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Published byDaniel Melton Modified over 9 years ago
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Hsien-hsing Liao Department of Finance National Taiwan University
Risk Management of Financial Institutions after the Financial Tsunami---Current Reactions Hsien-hsing Liao Department of Finance National Taiwan University
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Contents The financial failure 2007-? Basel III
Some points from “NYU Stern Working Group on Financial Reform”
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Understanding financial failure (G20, June 2010, Toronto )
Originate-to-distribute model: complex derivatives, but simple maturity mismatches Leverage and deleveraging cycle (Minsky-moment) Contagion cycle: financial real political Contagion: liquidity solvency Amplifiers Endogenous risk (behavioural) Counterparty risks Off-balance sheet, contingent lines - paradox of trust Excess reliance on ‘wholesale’ finance
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Broad principles underlying reform and regulatory change (G20, June 2010, Toronto )
Undercapitalized financial system Limits of micro-prudential (individual) rationality in regulation, supervision Limit size, complexity, in some cases interconnectivity of financial institutions. Risk allocation Ex-ante incentives (bail-in) vs. ex-post (bail-out, levy, taxes) Continuous markets (risk pricing, market clearing, basic transformation functions – ‘market-maker of last resort’)
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Summary: status of core issues
High conceptual clarity High/reasonable prospect (with modifications) High level consensus Capital adequacy; capital standards ; trading book changes; leverage ratios; liquidity ratios; countercyclical buffers Reasonable conceptual clarity Reasonable prospect (in some jurisdictions more than others) Some consensus Charges on SIFI; other macro-prudential systemic risk measures – FAT, FSC (IMF); Financial Crisis Responsibility (FCR) fee (Obama-TARP levy 0.15% of LFI liabilities); market stabilization fund (Germany, US); bonus/payroll taxes (UK, France) Resolution plans –living wills; Volcker-rule Basic concept, low clarity Uncertain prospects No consensus Cross-border resolution regime- its link with national measures (punitive charges, stability funds); bank-tax/levy; FTT/CTT
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Basel III The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision reached board “Basel III” agreement on 12 Sep. 2010 “Basel III” tightens the definition of regulatory capital; increases the min. requirement of Tier 1 Capital; establishes conservation / countercyclical capital buffers; introduces a leverage ratio; a new liquidity coverage ratio and a net stable funding ratio To be phased-in between 1 Jan and 1 Jan. 2019
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Basel III Proposed Capital Reforms
Quality, consistency & transparency of the capital base. Enhance risk coverage. Introduce a leverage ratio. Deal with Pro-cyclicality. Address systemic risk & interconnectedness.
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NYU Stern Working Group on Financial Reform
Financial Architecture If the financial system continues to be dominated by institutions with high levels of systemic risk: The creation of a new systemic risk regulator is necessary This new regulator would supervise the growing cohort of financial conglomerates institutions are encouraged to follow more specialized business strategies.
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Systematic Risk Measuring Systemic Risk Managing Systemic Risk
Taxing Too-Big-to-Fail Institutions Capital and Liquidity Requirements Is Breaking Up the Big Financial Companies a Good Idea? Size or activities Contingent Capital Financial Institutions Subject to the Bankruptcy Code
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Markets and Institutions
Securtization reforms Securitization created serious systemic problems that played a major role in the financial crisis. Transparency More Regulations vs. Cost Efficiency Credit Agencies central players in the subprime residential mortgage crisis
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