling (CRM) Framework –Application of CRM for fire emergencies in offshore Oil & Gas Production Platforms (OGPP) –Simulation based evaluation of CRM over OGPP

29 2008 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security Manageability as Q-value n NORMAL STATE i x p x,i Manageability from any arbitrary critical state x –i an immediate upstream state. Q x,i,n = p x,i P i,n if W met = 0 if W NOT met P i,n = 1if i = n = (1 -  p i,j )  p i,k P k,n +  p i,j P j,n if i  n & W met = 0 if W NOT met Probability of a criticality at state i Probability of reaching normal state if NO additional criticality occurs at state i Probability of reaching normal state if ANY additional criticality occurs at state i Probability of reaching the normal state from state i (i,j)  CL(i)(i,k)  ML(i) (i,j)  CL(i)


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